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Summary: Kant and the unity of reason 
 
The achievement of Immanuel Kant lies in demonstrating the law-giving power of the human 
intellect in the metaphysical basis of human cognition and in defence of human freedom. The 
power of reason was his response to the mechanical view of nature and scepticism in morals, 
aesthetics and religion. While reason extended over theory and practice, it was, he insisted, one 
reason: a unity. I advocate the unity of reason as key to understanding Kant’s philosophical 
project. Given his huge output, this is an inevitably incomplete ambition. After an introductory 
chapter (ch1), comes an explication of the key role of the maxim (ch2) followed by  proposing a 
three-fold understanding of reason itself (ch3) with its ideas and postulates (ch4). These extend 
our theoretical and practical knowledge in reason’s differing interests (ch5), albeit with 
conceptual difficulties in motivation and respect (ch6). Despite different faculties, theoretical 
and practical reason cannot conflict for there are not two reasons. One must have primacy which 
is shown to be the practical (ch7). The latter doctrine has implications for Kant’s rational 
theology and his broader world view. Morality’s supreme principle, a product of universalised 
reason, highlights the destiny of humankind and leads to a moral faith unique to humans. By 
virtue of reason, we have the will to realise our final end. The justification of reason’s unity 
(ch8) leads to the regulative idea of a highest intelligence as a heuristic. Kant’s moral 
philosophy culminates in the concept of the highest good as the final end of human life (ch9). I 
discuss its secular and religious interpretations before concluding that, for Kant, we belong not 
only in the world of nature but in a noumenal world in which God and a future life may be the 
hope of our finite reason. 
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Preface 
 
“Reason is the glory of human nature.” 
Isaac Watts (1674-1748)1 
“He mentioned how much effort it had cost him to know what it was that he really 
 wanted to establish when he first had the idea to write the Critique of Pure Reason.”  
Student of Kant, 17922 
 
 
What is the origin, development, substance and end (telos, Zweck) of reason in Kant’s 
thinking? This question animates Kant’s thought and his interpretation of reason. 
Reason and its interests will be the leitmotif running through this thesis. My claim is 
that pursuing the nature and interests of reason will lead through reason’s concepts of its 
ideas and postulates to its final end – indeed to the final end for humanity in a unity of 
theoretical and practical reason. In his life’s work, Kant demonstrated his own 
definition of enlightenment: “man's emergence from his self-imposed immaturity." Its 
motto: "Sapere Aude! Have courage to use your own understanding!"3 The light of 
reason would show the truth.4 
Even today, the city of Königsberg (now Kaliningrad)5 appears remote. That part of the 
European archipelago was sparsely populated, but the city had formerly been capital of 
Prussia and remained second in importance only to Berlin. Its port ensured access to the 
                                                          
1 Isaac Watts, ‘Introduction’, Logick 1724.  Quoted in: Roy Porter, Enlightenment (London: Penguin 
Books, 2001), p.48. 
2 Immanuel Kant, ‘Logic Dohna-Wundlacken,’ in Michael Young (ed.), Lectures on Logic, (Cambridge: 
CUP, 1992)  24:783 
3 Immanuel Kant, ‘An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment? (1784)’, in Ted Humphrey 
(transl) Perpetual Peace and other essays. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1983)  8.35 
4 One contrasts the historian, Eric Hobsbawn’s remark that enlightenment could be "dismissed as 
anything from the superficial and intellectually naive to a conspiracy of dead white men in periwigs 
providing an intellectual foundation for Western imperialism." (On History London: New Press. 1997 
p.254). 
5 Edward IJ Saunders, ‘Imagining Königsberg 1945-2010.’ PhD dissertation, Cambridge 2012. 
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wider world and there was sufficient traffic between German principalities to enable 
access to the main authors of the day. 
Shortly before his Enlightenment essay, Kant had published his Prolegomena to Any 
Future Metaphysics. Although he there acknowledged both Locke and Leibniz - and the 
lesser work of Reid, Oswald, Beattie and Priestley - it was David Hume that he said, 
"first interrupted my dogmatic slumber and gave a completely different direction to my 
researches in the field of speculative philosophy."6 Hume's scepticism as to the 
possibility of metaphysics, to the concept of causation and to an objective morality, led 
to Kant's critical philosophy, beginning with the Critique of Pure Reason in 1781 and 
ending in 1797-8 with the Metaphysics of Morals, the 1798 Anthropology from a 
practical point of view and shorter, unfinished writings, as he descended into the 
darkness of what was probably Alzheimer's disease. 
In this thesis, I will examine some of the key ideas in Kant's philosophy, focussing on 
reason’s unity, in the belief that Kant's practical reason remains alive today, relevant 
both to public policy and individuals in 21st century society. Despite its difficulties and 
obscurities,7 those who engage with his thought will find it richly rewarding. 
 
 
                                                          
6 Prol 4:260 
7 A frequent sort of accusation made against Kant. See ch3.2. Probably initially amplified by conventions 
of late 18th century writing, new uses of familiar words and the challenges of a lengthy and radical 
treatise. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
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Kant’s status in philosophy was established in his lifetime, both in the German lands 
and internationally. The beginnings of German idealism and of what would be known as 
post-Kantianism were recognisable well before his death in 1804. Editions of his works 
were translated into English before 1800. Although his reputation has subsequently 
undergone some vicissitudes, the importance of his thinking to western philosophy has 
never been doubted. Nevertheless those approaching his philosophy for the first time are 
often surprised by the sheer size and breadth of his writings. In both his pre-Critical and 
post-Critical periods, he addresses issues in natural sciences, morality, metaphysics, 
logic, epistemology, education, politics, anthropology, history, aesthetics, human 
destiny, theology and religion. In many of these fields the study of his writings remains 
of huge value today: for example, the opinions of a Kantian scholar like Onora O’Neill.   
In this thesis, I have focused on his most important concept: that of reason. This is 
explicitly emphasised in his essay on enlightenment8 but is a central idea in all three 
Critiques, as well as shorter treatises such as the Prolegomena, the Religion within the 
Boundaries of Mere Reason and others. Faced with this huge corpus, scholarly 
endeavour is never ending. On the one hand, there is specialist emphasis on his 
philosophical relevance to physical sciences, to aesthetics, to ethics, or to arcane 
disputes in metaphysics; but on the other hand, there is a need for a broader exegetical 
approach to the literature. To use a metaphor, we need general practitioners as well as 
consultant electrophysiologists. The idea of reason permeates Kant and its unity is a 
theme that recurs across his writings from some of the earliest in the pre-critical period 
                                                          
8 Immanuel Kant. An answer to the Question:-What is Enlightenment? (1784), Transl Ted Humphrey, 
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, (1982). 
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to the latest, even to the Opus Postumum.9 The publication of the comprehensive 
English translation by Cambridge University Press has made this a good time to analyse 
the Kantian corpus as a whole, identifying its fundamental philosophy and illustrating 
its importance with some specific current issues in Kant scholarship. 
 From the interplay of exegesis and interpretation, new insights emerge – as with other 
great works such as Shakespeare or the Bible. For example, I will address the structure 
of Kant’s ethics and, in particular, the key role of the maxim, against which moral 
intentions can be assessed; I will offer some novel thoughts in Kant’s moral theology 
such as the role of grace or the deeply puzzling issues that arise in discussing the 
highest good, where even Kant confesses that its possibility “still remains an unsolved 
problem.”10 More than this, I suggest that the unity of reason can be interpreted as 
highlighting a unity in his entire corpus of writing.  
The distinction between Kant’s thinking and Kantian thinking is often unclear, the 
former as an exercise in history of philosophy, the latter in the contemporary relevance 
of Kant’s thought, to which has been added the insights of “Neo-Kantians.”11 An 
excellent example and contrast is provided by the Kantian scholar, Allen Wood, with 
his exposition of Kant’s moral philosophy in his Kant’s Ethical Thought12 and an 
exposition for today in Kantian Ethics.13 On specific issues, Kant’s views on race and 
sex, for example, are risible or abhorrent to modern thinkers. Today’s philosophers are 
not great systematisers but in this thesis I give an account of reason’s unity as the 
                                                          
9 Immanuel Kant. Opus Postumum. Cambridge: CUP, Transl Eckart Förster and Michael Rosen 
(1993) 
10 CPractR 5:112 
11 Frederick C Beiser. The Genesis of Neo-Kantianism (2014), Oxford: OUP 
12 Allen Wood. Kant’s Ethical Thought (1998), Cambridge: CUP 
13 Allen Wood. Kantian Ethics (2008), Cambridge: CUP 
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fundamental idea of Kant’s project, the key unifying factor in the construction of his 
system.  
Returning to the stirring sentences in the Prolegomena, Kant was awoken by Hume 
from his “dogmatic slumber.”14 His Critique of Pure Reason represents a response to 
the challenge of scepticism espoused by Hume, especially over causation, and a defence 
of metaphysics as set out by an earlier generation in rationalist and empiricist theoretical 
philosophy. That defence extended further to a defence of human freedom – and hence 
morality – in his moral and political philosophy. To these we can add both religion and 
aesthetics. It is true that Kant has little sympathy towards, shall we say, liturgical 
practice (of which he is scornful) or music (which he hardly mentions); but he still has a 
lot to say of more than historical relevance to religion and aesthetics. The influence of 
the pietism of his younger years seems to have contributed to a formidable 
understanding of Christian doctrine and, in part through his Anthropology, of other 
religious doctrine and practice.  
What is this unity of reason at which I renew discussion? It is the harmonisation of 
intellectual discourse in scientific understanding and morality: the suggestion that there 
is only one reason, united as it considers the questions of our knowledge and conduct. It 
culminates in the biggest ambition of all: to give an account of the destiny of mankind, a 
final telos to human life. Considering modern scientific knowledge of the universe, this 
is astonishingly ambitious. It poses Kant’s great question: what can we hope? This 
overall analysis of a systematic philosophy is offered without the claim to solve specific 
modern philosophical questions, but it should raise issues for contemporary readers. 
These will include whether he dispels the tensions between the moral, the scientific and 
                                                          
14 Prol 4:260 
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the theological; or adequately integrates the aesthetic. Inevitably this analysis will 
challenge interpretations based on details and not the whole. Without an emphasis on 
reason’s unity, perspectives on specific areas of Kant’s philosophy are likely to be 
distorted.  
At its conclusion, Kant’s enterprise in his moral (practical) philosophy is clear that 
practical reason has priority over theoretical (or speculative) reason. For that reason the 
present account starts (ch2) with an exposition of the maxim and its relationship to the 
supreme principle of practical reason, the categorical imperative.  
The maxim is a short pithy statement, a principle, a rule of conduct, under which an 
individual wills or acts. It is primarily a subjective expression of the reasons for my 
action. An objective maxim is universalisable and is a principle under which a rational 
agent would necessarily act. The choice of ends involves maxims of actions to achieve 
those ends. Kinds of actions, ends of action and incentives for action express our moral 
character. Kant offers a hierarchy of maxims, exemplifying the systematicity that will 
feature in the final arguments for reason’s systematicity and unity, linking the two ends 
of the thesis. The Categorical Imperative not only provides the test for maxims, but will 
be evident in later arguments for reason’s unity.  At the highest level, ‘Gesinnung’, the 
permanence of maxims and their pedagogical value are addressed. Principled action i.e. 
by maxims combining duty and moral worthiness, may beneficently extend beyond 
duty. Moral worth marks a unity of motive and maxim content. These early links to 
reason’s unity lead to the next chapter on reason itself.  
Acknowledging the challenge of definition in Kant’s writing, I attempt (ch3) to define 
reason itself. It is primarily a distinctive human faculty guarding against error and 
creating ideas that go beyond the empirical boundaries of our senses: what we can think 
6 
 
is further than we can know. Reason has theoretical and practical functions. The unity of 
these two faculties is introduced. Freedom is relevant to both in decision-making; it is in 
freedom that mankind will claim its destiny through reason’s unity. I emphasise the 
distinction of reason from the understanding and how reason must organise the rules of 
the understanding under unconditioned principles to enable cognition. Reason in its 
logical function infers, seeking to bring the highest unity possible to the manifold of the 
understanding. In its real use, cognitive illusions can be prevented as well as science 
advanced from its ideas. Ideas of reason can be organised into systems and eventually 
into the final unity to which this thesis leads. Kant believes this unity belongs to nature 
itself: and “here nature does not beg but commands.”15 Here I introduce freedom’s 
dependence on transcendental idealism with its crucial role for morality and reason’s 
causality. Reason’s ideas (ch4) seek the unconditioned, using regulative ideas of 
teleology. They guide us, for example, in proposing a highest intelligence with a role in 
maintaining the greatest systematic unity in the empirical use of our reason. The power 
of reflecting judgement provides a bridge (Übergang) between concepts of nature and 
concepts of freedom, from the purely theoretical to the purely practical, from lawfulness 
in accordance with the former to the final end in accordance with the latter. 
Postulates (ch4) refer to statements acting as premises, yet without grounding in 
evidence. Kant thinks them essential to the concepts of deity and immortality. All three 
postulates (freedom, God and the immortal soul) necessarily have a practical reference 
and give objective reality to the idea of theoretical reason in general.  
The differing interests of theoretical and practical reason are addressed in ch5, noting 
that interest signifies “an incentive of the will.” Interest is linked to pleasure in the 
                                                          
15 A653/B681 
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Metaphysics. A key distinction is that between judgements of beauty and moral 
judgements, the former devoid of interests contrasting with the essential presence of 
interests in the latter. ‘Interest’ as it applies to practical reason and to theoretical reason 
turns out to be a broad concept that links the beautiful and the moral in the third 
Critique.   
Earlier in his career Kant explored the role of moral feeling developed by the British 
‘sentimentalists’. I note the continued role for feeling (ch6) through the concept of 
‘respect.’  Motive must be interpreted as the application of the moral law, yet associated 
with ‘respect’ as ‘feeling.’ Terminology sheds some light on this, but (ch6) I justify the 
mechanism by which practical reason produces moral feeling, exploring the concepts of 
self-love and self- conceit. The apogee of this analysis is reached in the debate between 
intellectualists, basing motivation entirely on rational grounds, and affectivists, who 
believe that respect (as feeling) has a real force in moral motivation. Kant is aware of 
the challenge, given the space he devotes to it in the second Critique’s Analytic. But the 
interpretation is controversial and I have argued for a compromise position.  
The last three chapters bring these themes together. The primacy of practical reason 
(ch7) over theoretical reason reverses the priorities of Aristotle and emerges from a 
consideration of their interests. To avoid a permanent state of vacillation, one sort of 
reason must have primacy. The primacy doctrine, narrowly interpreted, is essential to 
justify the theological postulates and hence develop the highest good. Broadly the 
primacy doctrine concerns the unity, interest and teleology of reason as a whole, its 
status and meaning. It shows that what we do is more important than what we know. 
The intimate relationship between practical and theoretical reason leads to man’s 
destiny as the master of creation in the combination of his nobility and finitude, a moral 
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faith that replaces the unrealisable pursuit of knowledge- an ultimate end of the 
practical. His moral faith defuses tension with religion. 
From interpreting the primacy comes the exposition of how two sorts of reason with 
different interests can be united (ch8). This depends on the postulates, themselves 
theoretical propositions, but necessary for practical reason.  Theoretical reason has clear 
boundaries that cannot be ‘opened’ without ingress of wild ideas. Theoretical reason 
cannot deny propositions that it cannot decide upon but could accept propositions 
postulated by practical reason (God, immortality, freedom) in a practical sense. Moral 
reasoning is independent of empirical conditions and is a more powerful faculty. In 
short, we can use concepts of reason and assert objects for them which are beyond the 
sphere of knowledge marked off for theoretical reason.  
 
If the Categorical Imperative is the supreme principle of practical reason, then it should 
also be true that it is the supreme principle of all reason (unqualified). Reason does not 
proceed algorithmically but by judgements. There are communal, societal and political 
dimensions to these conclusions. Prioritising freedom is more important than 
prioritising welfare. In ch8 I note that finding “the unconditioned for conditioned 
cognitions of the understanding by which its unity will be completed”16 is the proper 
principle of reason in general. The key to unity is systematicity, a regulative idea from 
an all-sufficient necessary cause leading “inexorably to the purposive unity of all things 
and uniting practical with theoretical reason.”17 One ought to endlessly search for the 
fundamental power that demands systematic unity, under the guidance of a heuristic 
                                                          
16 CPR A309/B365 
17 CPR A815/B843 
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idea of a highest intelligence. I argue that the unity of reason is supported by a practical 
reading of the principle of reason as a categorical imperative. It is nature’s 
purposiveness, stemming from divine design that unites theoretical and practical reason. 
Although we cannot know whether a fundamental power exists to unify reason when we 
try systematically to unify the powers of theoretical and practical reason, we should 
seek it as if it exists because our reason needs it in order to be systematic and achieve a 
unity of cognition. 
The antinomy of practical reason leads to the concept of the highest good. The highest 
good demonstrates the unity of reason in combining the theoretical concept of happiness 
with the moral concept of virtue: a marriage of theoretical and practical components. 
Primacy of the practical supports the concept of immortality in which we can achieve 
virtue with proportionate happiness.  
Regulative ideals are essential to completeness and systematicity. Human reason only 
satisfies itself in a complete systematic unity of its cognitions. Experience will never 
attain a systematic unity of all the appearances of inner sense. By contrast, reason can 
conceive of “the concept of a simple self-sufficient intelligence.”  
Kant repeatedly identifies the end of humanity as the highest good: fittingly the concern 
of the last part (ch9) of this thesis. There are inevitably debates about attainability of a 
holy will and therefore whether, on the basis of ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, we are obliged to 
seek it. The concept raises questions about its transcendent (religious, other-worldly) or 
immanent (secular, phenomenal, this-worldly) interpretation, whether it applies to 
individuals (salvation) or to societies (social welfare). Here Kant often resorts to the 
“inscrutable” concerning God and immortality, beyond the possibilities of our 
experience. Receptivity is the key concept to the undeserved beneficence of God’s 
10 
 
grace, a concept ignored by many commentators. Grace imputes righteousness to us: 
through grace “what in our earthly life…is only ever a becoming should be reckoned to 
us as if we were already in full possession of it.”18 The hope of happiness is not a 
reward depending on God’s justice (- Kant is no Pelagian and brooks no heteronomy -) 
but aid given freely and inscrutably. The highest good is inseparably bound to the moral 
law. The thesis ends with hope: that our lives can be endowed by our unified reason 
with purpose and meaning. “Human reason defines for man a final end, a single highest 
purpose for his existence, an ideal inseparably related to his finite rationality itself.”19 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
18 Rel 6:75 
19 Allen Wood. Kant’s Moral Religion p.250 
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2.1 Introduction 
The development of Kant’s moral philosophy can be traced back through his ‘pre-
critical writings and through the work of many others, most notably the British 
‘sentimentalists’, (such as Francis Hutcheson, 1694-1746), Pietists, (such as Christian 
August Crusius, 1715-1775) and Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778). But most 
prominent among his predecessors, especially in the development of the maxim, a 
hallmark feature of his moral thinking, were figures in the pre-Kantian German 
enlightenment, such as Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716), Christian Wolff (1679-1754), 
Alexander Baumgarten (1714-1762) and his own teacher in Königsberg, Martin 
Knutzen (1713-1751). From these predecessors he constructed his ‘ethic of maxims.’20  
A consideration of Kant’s mature moral theory requires a more detailed exploration of 
the maxim: its meaning, its structure, and its role as relating to ends - and hence on the 
moral worth of the subject – and to actions. I suggest a hierarchy subsuming the more 
specific under less specific maxims, leading to broad notions of individuals’ values. Part 
of this hierarchy results from terminological inexactitude but I suggest that it is mainly a 
result of the specificity and level of intention with which the maxim is concerned. I 
conclude by considering the maxim in the widest context of ‘Gesinnung.’ 
2.2 Kant’s definitions of the maxim 
Given its featuring in all three Critiques, it is surprising that Kant’s definition of the 
maxim is not more explicit. In ordinary English usage,21  a maxim is “a short, pithy 
statement expressing a general truth or rule of conduct.” Synonymously, it could be an 
aphoristic expression of a rule. Here the term refers to moral maxims. Kant also refers 
                                                          
20 This expression was introduced to emphasise the central concept of the maxim by Otfried Höffe in 
Immanuel Kant, (Albany,New York: State University of New York Press, 1994), pp.145ff. 
21 Oxford English Dictionary 
14 
 
to logical maxims22 or maxims of reason,23 maxims of the aesthetic power of 
judgement,24 or maxims in relation to teleological judgements.25 I will not discuss these.  
The first definition occurs in the CPR Doctrine of Method.26 “Practical laws, insofar as 
they are at the same time subjective grounds of actions, i.e., subjective principles, are 
called maxims.” A maxim, then, is a subjective practical principle; but an agent can 
adopt an objectively valid law as a subjectively valid maxim. He emphasises their 
importance:  
“The judgement of morality concerning its purity and consequences takes place 
(in).... the observance of its laws in accordance with maxims. It is necessary that 
our entire course of life be subordinated to moral maxims; but it would at the 
same time be impossible for this to happen if reason did not connect with the 
moral law, which is a mere idea, an efficient cause which determines for the 
conduct in accord with this law an outcome precisely corresponding to our 
highest ends, whether in this or in another life.”27  
Maxims on this definition are laws under certain conditions but also (and always) 
principles. Those conditions are that they are also subjective. The assertion that practical 
laws can be maxims does not mean, of course, that something else could not be a 
maxim as well. So while practical laws are maxims (under the stated conditions), the 
implication is that a subjective principle could also be objective in being a law. But it 
does not validate the law. Laws have an objective character and apply to all rational 
                                                          
22 CPR A649/B677 
23 CPR A666/B694 (where maxim of reason is defined), A667/B696; CPJ 5:294, 5:348, 5:247, 5:456, 
5:411; Determination of the concept of a human race 8:96 
24 CPJ 5:182, 5:385-390, 5:398, 5:411 
25 CPJ 5:376, 5:379 
26 CPR A812/B840 
27 CPR A812/B840 
15 
 
beings; principles may be subjective and only apply to me. Maxims are always 
subjective (i.e. meaning ‘mine’), but sometimes may be objective too (i.e. valid for all 
rational beings). What may be subjective for me as an individual may be objective for 
me as part of a species of rational beings. In describing it as ‘subjective’, is meant that it 
is the maxim for my action. It is material insofar as it intends a particular end (that is, an 
a posteriori or empirical maxim): it is mine. Such a maxim is universalisable in the 
sense that it will or can (or, for consistency, should) be applied to different situations of 
a similar kind. But it is not universalisable in the sense that it is valid for all rational 
beings: it would lack the form of universality. That sort of maxim would be a priori 
only, lacking material properties and demonstrating only the form of its universality: 
valid without the qualification of an ‘if’. Most maxims are subjective only; and such a 
subjective maxim can be the principle of a wrong action because many of our actions 
result from self- love.  
In the Groundwork (1785), the emphasis is slightly different:  
“a maxim is the subjective principle of volition; the objective principle (i.e. that 
which would also serve subjectively as the practical principle for all rational 
beings if reason had complete control over the faculty of desire) is the practical 
law.”28  
Here the emphasis is on the maxim as a principle of volition, a relationship with the will 
in contrast with the earlier definition’s emphasis on the maxim as a ground of action. 
This definition also suggests that fully rational agents would act according to objective 
                                                          
28 G 4:402n 
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practical principles which could also be subjective, as in the definition from the first 
Critique above and that in the second Critique below.  
A third definition later in the Groundwork is superficially similar but appears to exclude 
regarding objective practical principles as maxims:29   
“a maxim is the subjective principle of acting, and must be distinguished from 
the objective principle, namely the practical law. The former contains the 
practical rule determined by reason conformably with30 the conditions of the 
subject (often his ignorance or also his inclinations), and therefore the principle 
in accordance with which the subject acts; but the law is the objective principle 
valid for every rational being, and the principle in accordance with which he 
ought to act, i.e., an imperative.”31  
The term “maxim” is reserved here for a type of practical principle that is subjective in a 
stronger sense in that it must accord with a particular condition of the subject (e.g.  
ignorance or inclination). The relationship of practical principle with conformity of the 
subject’s condition is closer or tighter than in previous definitions. In addition, it 
identifies an objective practical principle with an imperative. Imperatives or commands 
(Kant does not distinguish between these) are second order principles which dictate first 
order principles (maxims). We may command that a maxim is followed: it is an order. 
Categorical imperatives are counterparts of moral laws directed at agents who are 
tempted to follow impermissible subjective maxims of actions. It means that such a 
                                                          
29 Henry E Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, (Cambridge: CUP 1990), p.87. 
30 Abbott (transl TK Abbott, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics ), London: Longmans 
1946) translates this as “according to the conditions...” Paton (transl HJ Paton, The Moral Law London: 
Hutchinson 1948) and Guyer (transl P Guyer, Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals:a 
Reader’s Guide London: Continuum 2007) both translate as “in accordance with the conditions...”  Either 
of these seem clearer to me than the use of an adverb in Gregor’s translation as “conformably with the 
conditions...” in the Cambridge edition that I have used for consistency.  
31 G 4:421n 
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principle, an imperative, cannot serve as the maxim itself. Imperatives are the wrong 
logical type to be a maxim. It follows that this definition (at G 4:421n) demonstrates a 
genuine difference with the definition that preceded it. The maxim features in the 
universal law formula of the Categorical Imperative: “act only in accordance with that 
maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.”32 
Although all three version of the Categorical Imperative are “formulae of the same 
law”, it is the formula of universal law with its central feature of the maxim that Kant 
puts as the basis of moral appraisal.33 The Categorical Imperative tests whether an 
action is based on a universalisable principle and its moral status. 
Like the first definition in the first Critique, in that above from the Groundwork the 
maxim relates to intentional action. On a superficial reading, it also makes a clear 
distinction between a maxim’s subjective status and the contrasting practical law as if 
they are entirely separate. However further consideration fails to exclude the possibility 
of a maxim also acting as a practical law.  Indeed for a fully rational agent, a practical 
law would necessarily act as a (subjective) maxim, even though we can distinguish the 
two principles. Upon what other principle could a wholly rational agent act? But my 
making or selecting a practical law the maxim of my action does not validate that law as 
a maxim: my subjective maxim cannot validate a universal law. 
In the second Critique (1788), Kant tells us that  
“practical principles are propositions that contain a general determination of the 
will, having under it several practical rules. They are subjective, or maxims, 
when the condition is regarded by the subject as holding only for his will; but 
                                                          
32 G 4:421 
33 G 4: 436 
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they are objective, or practical laws, when the condition is cognized as objective, 
that is, as holding for the will of every rational being.”34 
The condition will be the matter of the maxim if subjective; and will be duty when 
objective. If the phrase “general determination of the will” means a lasting policy on 
which an agent acts, then perhaps both first and second order subjective principles can 
be thought as first order principles on which an agent acts. This definition therefore 
appears more in line with the first Groundwork definition discussed above. Later he 
clarifies: “maxims are indeed principles but not imperatives”; and also “imperatives 
therefore, hold objectively and are quite distinct from maxims, which are subjective 
principles.”35 Nevertheless the law/principle terminology recurs when he refers to a 
rational being who “is to think of his maxims as practical universal laws” when “he can 
think of them only as principles that contain the determining ground of the will not by 
their matter but only by their form.”36 Under the Table of the categories of freedom with 
respect to the concepts of the good and evil, Kant tabulates of subjective quantity “in 
accordance with maxims (intentions of the will of the individual).”37 A fully rational 
being will only consider action that accords with the moral law and is motivated by 
respect for that law. Such a being’s will is ‘holy’ and, as already noted, his maxims will 
be practical universal laws.  
In the Metaphysics of Morals (1797), Kant’s definition is essentially similar to those 
already stated but does not solve the question of terminological inexactitude:  
                                                          
34 CPractR 5:19 
35 CPractR 5:20 
36 CPractR 5:27 
37 CPractR 5:66 
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“A principle that makes certain actions duties is a practical law. A rule that the 
agent himself makes his principle on subjective grounds is called his maxim, 
hence different agents can have very different maxims with regard to the same 
law.....A maxim is a subjective principle of action , a principle which the subject 
himself makes his rule (how he wills to act)”38  
A Romantic Individualist would deny that there are any laws at all and all his principles 
would be (subjective) maxims. A principle that gets its validity from a subjective act of 
ours is always a maxim, never a law because it is only subjectively valid.39 A law has 
universal validity and all maxims are subject to objective criteria. If the maxim involves 
some inclination or empirical interest of the subject, its universality is limited to those 
sharing those conditions. Maxims thus have an intimate relationship with interests. It 
will be discussed later to what degree maxims can be viewed in a hierarchy that may 
accommodate these different emphases.  
Finally, Kant again defines the maxim in one of his late (1796) essays in writing that 
with regard to   
“the principle which may serve as the touchstone of all legitimacy, act on a 
maxim on which you can simultaneously will that it becomes universal law and 
gives it a meaning that limits it to empirical conditions.”40 
This adds nothing more to the definitions previously discussed, except in emphasising 
the limits of the maxim which are previously implicit in the term ‘practical’. 
                                                          
38 MM 6:225 
39 Allen Wood, Kantian Ethics (Cambridge: CUP, 2008), p.108. 
40 Immanuel Kant, ‘Towards perpetual peace (1795)’, in Mary Gregor (transl), Practical Philosophy, 
(Cambridge:CUP, 1996). 8:420 
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To summarise, a maxim: 
 is the principle under which an individual wills and acts. Since it is individual 
and belongs to the agent, it is subjective.  
 under which all rational beings could act is consistent with the moral law. Since 
it is universal, it is objective. The moral law is a principle under which all 
rational beings ought to act and requires that all other maxims they act under are 
universalisable.  
 may be a subjective principle of acting or of volition. (An action is what an 
agent does, for which rationality and intention apply; volition is the mental act 
of willing or an act of will preceding a physical movement.)  
Paton41 expresses the maxim elegantly “as a purely personal principle, subjective... as it 
is a principle on which a rational agent does act,...objective...on which every rational 
agent would necessarily act.”  
He highlights the distinction between the subjective maxim relating to what we actually 
do and the objective maxim, which states Kant, “we adopt as principles that contain the 
determining ground of the will not by their matter but only by their form”.42 The 
objective maxim remains whether I act on it or not. The subjective maxim may be good 
or bad, because I may act less than fully rationally; but the objective maxim must be 
good, for it applies to all rational beings: the principle according to which we ought to 
act.43  
                                                          
41 Herbert J Paton, The Moral Law: a study in Kant’s Moral Philosophy ( London: Hutchinson, 1948), 
p.20. 
42 CPractR 5:27 
43 Stefan Körner, Kant. (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1955), p.132. (also G 4:421) 
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2.3 Maxims of actions and maxims of ends 
Kant appears to distinguish maxims of actions and maxims of ends where he asks the 
question, "What is a duty of virtue?"44  In his early lectures on morality, Kant represents 
virtue as the greatest achievement of human reason. Virtue involves struggle, implying 
the possibility of failure. Thus we “can also ascribe ethics but not virtue (properly 
speaking) to the angels and to God, for in them there is assuredly holiness but not 
virtue.”45  
The passage46 that leads to his conclusion of maxims of actions and ends sees virtue as a 
strength that can overcome the natural inclinations that tempt us from our duty.47  A 
virtuous person has a good and strong will. It is more than self-constraint, for it is 
possible to overcome an inclination with another stronger inclination. Rather, virtue is 
"a self-constraint in accordance with a principle of inner freedom".48  That inner 
freedom describes what gives us choice between what we ought to do (our duty) and 
following our inclinations. It follows that virtue is a constraint "through the 
representation of one's duty in accordance with the moral law." Self-constraint is 
possible only by internal lawgiving for ethical duties, in contrast to (juridical) duties of 
right (ius). In the case of duties of right, one may be constrained by external forces, but 
this does not exclude being restrained by respect for the law alone. In that latter case, 
the action that results would be appropriately described as a virtuous action, even 
                                                          
44 MM 6:395 
45 ‘Herder’s notes’, in Lectures on Ethics. (Cambridge: CUP, 1997) 27:13 
46 MM 6:394-5 
47  Cf Guyer who offers two definitions as follows: 1. a particular form of moral excellence…any of 
certain moral qualities regarded as of particular worth or importance; and 2. conformity of life and 
conduct with moral principles; voluntary adherence to recognised laws or to standards of right conduct. 
In: Paul Guyer, ‘Virtues of Freedom: Selected Essays on Kant’. (Oxford: OUP, 2016), p.v 
48 MM 6:394 
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though being an action of right. From this it follows that a virtuous action may not 
always be a duty of virtue ("strictly speaking"). The distinction that Kant introduces at 
this point is that a duty of virtue is concerned with what is material in its maxim and not 
only with what is formal. The material is concerned with an end that is also a duty. An 
ethical obligation is wide because there may be numerous ends, because they are freely 
chosen by the moral agent, whereas obligations of (juridical) right are laid down by 
others. Thus  
"with respect to the end of actions that is also a duty, that is, what one ought to 
make one's end (what is material), there can be several virtues; and since 
obligation to the maxim of such an end is called a duty of virtue, there are many 
duties of virtue."49  
Fulfilling one’s duty is the act of a good will whose intentions are to follow the moral 
law and realise the ends that are implied or expressed by the maxim. This leads Kant to 
the "supreme principle of virtue: act in accordance with a maxim of ends that it can be a 
universal law for everyone to have."50  
A maxim of ends identifies the purpose of the maxim, the object to be achieved, but not 
how to achieve it. That object51 (end) must be a good one. By contrast, the maxim of 
actions specifies the way that the end is to be achieved. There may be several ways in 
which a maxim of ends could be achieved, so that several maxims of actions could 
                                                          
49 MM 6:395 
50 MM 6:395 
51 Lewis White Beck clarifies Kant’s meaning of the word ‘object’. “The word ‘object’ denotes two quite 
different things. It may mean an actual state of affairs, a physical thing and its psychological effects that 
can be brought into existence by action. The production of such an object requires empirical knowledge 
of its causes and skill in applying this knowledge. It is in this sense only that the word ‘object’ is to be 
used in analysing an empirical practical reason. But the word has another, quite unusual, meaning. It may 
refer to an internal setting of the will, to an act of decision itself without regard to the causality of will in 
bringing its object (in the first sense) into existence. This is the meaning that the word will have in the 
analysis of pure practical reason. (A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason 1960, p.92) 
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relate to one maxim of ends. For a rational being, all actions must be purposive. A 
purposeless action is unworthy of a rational being. It follows that all maxims of actions 
imply or express an end. Where the end is explicitly stated, the maxim may be termed a 
maxim of ends; and where it is only implied, it may be termed a maxim of action.52 In 
brief, all moral maxims have a purposive element, but this may be irrelevant in some 
contexts and therefore suppressed; in others, the purposive content is expressed and 
these would be maxims of ends. Most of Kant’s actual examples of maxims do not 
include an explicit account of the end of the action.53 (All of Kant’s examples of 
maxims contain descriptions of kinds of actions, but it is the choice of ends that 
determines the choice of actions, although several means or actions could of course be 
appropriate for a particular end.) 
Kant had already set this out in his Inquiry of 1764 where he writes that  
“...every ought expresses a necessity of the action and is capable of two 
meanings. To be specific: either I ought to do something (as a means) if I want 
something else (as an end), or I ought to do something else (as an end) and make 
it actual. The former may be called the necessity of the means and the latter the 
necessity of the ends.”54  
The ‘ought’ here expresses our obligations and it is the fulfilment of those obligations, 
with the actions described, that should be expressed in our maxims. 
                                                          
52 Onora O’Neill writes, “Following a usage Kant suggests but does not develop, I shall call maxims 
whose purposive component is suppressed maxims of action, and those whose purposive component is 
expressed...maxims of ends.” In: Acting on Principle (Cambridge: CUP, 1989), p.103. 
53 Nelson Potter, ‘Maxims in Kant’s Moral Philosophy’, in Faculty Publications. Department of 
Philosophy, (1994). http//digitalcommons.unl.edu/philosfacpub/13 Accessed 2/8/17. 
54 Immanuel Kant, ‘Inquiry concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and 
Morals’, in David Walford (transl),Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770, (Cambridge: CUP, 1992)  2:298 
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The difference between the doctrines of right and virtue clarifies this. In law (ius) an 
end is set for us externally. We must then work out how to realise those ends. Having 
identified the possible actions required, their maxims can be assessed and the action 
willed, based on those maxims. These would therefore be maxims of action. But “ethics 
takes the other way.”55 If we set ends for ourselves, we exhibit our freedom, but in 
doing so involve our inclinations. The maxim that describes such an end will be 
empirical. It cannot therefore be our duty:  
“if maxims were to be adopted on the basis of those ends (all of which are self-
seeking), one could not really speak of the concept of duty. Hence in ethics the 
concept of duty will lead to ends and will have to establish maxims with respect 
to ends we ought to set ourselves, grounding them in accordance with moral 
principles.”56 
Three different things are taken up into our maxim about which we can choose: our 
basic moral character, our basic ends of action and our actions themselves. To express 
this slightly differently, character, ends and the moral character of actions. Or, kinds of 
actions, ends of action and incentives for action as an expression of moral character.57 
Ends may be implied but will always be present. “The conformity of a maxim of an 
action with a law is the morality of the action.”58   
Kant only recognises two material ends that are our duty to promote: the happiness of 
others59 and to be deserving of happiness ourselves, that is, to seek our own perfection. 
The maxims for these ends will be, respectively, ‘the happiness of others is good’ and 
                                                          
55 MM 6:382 
56 MM 6:382 
57 Potter ‘Maxims in Kant’s Moral Philosophy’, pp.64-5. 
58 MM 6: 225 
59 MM 6: 393; and 385 
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‘my self-perfection is good.’ Maxims of action will then be needed in order to realise 
these maxims of ends. To do so will require secondary ancillary maxims of ends. For 
example, promoting the happiness of others may involve learning the language of those 
around me, leading to a maxim of ‘learning the language of my neighbours improves 
the possibility of promoting others’ happiness.’ That will then require maxims of action: 
‘doing a weekly language class is good’ or ‘enrolling in a distance learning programme 
is good’. How I achieve my stated moral end will depend on empirical factors: what 
suits my learning style, available local facilities and so on. This demonstrates a 
hierarchy in maxims: the two material maxims of ends that are our duty, with subsidiary 
maxims of ends, then maxims of actions that realise them in practice. Because man has 
a moral predisposition, rational man should adopt the moral law as a supreme maxim; 
but “he is, however also dependent on the incentives of his sensuous nature because of 
his equally innocent natural predisposition, and he incorporates them too into his 
maxim.”60 Thus he adopts both the moral law and his sensuous nature into his maxim. 
Kant then asks which of these two maxims is supreme; or as he puts it “which of the 
two incentives he makes the condition of the other….aware that they cannot remain on a 
par with each other.” Alas, man’s self-love is the incentive he often adopts: “There is in 
man a natural propensity to evil”.61  
This propensity is radical because it corrupts the ground of all maxims and is 
inextirpable. It is intrinsic to us. Extirpation could only happen through good maxims, 
but this is not possible if the “subjective supreme ground of all maxims is presupposed 
to be corrupted.” Nevertheless it must be possible, if not to extirpate this propensity, 
then to overcome it as free beings with choice. This reversal of the ethical order in and 
                                                          
60 Rel 6:36 
61 Rel 6:37 
26 
 
through his maxims does not exclude action being in conformity with the moral law. 
The “depravity” of human nature is not malicious or the incentives of its maxims 
diabolical. Rather we demonstrate a “perversity” of the heart. Reason can use, he writes, 
“the unity of maxims in general, which is characteristic of the moral law, to introduce 
into the incentives of inclination, under the name of happiness, a unity of maxims they 
cannot otherwise have.”62  Empirical factors can help – which is good. Truthfulness is 
an example, the adoption of which spares us being ensnared in the “serpentine coils” of 
our lies. Part of the importance of the analysis of maxims of ends and of actions is the 
key it provides to the central role of maxims in Kant’s ethical theory. Good indwells 
with evil in man’s nature. “We call a man evil not because he performs actions that are 
evil (contrary to law) but because these are so constituted that they allow the inference 
of evil maxims in him.”63 Our propensity to evil results in evil deeds from our weakness 
in complying with good maxims (“frailty”, akrasia); from the impurity of our reasoning 
in which the moral law alone is not a sufficient incentive; and from choosing maxims 
that subordinate the incentives of the moral law to others (depravity, corruption or 
perversity of the human heart).64  
The distinction that Kant makes between duties of narrow and of wide obligation also 
points up the distinction between maxims of actions and of ends. Some obligations may 
be broad:  an obligation to assist the needy, for example, does not define who are “the 
needy”, what assistance should be rendered, how, when etc. A maxim of ends can 
define that we should assist, but it will require maxims of action to set out for us, 
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individually (that is, subjectively) what we should do. I will set aside the overlap 
between duties that are of wide obligation, imperfect and of virtue. Kant tells us that  
“a wide duty is not to be taken as permission to make exceptions to the maxim 
of actions but only as permission to limit one maxim of duty by another65 (e.g. 
love of one’s neighbour in general by love of one’s parents)…the wider the 
duty, therefore, the more imperfect is it man’s obligation to action.” 
In determining how there can be a law for the maxims of actions, the concept of an end 
that is also a duty is required. Law and the concept of duty are bound together (“in 
immediate relation”), as the Categorical Imperative demonstrates. In ethics we must 
think of this principle as the law of our own will (that is, as subjective maxims) but 
which could also be the will of others. For an action to be free, an agent must intend and 
choose an end. If there is an end that is also a duty, then maxims of actions are 
conditional on being possible to give universal law.66 The wilfulness of an action is 
removed by a law, which distinguishes it from a recommendation, where knowing the 
means to an end is all that is needed. 
There is a problem in deciding how to describe an act for a non-teleological theory, 
highlighted by part of Anscombe’s critique of Kant.67 Any act has an infinity of 
circumstances and of remote or improbable consequences; acts are composite but 
without all falling under moral principles. One has only to consider the debates around 
informed consent to medical treatment to appreciate the importance of judgements 
involved. We can conceive of more benign examples: placing a bet on the greyhounds 
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may be aimed at winning money, but that isn’t what I am doing in placing the bet. In 
fact, winning money is not the most likely outcome. An intentional description of the 
act would therefore be wrong. The intention with which the agent acts is not included in 
the intentional descriptions of the act.68  Various components of an act may be relevant 
for moral assessment and we may be unable to isolate one act description. The context 
of the act may be important and the use of language may colour judgement. ‘Assist 
dying’ has a different ambience from ‘killing.’ There is no rigid rule for deciding the 
maxim’s ‘relevant act description’ in assessing right action. Testing a maxim against the 
Formula of Universal Law version of the Categorical Imperative raises a problem 
without an apparent solution.  Our actions can be described in many ways, at various 
levels of specificity, varying generality, with content that may describe intention and 
purpose variably and trying to determine whether we are searching for “the” maxim or 
the relevant one or what should be included. It is unlikely that any proposal will identify 
just the right maxim to test for each and every course of action; and troublesome 
conflicts of duties easily arise. There is no easy solution to determining what constitutes 
a relevant description of a maxim. No description seems likely to describe the right 
maxim for every course of action we might consider. Some act descriptions couldn’t be 
willed or conceived as universal law, yet refer to morally neutral actions (e.g. “playing 
chess with a better player”). Contrariwise, some maxims could be conceived or 
universalised despite being morally wrong (e.g. “lying to redheads”). A second problem 
is that of an inability to resolve conflicts of duties, especially narrow, strict or perfect 
duties. Should I repay money that I owe when I know the person who loaned the money 
will use it to seriously harm another person? Kant addresses conflicts of duty by 
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initially suggesting that since duty and obligation are concepts that express the objective 
practical necessity of certain actions and since two opposing rules cannot be necessary 
at the same time, then “a collision of duties and obligations is inconceivable.”69 Having 
articulated that apparently dismissive view, he then concedes that a subject may have, 
by a self-prescribed rule (which I interpret as a maxim), two grounds of obligation, 
neither of which is sufficient to put him under obligation and “the stronger ground of 
obligation prevails.” This fails to establish what should be done if the grounds of 
obligation are deemed equal, or if the obligating grounds are different, or what “moral 
residue” is left over by following one course (that is, are we also obliged to offer 
restitution for the dutiful action not discharged?). Wood raises the possibility that 
Kantian ethics can allow some limited truth to those doctrines that fall under the name 
of “cultural relativism”, citing Fichte’s advocacy of a system of ethical duties that 
comes to be defined by an account of a rational social order.70  But Kantian ethics is not 
the same as Kant’s ethics and I will explore Fichte no further. Kant’s guidance on 
conflicts fails to give an adequate account of exactly how “grounds of obligation” might 
be best construed nor how to measure them in order to make comparisons. Complex 
cases lack simple solutions.  
Galvin71 identifies a third problem in testing contradiction in the will. The Contradiction 
in the Will test means that nobody could will not to be open to the beneficence of others 
if needed or will to not develop one’s talents. This creates a contradiction in willing that 
leads to rejection of the maxim by the Categorical Imperative’s formula of universal 
law. The formula of universal law cannot test a maxim according to whether it would 
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make us happy or is agreeable to us. But a very narrow criterion for rational willing in 
terms of consistency or coherence is unlikely to generate contradictions for all but a few 
of the most egregiously “unwillable” maxims. So, what could be rationally willed? One 
approach might be to test the maxim against the formula of humanity as an end in itself 
or the formula of autonomy and the Realm of Ends. For example, could we will the 
maxim if it treated humanity or any person as an end and never as a means? Such a 
proposal would transgress Kant’s view that the different formulae of the Categorical 
Imperative are independent of each other and equivalent, but the coherence of the 
formula of universal law would be maintained. Given that the formula of universal law 
gives no practical laws but only a test for maxims, using the formula of autonomy -that 
is the author of objective practical laws- makes good sense. In principle too, it might 
give a richer account of what we can rationally will, but I am unconvinced that this 
proposal from Galvin would work. Significantly, he provides no example. 
  
2.4 What are maxims for? 
In 2.3 above, having analysed what a maxim is and its relationship to practical laws, I 
now explore what it does: whether it only enables us to test the morality of our actions 
using the Categorical Imperative or whether it has other functions too, such as reflecting 
or determining our moral character and the goodness of our will. The Categorical 
Imperative itself does not tell us what actions to do; rather it is the maxim that is the 
Categorical Imperative’s object. 
A maxim's primary role is to provide a way of morally assessing actions: it contributes 
to a theory of proper deliberation and does so directly by posing the question whether 
31 
 
we can will it as universal law; and indirectly by the question whether the proposed 
action treats anyone as mere means72  
The degree to which one follows certain maxims cannot distinguish between virtue and 
vice.73 It is the relationship to the moral law that matters. In Aristotle’s moral 
philosophy, the optimal expression of what ought to be done lies between two 
contrasting qualities – in Kant’s own example, between prodigality and avarice. The 
amount to which one follows a maxim for either or both of these cannot define the right 
action. Kant expressly disagrees with Aristotle’s doctrine of virtue as a mean between 
two qualities.74 In Kant’s example, he states that if good management consists in a mean 
between prodigality and avarice then it cannot be achieved by diminishing prodigality 
by saving, on the one hand, or increasing spending by the miser, on the other. The two 
qualities both have their own maxims, which contradict the other. Avarice is 
distinguished from thrift, not by simply going farther, but because it has an “entirely 
different” maxim. Their opposed maxims distinguish miserliness and prodigality, not a 
matter of degree. 
“In the same way, the vice of prodigality is not to be sought in an excessive 
enjoyment of one’s means but in the bad maxim which makes the use of one’s 
means the sole end, without regard for preserving them.”75 
The Categorical Imperative is presented as the supreme moral principle, a law, valid for 
all rational beings. Superficially, it appears straightforward: it commands no particular 
deeds; rather it expresses “the conditions under which alone a principle can have the 
                                                          
72 Talbot Brewer. ‘Maxims and virtue’, Philosophical Review 111, no.4 (2002), pp.539-72. 
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character of a categorical demand.”76 It states: “act only in accordance with that maxim 
through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law”;77 or in its 
later formulation: “act only on that maxim that can also hold as a universal law.”78 The 
consequences of this are spelled out:  
“You must therefore first consider your actions in terms of their subjective 
principles; but you can know whether this principle also holds objectively only 
in this way: that when your reason subjects it to the test of conceiving yourself 
as also giving universal law through it, it qualifies for such a giving of universal 
law.”79  
The Categorical Imperative functions therefore as a test of maxims. It provides us with 
the supreme principle of the will telling us how to determine the maxims according to 
which we ought to act; the maxim is the principle on which we do act and whose 
validity is tested by the Imperative. On this basis, if we ask what maxims are for or ask 
what is their purpose, the answer is that they enable the morality of our actions to be 
determined. Since the good will and not the consequences of our actions determine the 
moral acceptability of any deed, maxims have often been construed as expressing 
something like intentions. The difference between mere behaviour and an action is that 
the latter proceeds from a maxim of the will. Thus, one commentator states,  
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“Maxims simply articulate an agent’s intentions or disposition, that is, the rules 
a person adopts and on which a person actually acts, unless, of course, that 
person is acting non-rationally, say, absent mindedly or while delirious.”80  
For another, they are the “deeper intentions of all our conscious actions.”81  And for 
another, “I concluded…that they (maxims) are best thought of as agents’ intentions”; 
and she continues,  
“In construing maxims as intentions I was saying nothing very new: the long 
tradition that reads Kant’s ethics as a ‘philosophy of the subject’ and the long 
running criticism that his ethics is too individualistic, both commonly construe 
maxims as intentions.”82  
It would be unfair not to add the subsequent gloss on this statement: that Kant uses 
‘maxim’ “to cover both agents’ intentions in acting and their intentions for the future, 
both their intentions to do specified acts and their intentions to pursue specified ends or 
objectives.” This has been challenged; and challenged in a way that brings back into 
focus the intellectual origins of Kant’s maxims, with which I began in ch2. Albrecht83 
has argued that Kant’s ethics of maxims should be understood less in relation to Wolff 
or Baumgarten, but to Rousseau. In Rousseau’s use, this term (from the French 
‘maxime’) is used to mean a relatively stable rule adopted for one’s own conduct. 
Albrecht argues from this that maxims in Kant are not principles on which we 
consciously base our conduct every day. Apart from anything else, just as we cannot 
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ever, “even by the most strenuous self-examination get entirely behind our covert 
incentives”,84 so too “we cannot observe maxims...even within ourselves.”85 Contrary to 
being part of our decision making about our daily conduct, says Albrecht, acting on 
maxims is rare:  
"To have a character signifies that property of the will by which the subject 
binds himself to definite practical principles that he has prescribed to himself 
irrevocably by his own reason. Although these principles may sometimes indeed 
be false and incorrect, nevertheless the formal element of the will in general, to 
act according to firm principles has something precious and admirable in it;  for 
it is also something rare.”86  
But firstly, the Rousseau link would be, at best, circumstantial evidence upon which to 
reinterpret an orthodox interpretation of the maxim. Secondly, such a reinterpretation in 
the face of the definitions of a maxim given by Kant in his critical and post- critical 
moral philosophy requires strong evidence. I do not believe that can be adduced. 
Albrecht also suggests that the maxim is understood differently in Kant’s 
anthropological writings. In the Bergk Menschenkunde lecture notes, he is said to have 
stated that  
“there are in fact human beings who in respect to their actions and their 
intentions are not determined at all, and who do not act according to any maxims 
at all, thus they also have no character.”87  
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Having a character is something that is developed over time, not every day,  
“like a kind of rebirth, a certain solemnity of making a vow to oneself….that 
which marks a resolution in the principles in the human being.”  
The young, who must develop character must therefore learn to act on their own 
maxims. Kant emphasises the importance of maxims to character: “A human being of 
character has maxims in all things, in friendship, action and religion.”88  Moreover,  
“a noble character is he who does something meritorious; all of his maxims are 
principles where the private good is placed after the common good….our moral 
doctrines spoil character in this way because they are all based on 
sentimentality. For we can do what is good from love or from duty. Duty has its 
definite principles but love has its allurement that we can seldom explain and 
which do not last.”89  
Bergk’s notes were published long before most others, reflecting both Bergk’s devotion 
to Kant’s thought and their perceived value. The quotations above are compatible with 
Kant’s thought elsewhere, but the emphasis on character fails to establish that the 
maxim should be reinterpreted in the way Albrecht suggests.  
Yet Albrecht's view emphasises the maxim rather more than most commentators. 
Maxims guide actions and that implies some intentional persistence: they should remain 
valid over a period of time. They are principles that we may wish to modify or to 
change but infrequently and in line with changing circumstances or fresh insights from 
rational reflection. The ethical demand of the Categorical Imperative validates the 
                                                          
88 LA 25:1170 
89 LA 25:1171 
36 
 
subjective maxim, through which the subject wills to act. That demand means that we 
ought to make maxims for ourselves: that is the implication of subjectivity coupled with 
the demand of the moral law. Maxims are not about the way we act, but about the ends 
of our actions in terms of which our maxim is grounded. We bind ourselves in making 
maxims: the moral law is something that we give universally - for all rational beings.90 
Maxims of greater generality are likely to change with slower frequency than those of 
greater specificity. Thus a maxim that ‘it is good that I increase my knowledge of 
Kant’s philosophy’ can subsume a maxim that ‘reading a chapter of Kant’s writing daily 
would be good.’ However, if my vision fails, the more specific maxim must change, 
while the broader one remains. Whether it is therefore rare to act on a maxim does 
depend on its specificity. If the highest level of maxim, the Gesinnung, represents moral 
character, then Albrecht is surely right to maintain that it changes rarely. It also suggests 
that we always act on some maxim, if we concede, firstly, that the maxim may be of 
wide specificity and, secondly, there are cases where it may be difficult to distinguish 
acting upon a maxim from behaviour that is almost automatic. They may become 
overtly conscious when we are asked to justify our actions91 – yet another example of 
what maxims do. 
In the second Critique’s definition, a maxim has under it “several practical rules”. What 
constitutes a “practical rule” is undefined and the distinction between such a rule and a 
maxim is not clear. All actions have maxims, yet not all actions have moral maxims: he 
actively condemns the pedant who would make the choice of fish or meat subject to 
morality.92 But practical rules would be as irrelevant here as maxims, if indeed we can 
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distinguish them. For it seems clear that practical rules in the sense of ‘how to do it’ 
may have moral consequences and hence indistinguishable from maxims. In summary 
then, Albrecht’s notion of the infrequent use of maxims and the emphasis on the 
‘higher’ level of the maxim makes good sense.  
In providing a subjective principle for action, the maxim offers a constructive step to 
objectively valid laws.93 Objectively valid laws enable the agent to determine his/her 
will. Any act of willing must be based in something concrete and maxims relate to the 
concrete, to the object of the action. All actions of a rational being are willed. 
 
2.5 The structure of maxims 
Maxims, besides a sufficient indication of what act the reasons call for94  have 
propositional form and structure which makes them apt for reasoning. The standards 
that they articulate can be used to shape action. This makes them useful for practical 
purposes.95 In structure a maxim is expressed by a quantifier (- such as ‘all’, ‘some’ etc) 
plus an agent description, a verb and an act description.96 For example: all adults should 
vote. Here ‘all’ is the quantifier; ‘adult’ is the agent description; ‘should’ is the verb; 
and ‘vote’ is the act description. The purpose here can be added: for example, “to 
change the government’ or ‘to demonstrate his civic duty’ and so on. This resembles 
Allison’s description:97 “when in S-type situations, do A-type acts”, where S-type 
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situations describes the circumstances and A-type acts the action. O’Neill suggests that 
a schematic structure could be: 
Any (all, none, some) ought to (may, deserves to, etc) do/omit-----if..... 
or it could be: 
I (he, X) ought to (may, deserves to , etc.) do/omit-----if..... 
where -----is an act description and ...... is an agent.  
The allocations of functions is similar: the act description (----) in the example is ‘vote’ 
and the agent description (.....) ‘if she is an adult’. 
The relationship between different practical principles and between principles and 
instantiations of principles is complex.98  Although principles are not particulars, when 
adopted by me as a maxim they are: an agent’s maxim is a particular. Maxims are not 
fully determinate and their structure implies a multitude of actions. A maxim of ‘I will 
write this thesis’ could be acted on tomorrow, by candlelight, in the library etc in an 
infinity of different ways. If maxims are not fully determinate, questions arise as to how 
it is possible to test them.  
To be acceptable against the Categorical Imperative, a maxim should not be capable of 
being shown incoherent in being universalised. A maxim fails this test of acceptability 
if the instrumental and consequential commitments contradict one another. For 
example, if I think of a world in which cheating is universal, then the maxim fails in its 
instrumental and consequential commitments because cheating would be impossible in 
such a world as there would be no underlying trust for it to happen. As conceived, the 
                                                          
98 Onora O’Neill, ‘Acting on Principle’,2nd edn, p.57. 
39 
 
structure of the maxim is contradictory: it demonstrates a contradiction in conception. In 
a parallel test,99 a concept of contradiction of the will is proposed. It may be possible to 
conceive of a world without beneficence. But to conceive of such a world involves that 
agent ignoring the need for such beneficence for themselves. The instrumental 
conditions of action to promote my own happiness would be lacking. Indifference to the 
needs of others cannot be coherently adopted by all (i.e. universalised) in a world of 
finite agents. Such a maxim demonstrates volitional inconsistency (that is, inconsistency 
and contradiction of the will.)100 
 
2.6 Maxims in moral education 
Maxims are important in moral education. Kant addresses this in the first section of the 
Doctrine of the Methods of Ethics in the Metaphysics. Vice is too tempting and Kant 
thinks that education in virtue should be taught systematically. He is sceptical of 
preaching; rather, he thinks that the teacher must engage in dialogue to enable his pupil 
to learn and develop his own maxims. Neither Socratic dialogue nor lecturing can 
engage the immature pupil. The maxims of others will not make a child virtuous.  
"A maxim of virtue consists precisely in the subjective autonomy of each human 
being's practical reason and so implies that the law itself, not the conduct of 
other human beings, must serve as our incentive."101  
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Nevertheless, example has its value: by the teacher, exemplary conduct helps to 
cultivate virtue, while bad behaviour offers cautionary examples in others.  In this way 
patterns of behaviour - habits - and maxims of others may be learned. Such maxims are 
not sufficient.  
"To form a habit is to establish a lasting inclination apart from any maxim, 
through repeated gratifications of that inclination; it is a mechanism of sense 
rather than a principle of thought."102  
He warns that habits are easy to acquire and harder to lose. Kant is optimistic that his 
programme will enable the development of practical reason which will offer the pupil 
something that will carry him through life: the ability to conquer all the forces of nature 
within, that may conflict with the pupil's moral principles. The pupil will be able to 
realise his autonomy.  
A similar programme is outlined in his Lectures on Pedagogy, published in 1803 by 
Kant’s younger colleague, Friedrich Theodor Rink, but dating to a series of lectures 
given on four occasions between 1776 and 1786. His remarks are entirely consistent 
with the Metaphysics. Kant claims that he is giving a systematic concept of the entire 
purpose of education and the means to attain it.103 As regards moral education he writes:  
“In this case it is based not on discipline but on maxims. Everything is spoiled if 
one tries to ground this culture on examples, threats, punishments, and so forth. 
Then it would be merely discipline. One must see to it that the pupil acts from 
his own maxims, not from habit, that he not only does the good, but that he does 
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it because it is good. For the entire moral value of actions consists in the maxims 
concerning the good. Physical education differs from moral education in that the 
former is passive for the pupil while the latter is active. He must at all times 
comprehend the ground of the action and its derivation from the concepts of 
duty.”104  
Later he writes,  
“Moral culture must be based on maxims, not on discipline. The latter 
prevents bad habits, the former forms the way of thinking. One must see 
to it that the child accustoms itself to act according to maxims and not 
according to certain incentives. Discipline leaves us only with a habit, 
which, after all, fades away over the years. The child should learn to act 
according to maxims whose fairness it itself understands.”105  
He goes on to set out how character consists in the “aptitude of acting according to 
maxims” and that the grounding of character is the priority in moral education. Behind 
these recommendations is a progressive view that the developing child must understand 
the value of reason in making moral choices: that is, a child or youth should learn the 
way that maxims of actions relate to moral behaviour, and not merely build up a series 
of habits, based upon the dogmatic assertions of teachers, pastors or parents. Doing 
things by habit may have a value when very young, but more needs development. Kant 
is scathing about mere habit. If our actions only reflect habit, then we shall cease to act 
on maxims and are likely to fall prey to self-love. Yet isn’t habit indirectly what 
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Albrecht is commending: for what is the significance of moral character if not a 
consistency of behaviour in a situation of moral complexity? 
 
2.7 Maxims and habit 
Adoption of a maxim may not amount to a deliberate and premeditated process of 
thought. Many of our actions are seemingly spontaneous. Habits are developed by 
constant repetition and what was originally a well thought choice may become an 
unthought reflex.  
"To form a habit is to establish a lasting inclination apart from any maxim, 
through frequently repeated gratifications of that inclination; it is a mechanism 
of sense rather than a principle of thought."106  
Nevertheless, the initiation of the act on the first occasion was conscious and, in some 
degree, considered. It remains my act and a result of my choice. And we may repeat 
actions in order to achieve different ends. I may drink a glass of wine in order to relax; I 
may drink another because I wish to savour its taste; a third to provide amusement for 
my friends at my behaviour; and another to feed my addiction. 
Maxims are not necessarily permanent features of our moral life,107 but then neither are 
habits. We may select different actions to achieve our ends or we may lose interest in a 
particular end (or achieve a long term goal) and pursue another one - perhaps even 
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through the same action. Our intentions can alter. Maxims don't have to be held 
permanently. Nevertheless it would be inconsistent to act upon different maxims in 
similar circumstances unless previous experience had demonstrated sound reasons for 
change. And, as previously noted, consistency in moral behaviour – which is what is 
witnessed by appearing to act on the same maxim – is what constitutes moral 
character.108 It is the agent that must self-apply the maxim, amend it, negate it and know 
it. 
 
How extensively must an action be described? In writing a letter I pick up a pen, fill it 
with ink, make marks on paper etc. These individual actions are both habit and 
subsidiary to a greater purpose, which falls under a maxim of ends. Surely the 
individual component actions are best construed as part of a behaviour, that is, part of 
an overall action.  "Maxims are those underlying principles or intentions by which we 
guide and control our more specific intentions."109  Most of the component actions have 
no moral content – most habits don’t and therefore not based on moral maxims. How I 
hold my pen or the style of my handwriting are not matters of morality.  
If the end is the key defining feature of a maxim, then it might be thought that an action 
is often best understood as composite: numerous individual actions may be required to 
achieve a particular end, specified in the maxim. In the example above, all the 
subsidiary actions are part of one composite action that the maxim will refer to. Yet it 
might be argued that such subsidiary actions themselves serve subsidiary ends and 
therefore should relate to (subsidiary) maxims - to which an infinite regress beckons. 
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Ends, actions and maxims can all be multiplied. Not all maxims have to be underlying 
or fundamental or overall principles or moral.  
This creates an objection in assessing moral worth: “when moral worth is what is at 
issue, what counts is not actions, which one sees, but those inner principles of actions 
that one does not see.”110 The assessment of these may be further complicated by self- 
deception or mistaken beliefs. There may never have been a true friend.111 This throws 
into question the value of the Categorical Imperative as a test of moral action, although 
it can be asserted that at least the action will not positively violate duty or be morally 
unworthy.112  
 
2.8 Maxims and moral worthiness 
Kant believes that in estimating the moral worth of our actions some good actions are 
done without inclination and therefore from duty. Yet our intentions are strictly 
unknowable. The maxims of our actions are sometimes opaque to ourselves and we 
infer the intentions of others from external behaviour. If we observe a masked man in a 
striped jersey climbing out of a window at midnight carrying a bag labelled ‘swag’, we 
assume a maxim of theft, not a collection of goods in fancy dress for a children’s 
charity, after no answer on ringing the house bell. The problem deepens when an action 
conforms with duty or fits a purpose that benefits the agent: the shopkeeper who does 
not overcharge the inexperienced customer.113 But principled action embraces both 
moral worthiness and duty in the way most of us think. O'Neill suggests that Kant's 
primary concern is with moral worthiness: 
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"It is quite usual for us to think of principled action as combining both duty and 
moral worthiness, which we regard as separate matters...or alternatively as 
revealing a moral worthiness that goes beyond all duty...Correspondingly, it is 
quite usual for us to think of unprincipled action as in any case morally 
unworthy but still, in some cases, within the bounds of duty...This is beyond the 
bounds of Kant's way of thinking which sees the central case of duty as that of 
action that has moral worth and regards as derivative that which accords merely 
in external respects with morally worthy action."114  
Thus she thinks that a poisoner who inadvertently administers a life-saving drug has 
violated a duty by acting in a morally unworthy way. His underlying principle is 
repugnant, like the Nazi who shoots the innocent but claims a maxim of doing his job. 
The test against the Categorical Imperative is the underlying maxim. It is best applied 
by the agent, because only the agent can adopt or reject maxims, although sometimes an 
outsider can be capable of assessing an underlying intention - the maxim- better than the 
agent. 
  In the Groundwork, the man who preserves his life not from inclination but from duty 
without loving it, is said to have a maxim of “moral content.”115  What gives moral 
worth is the maxim. Where we take joy in beneficent action, the action may conform 
with duty and be “amiable” but has no true moral worth being “on the same footing 
with other inclinations.” The same analysis applies to the cold-hearted philanthropist. 
Kant’s conclusion is that the moral worth of an action done from duty depends on the 
“maxim in accordance with which it is decided upon.”116 It is not based on the outcome 
of the action but on the principle of its volition. Against this, in referring a maxim to the 
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Categorical Imperative (in its formulation of Universal Law), the maxim cannot have 
moral content since it is what is to be tested to determine the permissibility of the act, an 
action that would otherwise be pointless.  
Kant believed that actions are morally good when determined by their maxim’s 
representation of goodness qua a moral law: “maxims present actions as they are or are 
believed to be good.”117 To the schema that I discussed above on the structure of the 
maxim, should also be added the moral law: whatever I should do in specified 
circumstances for whatever purpose, I am permitted to do because it conforms to moral 
law. This links to the concept of the good will and can give the maxim moral content. 
As Herman argues, “all action is for some end taken to be good....Maxims of action 
express what an agent wills: her action and intention as understood to be good and 
chosen because good.”118 Moral worth isn’t a kind of goodness originating from the 
motive of duty after an action’s evaluation. Rather, duty motivated actions have moral 
worth and actions have moral worth when their maxims have moral content. As Herman 
expresses it, moral worth marks a unity of motive and maxim content. 
 Some actions are permissible but good (as in duties of wide obligation) but others are 
wholly indifferent.119  For these behaviours, there could be a maxim also: Kant still 
describes them as actions and an action must be capable of having a maxim. The maxim 
of Kant's person of "fantastically virtuous" character120 (whom he condemns) perhaps 
should be: to eat fish or meat is something I can do according to my whim.  'To eat fish 
or meat' would describe the action; 'something I can do' says something about me as 
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agent (my circumstances); and 'according to my whim' refers to my purpose (or in this 
case, almost the lack of it). 
 
2.9 Specificity of maxims 
This leaves two problems. Firstly, if I do not know my intentions, how is it possible to 
have a maxim? Secondly, into how much detail must a maxim be broken to be accepted 
as a maxim or, per contra, if a broad brush generalisation, at what point does it cease to 
be a maxim and merely become a general principle? 
Kant envisages not knowing my intentions in stating that a maxim contains a practical 
rule that may conform with "often (his) ignorance or also (his) inclinations".121 How is 
it possible to analyse my action if I do not know what end I am really aiming at and am 
therefore unable to formulate a maxim? Yet Kant tells us that all actions must have 
maxims. Is the maxim merely the policy that I should follow? But a policy is not an 
action and is little more than a broad idea of a 'direction of travel' in certain situations, 
potentially with many sub-clauses. A policy may comprise a consistent adoption of 
several consistent maxims: the policy is a collective term for (the purpose of?) a group 
of maxims. A policy will lack those fine details (because it is bound to lack details) that 
are essential for moral evaluation. If a maxim is a proposition that enables moral 
assessment to be made, then a policy may lack precisely those essential details. If 
maxims are policies, then they become remarkably open-ended. How close to a maxim-
as-policy would an action have to be to count as falling under that maxim? To function, 
a maxim should be neither over-generalised nor over-particularised. If maxims are too 
particular they cannot be construed as principles and would be only capable of 
application to every single individual action. Moreover, if I am unable to be aware of 
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my specific maxim, it is also possible that I am likely to have the same problem in being 
aware of my maxim-as-policy, even with reflection. Allison highlights this issue of 
awareness: 
"Since our maxims are self imposed rules, one cannot make something one's 
maxim without in some sense being aware of it...This does not entail that we 
possess a 'Cartesian certainty' regarding our motivation, or that we must 
explicitly formulate our maxims to ourselves before acting...rather...I cannot act 
on a principle without an awareness of that principle, although I need not be 
explicitly aware of myself as acting on that principle." 122 
This raises the inevitable question of what "in some sense" actually means. What sense? 
If a maxim cannot be explicitly stated, does it exist? If I cannot state it, is it plausible to 
claim that I know it or reason about it? Although Allison does not say so, could it be 
that it is not awareness itself that counts but the possibility or ability or capacity of 
being or making myself aware of it that is important? But this is still troubling, for it 
remains the case that unless I make the effort to reflect on the possibility of a particular 
maxim and to articulate what it is to myself, it cannot exist. The unreflective person 
cannot be morally responsible, a conclusion that is unacceptable. Adopting a principle 
must involve knowing what it is. Maxims proceed from free choice.123 We can't choose 
what we don't know. Choice implies knowing the alternatives between which we are 
deciding. If it is the possibility or ability to identify a maxim that is important, how do 
we go about doing this? If our action is impetuous or absent minded or reflex, does it 
follow that there can be no maxim and that we are not responsible for the action? 
In the Reflexionen 124, Kant states that an  
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"incentive can determine the will to an action only insofar as the individual has 
taken it up into his maxim (has made it into a general rule, according to which 
he will conduct himself)."   
In the case of a will, according to what Wood125 terms the 'incorporation thesis', 
desires produce actions only by the way they are incorporated into maxims or practical 
principles that serve the agent as subjectively adopted norms. A maxim must involve an 
end, which serves as its 'matter'. 126 
 
Maxims cannot be empty platitudes: “do good deeds”, “be kind”. It may be that we 
cannot deduce specific duties from very general statements without such lengthy and 
complex deductive arguments that agreement would be hard to reach. Moral decisions 
are often difficult and diverging opinions are common. At the other extreme a maxim 
may be so specific that it could be universalised, yet seem morally repugnant. It would 
not be excluded by any test of contradiction in conception. Wood’s example is often 
quoted: the maxim of making a false promise on Tuesday, August 21 to a person named 
Hildreth Milton Flitcraft.127 Wood points out that this maxim, if made a universal law of 
nature, would not prevent him from gaining money by making false promises. If the 
Categorical Imperative is supposed to supply a rigorous test of the morality of maxims, 
it should work on rare, strange maxims as well as more common ones. And the greater 
the specificity of an agent’s intentions, the more likely that immoral conduct will pass 
the test of contradiction in conception. 
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A way around some of these problems may be to consider maxims as something 
ascribed to agents.128 Such as description would permit ignorance of maxims and a 
multiplicity of maxims, with a lesser emphasis on intention. But the objections to this 
interpretation appear formidable. Kant insists that maxims are determinations of the 
will; and an ascriptive view brings in a third party perspective to a subjective principle, 
removing the close link to practical reason and the focus on action. Adopting a maxim 
does imply accepting how we are going to act when the circumstances arise. 
Perhaps it is not successful identification of the maxim that matters but the deliberative 
attempt to describe it. We may fail or we may get it wrong, but trying to identify the 
maxims of our actions may be the best that we can do. If the capacity of our minds, the 
extent of our reasoning skills, the distorting effects of our emotions, the modifying 
effects of exhaustion or illness result in a different conclusion, then we will, at least, 
have tried. What else, we ask rhetorically, could we have done? What is morality for 
anyway except to make the best of a limited job? Morality, in a Kantian view, generates 
a need for reasons to create maxims for and against actions. This requires "the 
emergence of rational beings of dispositions disinterestedly and without coercion to 
give due weight to such reason in appraising actions."129 Maybe people actually can't 
reliably do that. They can, as a psychological fact, only achieve this occasionally. A 
rigid theory is impractical, including too specific an emphasis on what constitutes a 
maxim. If our emphasis in daily living is summed up by that aphorism of 'live and let 
live', perhaps we should place less emphasis on assessment of actions and of character. 
Living a reflective life may be part of virtue and the openness of such an approach may 
have much to commend it. But there is something desperate about such a proposal. We 
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cannot avoid such assessments and we do need to judge a large number of actions in 
order to live together. In short, we need maxims and need to understand what they are or 
imply. 
 
 
2.10 A hierarchy of maxims? 
 Underlying the above discussion is an assumption that maxims are uniform:  capable of 
a single definition with a place in explaining or justifying action, in moral evaluation or 
in relation to our inclinations and desires. But some difficulties might be resolved if 
maxims were considered at different levels. I want to support the idea that viewing 
maxims in a hierarchy will clarify some of the apparent contradictions that can arise if 
we opt for a rigid definition. At the most general level lies the concept of Gesinnung, a 
reflection of our overall values. At the level of basic actions, a maxim is, as explicitly 
defined by Kant130, "the subjective principle of willing" or "the principle on which a 
person acts."131 As such the maxim describes or illuminates, rather than evaluates our 
freely chosen actions. Such a maxim does not tell us what we ought to do - it is not an 
imperative. This is a kind of belief (Willensmeinung).132 
At a higher level, a maxim may be a principle of volition and action, being the principle 
upon which maxims of the first kind are chosen. Timmerman argues that such a maxim 
is still expressive of one's actual will. Although not set out in Kant's earlier moral 
philosophy, this hierarchy is explicit in his later writings on anthropology and religion. 
Thus, for example: "the ground of all specific maxims that are morally evil, which is 
itself a maxim."133 He concedes that the influence of higher order maxims on lower 
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level ones is difficult to discern, but suggests this could happen by producing incentives 
such as types of inclinations. "Moral maxims ...strengthen the moral incentive of respect 
for the moral law."134 These two levels of maxims are still, Timmermann asserts, 'thin' - 
they are not particularly robust or impose uniformity of behaviour. He proposes a third 
level of maxim that is a higher order subjective principle that is "particularly 
characteristic or vigorous". This is 'thick': a kind of life rule as in an example of Kant's: 
"I have made it my maxim to increase my wealth by all safe means".135  
This hierarchy reconciles maxim as a policy (at one level) with a maxim as the basis for 
an individual action at a more basic level. The end of a maxim may therefore vary 
according to the level of the maxim; and may change according to the circumstances at 
the lower levels. The highest level of maxim will serve as a guideline in the deliberative 
process that takes place at the lower levels of maxims - which may relate to several 
actions under this overall umbrella. In summary, one is adopted ideally after 
deliberation, one influences that deliberation by conditioning inclinations and one gives 
overall guidance in this process. This interpretation also helps with the objections 
concerning the knowledge or insight we have into our maxims. Mostly we do not reflect 
on our maxims before acting but we are likely to have broad 'life rules' of the higher 
order. It is these higher order maxims too that are more likely to be broken or to which 
exceptions may occur, although there should be no exception to well considered 
maxims. However, cultivating our 'life rules' is more likely to enable morally defensible 
maxims of a 'thinner' sort. Life rules will change infrequently. If these are termed ‘thick’ 
maxims, the position of Albrecht can be accommodated, with ‘thinner’ maxims for 
specific ends. It also accommodates the inability to know specific maxims but our ‘life 
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rules’ construed as maxims can be known to underlie our choices; and they need to be 
cultivated for they are basic to the other two levels of maxim in the hierarchy. Maxims 
as life rules link moral character and maxims and it becomes easy to understand why 
Kant suggests that we always act on some maxim, for our background life rules (i.e. 
values) inform all our decisions. Such values are crucial in our plans for the future.  
One further comment arises from the assertion that maxims are either good or bad, 
whereas actions are obligatory, permissible or forbidden. On this basis, Timmerman 
suggests that commands of morality do not admit of a more or a less and hence that 
there can be no room for supererogatory actions in Kant’s ethics. “There is no such 
thing as an action that is ‘good but not required’.”136 But this cannot be true because 
actions that result from maxims generated by imperfect duties give the agent a choice of 
actions, such that many actions may be good but not required – only that some action is 
required. I set aside discussion of supererogation here, while noting that two 
distinguished commentators explicitly oppose Timmerman’s position.137,138 
 
Although this interpretation asserts an ambiguity in the term 'maxim', it is one that I 
endorse. There is a further confusion in that maxims are not only principles, but are also 
'rules'.  Kant's use of the term 'rule' is highly variable139: "sometimes meaning "law", 
sometimes "imperative" and sometimes merely a precept or common maxim." In 
general, maxims state or imply ends; rules in the derivative sense imply the means we 
have to specify to realise our ends. Rules are instrumental and morally neutral. If my 
maxim is to maintain a healthy weight, it is an instrumental rule whether I increase my 
exercise or eat less or both. Kant's morality is concerned with rational ends not with the 
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minutiae of how they are achieved. It may be more useful in applying Kant's moral 
theory in this respect to emphasise the difference between means and ends rather than 
the terminology of rules, maxims and principles. 
 
 
2.11 Maxims for maxims? Gesinnung and meta-maxims 
In the Groundwork Kant introduces the idea of Gesinnung:140 often translated as 
'disposition' or 'meta-maxim'. He fails to discuss this concept further until the Religion, 
in which it appears in his account of radical evil. Despite a variety of claims, the 
account is not entirely clear.  Gesinnung is ultimately a choice between self-love or 
morality in our lives. Its description as a ‘meta-maxim’ places it at the head of the 
hierarchy of maxims. By this choice of dispositions, we become wholly good or evil.141 
(Notoriously he claims that we are radically evil.)142 
Kant links action on the basis of maxims with freedom: 
"(F)reedom of the power of choice has the characteristic, entirely peculiar to it, 
that it cannot be determined to action through any incentive except so far as the 
human being has incorporated it into his maxim (has made it into a universal 
rule for himself according to which he wills to conduct himself); only in this 
way can an incentive, whatever it may be, coexist with the absolute spontaneity 
of the power of choice (of freedom)."143  
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We act on an incentive when we freely choose to incorporate it into a maxim. 
Gesinnung complicates his account of action. 
Gesinnung may be variously translated: disposition, sentiment(s), views, opinions, 
convictions, attitude, persuasion, character, mind, way of thinking.144 Of these, 
'disposition' appears the preferred term in standard translations of Kant. In assessing 
whether an action is moral, we are unable to observe its maxim. Indeed "we cannot 
unproblematically do so even within ourselves." It follows that we are unable to judge 
reliably if a human is evil on empirical grounds. Only by inferring a priori from a 
number of consciously evil actions can we conclude "an underlying evil maxim, and, 
from this, the presence in the subject of a common ground, itself a maxim, of all 
particular morally evil maxims."145 This common ground (a maxim of maxims) is the 
disposition or Gesinnung. But evil must arise from choice or we could not be 
responsible for it.  
"This subjective ground must...itself always be a deed of freedom....Hence the 
ground of  evil cannot lie in any object determining (Kant's italics) the power of 
choice through inclination...but only in a rule that the power of choice itself 
produces for the exercise of its freedom, i.e. in a maxim."146  
Again, Kant considers this ground as a maxim. If we are tempted to wonder whether 
this  maxim of maxims (or "meta-maxim" or super-maxim) in turn is grounded in a 
further maxim and so on ad infinitum, Kant argues, firstly, that only a maxim will serve 
as a ground; and, secondly, it is "inscrutable." In the first place, if the subjective ground 
were not a maxim, it would be "merely" a natural impulse. On this basis, the exercise of 
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freedom would be determined through natural causes, "which would contradict 
freedom."  So it must be a maxim. Saying that a person is by nature evil means only that  
"he holds himself within a first ground (to us inscrutable) for the adoption of 
good or evil (unlawful) maxims, and that he holds this ground qua human, 
universally - in such a way, therefore , that by his maxims he expresses at the 
same time the character of his species."  
In a footnote147 Kant states, rather than argues, that the first subjective ground of the 
adoption of moral maxims is inscrutable because of its grounding in another maxim; 
and since no determining ground of the power of choice could be adduced, we would be 
endlessly referred without coming to a first ground. 
Gesinnung may be chosen but it can be chosen at a variety of times (adopted through 
the free power of choice148): "from the earliest youth as far back as birth.149 (The latter 
appears an odd assertion for choice at birth is impossible.) And Gesinnung can change:  
" the transformation of the disposition of an evil human being into the 
disposition of a good human being is to be posited in the change of the supreme 
inner ground of the adoption of all the human being's maxims in accordance 
with the ethical law, so far as this new ground (the new heart) is itself now 
unchangeable."150 (A "rebirth".151) 
A right action implies acting on a maxim that is a law for all, not only a subjective 
principle for myself. But to do the latter I must have reasons. The meta-
maxim/disposition (Gesinnung) can provide the reasons for the choice of maxim. There 
must be a basis to one's choice. One's disposition to commit oneself to upholding the 
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moral law or, alternatively, self-love is one's Gesinnung. As such, the meta-maxim 
reflects, or even is, our moral character. Character does not reflect a single deed or a 
single action for the wrong reasons. 
Gesinnung is noumenal whereas causation is phenomenal. This suggests that the 
connection between our disposition and maxims is difficult to understand as causal. But 
if the meta-maxim is a maxim, then the reasoning process from meta-maxim to maxim 
should proceed as in any other reasoning. It makes sense to say that  
"the meta-maxim is a kind of maxim, whose content is a commitment to take 
certain considerations as reasons for action (more precisely, to take morality and 
self-love to ground reasons for action, but to take moral considerations to have 
weight over self-interest, or vice-versa.)"152  
Kant's Gesinnung offers two meta-maxims that not only give an interpretation of the 
formation of first order maxims, but also offer a key factor in the make-up of character 
and of moral worth. Kantian maxims come in varying degrees of generality and in their 
hierarchy the more general may be seen as embedded in the more specific. In 
Gesinnung, the supreme maxim,153  the ultimate subjective conceptual ground of the 
adoption of maxims is found.  
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3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the concept, complexity and importance of the maxim were 
explicated. A detailed explication of reason is now required. ‘Reason’ appears in both 
title and first sentence of the critical philosophy: “die menschliche Vernunft” (“human 
reason”)154. Yet a definition of the word ‘reason’ does not follow. Reason may be 
applied theoretically or practically, but even defining ‘reason’ is not entirely 
straightforward.  
 
In this chapter, I begin with the act of defining itself and argue that definition can 
represent a conclusion rather than a starting point. I propose that ‘reason’ for Kant is 
best understood in three ways: a general one and two more specific senses, first detailed 
in the Dialectic. Reason has a unifying function which must be distinguished from the 
unity of reason itself: that there is one reason combining both theoretical and practical 
roles. Kant subjects reason to a “critique” but this must have positive outcomes or 
nihilism will result. He does tell us that “all our cognition ends with reason, beyond 
which there is nothing higher in us to work on the matter of intuition and bring it under 
the highest unity of thinking.”155  Its role appears supreme in our thinking. Reason in 
Kant’s account has principles, a discipline and a public use (e.g. for legislation).  
 
3.2 Defining Reason 
The talent for lucid presentation, Kant wrote, was "something I am conscious of not 
having myself".156 To this self-confession, one commentator, Norman Kemp Smith, 
adds,  
"the Critique is not merely defective in clearness or popularity of 
expression...there is hardly a technical term which is not employed by him in a 
variety of different and conflicting senses. As a writer, he is the least exact of all 
the great thinkers."157  
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With respect to 'reason' as a ‘technical term’, Kemp Smith expresses the opinion that the  
"use of the term is an excellent example of the looseness and carelessness with 
which he employs even the most important and fundamental of his technical 
terms. Only the context can reveal the particular meaning to be assigned in each 
case."158 
 
This is a devastating criticism from a reputable scholar. Schopenhauer is almost equally 
critical: “unclear, indeterminate, inadequate...complex foreign expressions used 
incessantly.”159,160 While Kant is not always consistent or clear, I hope it will become 
apparent that these criticisms are overstated.  
Kant makes several comments in the pre-critical writings about defining and definitions. 
For example, if a concept is ‘given’ then its definition is analytic; but if the concept has 
been ‘manufactured’ the process is synthetic. Thus  
“Through declaration a distinct concept is made. Through exposition a given 
concept is made distinct. Through definition a distinct concept is made complete 
and precise.”161  
Our minds construct many of the (‘manufactured’) concepts through which we think, but 
some others (‘given’) relate to objects a priori. Definition will accordingly depend on an 
empirical deduction or, for a priori concepts, a transcendental deduction.162  Either way, 
the act of definition is required for precision, to know exactly what we are thinking. 
Elsewhere Kant comments on defining in different circumstances:  
“Concepts that originate from the understanding can all be defined, whether they 
originate arbitrarily or through the nature of the understanding. Definitions of 
names are possible for all objects...Real definitions, which contain the 
possibility of the thing itself are only to be found for concepts that are given 
through the understanding.... And here nominal and real definitions coincide; 
however, in the case of arbitrary concepts they are synthetically produced, in the 
case of the natural concepts of the understanding they are analytically produced; 
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empirical concepts can only be nominally explicated. Fundamental concepts of 
the senses not at all.”163  
Here the distinction between defining ‘manufactured’ concepts and ‘given’ ones is 
maintained, characterised by the respective terms of ‘nominal’ and ‘real’, ‘arbitrary’ and 
‘natural’. But at the end of the 1770s he thought that one could not start from definitions, 
except in mathematics: “Only in mathematics and in hypotheses can one begin with 
definitions.”164 Evolution in meaning can be anticipated as Kant develops his thinking, so 
that definition emerges as an end point, not a starting point.  
In the first Critique, Kant discusses the defining of categories and the principles that 
derive from them. Without seeing how they are used, we “cannot define anyone of them 
in any real fashion.”165 But, even so, we can proceed by using the property of a concept, 
without needing to know all its properties. To have avoided the task of definition “was 
no evasion but an important prudential maxim.” Gold, for example, has a number of 
properties in weight, colour, valency, atomic mass etc. We do not need to know all these 
to use the concept ‘gold’. If this was required, we would be unable to use many 
everyday concepts. What matters is understanding enough to make distinctions between 
gold and, shall we say, iron pyrite (“fool’s gold”). The word 'gold' is best regarded as a 
designation rather than a concept. Examples make us confident enough in practice to 
know what we are talking about. Hence Kant states that he prefers to use the term 
“exposition, as being more guarded”.166 Thus he returns to his assertions in the notes of 
the 1770s:  
“A concept which I have invented, I can always define; for since it is not given 
to me either by the nature of understanding or by experience, but is such as I 
have myself deliberately made it to be, I must know what I have intended to 
think in using it.”167  
We cannot even be sure of defining that, because a true object to fit our concept may not 
exist. He concludes that the only concepts which allow of definition are those that 
contain an arbitrary synthesis “that admits of a priori construction…Consequently 
mathematics is the only science that has definitions.”168 Rationalists may have based 
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their concepts of reason on mathematics but this is not acceptable to Kant. Their error 
was the belief that mathematics consisted of analytic propositions, not synthetic a priori 
ones. The pursuit of mathematical method leads to the belief that by defining we can 
“exhibit originally the exhaustive concept of a thing within its boundaries.”169 There can 
be no error in mathematical definitions170 because concepts originate in the definition. 
By contrast, reason will be defined in its use and we should not be surprised if Kant 
postpones an exhaustive definition of reason at the outset.  
“In philosophy, we must not imitate mathematics by beginning with 
definitions…the incomplete exposition must precede the complete...and we can 
infer a good deal from a few characteristics, derived from an incomplete 
analysis...the definition in all its precision and clarity ought, in philosophy, to 
come rather at the end than at the beginning of our enquiries.”171  
We can get along using some key features. Reason's detailed characteristics will become 
plain as we proceed. A more complete definition should then become possible. 
 
One clarification: Kant uses the terms 'speculative reason' and 'theoretical reason' 
interchangeably (spekulativ, theoretisch). There is one exception.172 Rauscher thinks this 
makes "speculative reason, in a sense, a subset of theoretical reason; only the latter...is 
available for practical reason."173 This isolated example is best ignored: Kant does not 
pursue it further in what follows at 5:136-7. The two terms are closely associated and 
treated identically without comment elsewhere.174 
Although for Kant, human beings exist in two worlds, the natural, phenomenal world and 
the intelligible, noumenal world, what differentiates us from other animals is reason. 
Following Kant’s advice, I will define reason in some of its characteristics and functions. 
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Reason is that general human faculty or capacity for truth-seeking and problem-solving, 
differentiated from intellect, imagination or faith in that its results are intellectually 
trustworthy: for most of us the defining characteristic of human beings.175 However, a 
glance at a philosophical dictionary shows that it is a term that has been used in several 
different ways.  Flew, for example, writes, "A word used in many, various often vague 
senses, with complex and sometimes obscure connections one with another." He 
continues,  
"In one most important usage, contrasted with such hypostatized internal or 
external rivals as imagination, experience, passion or faith...These  great issues 
are too often debated as if they concerned the powers and province of some 
super-person. Yet there is no access to any answers save through discovering 
what actions may or may not be commended as reasonable. We have no 
independent road to acquaintance with the Goddess Reason."176   
A very Kantian response, we may think. For Scruton177, reason is the sole faculty to 
lead us to true knowledge. Not only is reason superior to the senses wherever it is in 
competition with them but, equally important, reason determines whether it is in 
competition with the senses. From this follows the rationalists' doctrine that since all 
beliefs from experience are about appearances, what is really real is known only to 
reason.  
 
3.3  Kant's view of reason 
Human thought is self-reflective. The possession of reason involves theoretical and 
practical roles, plus an awareness of this. Our thought is spontaneous: we think of 
ourselves as free, both in making judgements about what is, in the empirical world, and 
about what should be in the moral world. “Nothing is more reprehensible than to derive 
the laws prescribing what ought to be done from what is done.”178 
And reason is discursive: it applies concepts and in thinking we judge whether a given 
concept applies to a given object. Here it relates the particular to the general. From 
chaos we create order. As one commentator rather lyrically expresses it, Kant  
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"regarded reason as so transcending the rest of creation that it is uniquely worthy 
of awe and respect. Reason can discern what is true and good: the rest of 
creation simply is. Reason is the ground of intelligibility, necessity, and 
universality and thus also of harmony and peace."179 
We may contrast Hume’s dismissal of practical reason: "Reason is wholly inactive and 
can never be the source of so active a principle as conscience, or a sense of morals."180  
But for Kant, there is only one reason, not two:  
“if pure reason itself can be and really is practical…it is still only one and the 
same reason which, whether from a theoretical or a practical perspective, judges 
according to a priori principles.”181  
Pure practical reason, writes Kant in the Groundwork, must ‘be able…to present the 
unity of practical with speculative reason in a common principle, since there can, in the 
end, be only one and the same reason, which must be distinguished merely in its 
application.’182 Or again, in the second Critique, he refers to the ‘unity of the whole 
pure rational faculty (theoretical as well as practical)’ with the aim of deriving 
‘everything from one principle –the undeniable need of human reason, which finds 
complete satisfaction only in a complete systematic unity of its cognitions’.183 ‘There 
can only be one human reason’.184   
 
At the start of his Discourse on the Method, Descartes defines reason as ‘the power of 
judging well and of distinguishing truth from falsehood’.185 This is ‘good sense’. The 
enlightenment was the age of reason: reason revealing new insights into human 
understanding. Reason for Aristotle and for Aquinas was a property that distinguishes 
humans from animals. So too for Descartes:  
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“I know of no other qualities that make for the perfection of the mind; for as 
regards reason or sense, inasmuch as it is the only thing that makes us men and 
distinguishes us from brutes.”186 
Believing something for reasons implies explanation and evidence: why it is true. We 
have reasons for actions too –motivations. Reason is therefore a term that is used in a 
variety of ways, contrasting with imagination, instinct, faith, passion or experience. 
Hume notoriously described reason as the ‘slave of the passions.’ But overall it is a 
faculty for problem solving linked to discovering the truth. At its broadest it represents 
human thought, the power to think, and in that regard the opposite of the instincts by 
which ‘beasts’ live. Reason, personified, asks questions and grants an ‘unfeigned 
respect’ only to that which ‘has been able to withstand its free and public 
examination.’187 In pursuing his inquiry into reason, Kant aspires to find his answers by 
searching within. He is a thinking being, already using simple logic every day. Like 
Descartes, the answers to his examination of reason lie within himself: "I need not seek 
far beyond myself, because it is in myself that I encounter them, and common logic 
already also gives me an example of how the simple acts of reason may be fully and 
systematically enumerated."188 At the same time, he admits that he will need to use 
more than or other than, innate ideas: "only here the question is raised how much I may 
hope to settle with these simple acts if all the material and assistance of experience are 
taken away from me."189 In respect of theoretical reason, he emphasises that  
"if common reason ventures to depart from laws of experience and 
perceptions of the senses it falls into sheer incomprehensibilities and 
self-contradictions, at least into a chaos of uncertainty, obscurity, and 
instability."190  
In any case, "the depths of the human heart are unfathomable."191 Some 
commentators192 explicitly interpret Kant as therefore opting for a discursive starting 
point in his first Critique, rather than expounding a plain definition of reason. Even at 
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the start of the Transcendental Logic, he fails to distinguish reason and the 
understanding.193 And whereas mathematics has definitions, axioms, demonstrations 
and concepts which "come first",  
"[N]one of these elements can be achieved or imitated by philosophy194...in 
philosophy the definition as distinctness made precise, must conclude rather than 
begin the work."195 
What reason is must be open to criticism and would harm itself if such criticism is 
prohibited. "Reason has no dictatorial authority; its verdict is always simply the 
agreement of free citizens."196 In a parallel line of thinking, Kant investigates the 
foundation of philosophic moral cognition from "common rational cognition".197     
      
  
3.4 Kant's three varieties of reason 
The clearest way to understand what Kant means by ‘reason’ is threefold. The first is as 
a synonym for thought that is non-contradictory – a broad construal of what the mind 
does. This broad understanding of ‘reason’ extends sufficiently wide as to include all a 
priori elements of cognition. For example, early in the first Critique, he writes that 
insofar that reason exists in sciences, "something in them must be cognized a priori".198  
"In both the pure part, the part in which reason determines its object wholly a 
priori, must be expounded all by itself, however much or little it may contain, 
and that part that comes from other sources must not be mixed up with it.”  
He continues to state that "determining the object and its concept is the theoretical 
cognition of reason; and the making object actual is the practical cognition of 
reason".199 In his pre-critical phase he was even prepared to bring understanding and 
reason together:  
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"It is equally obvious that understanding and reason, that is to say, the faculty of 
cognising distinctly and the faculty of syllogistic reasoning, are not different 
fundamental faculties."200 
This early equation of understanding and reason does not survive into the critical 
philosophy and syllogistic reasoning will become a second role for reason. But the 
broad role of reason may be instanced in his use of the term ‘common human reason’. It 
is this meaning that he is appealing to when he writes of ‘the voice of reason;201 or in 
saying that an “idea of personality.... is natural even to the most common human 
reason.”202 Again, it is common human reason that determines pure morality.203 
3.5  Reason’s logical functions 
  Reason is also a more specific faculty, to be contrasted with the understanding. It has 
“logical” functions on the one hand; but on the other hand, “transcendental reason” 
creates “ideas”, unifying the understanding.  These are the second and third varieties of 
reason.  
Logic consists of the application of rules to thought, described in the Groundwork as 
formal philosophy, concerned with the universal rules of thinking.204 Logic can prove 
nothing because it abstracts from all objects of cognitions. This is why logic has been so 
successful: its limitations secure its success. For rationalists, logic formed part of 
reason’s principles, providing axioms that constrain acceptable thinking.205 For Kant 
however, in one sense, logic contrasts with reason.206 The boundaries of logic are clear 
and unchanged since Aristotle, a complete science207 with nothing empirical. 
Classically, reason here is syllogistic, following a chain of propositions that lead from 
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initial premises descending to valid conclusions that must be true provided the initial 
premises are true. Logic is not so much to be contrasted with reason as to be seen as part 
of reason: that reason has formal and transcendental faculties. 
In reason’s logical use, Kant means syllogistic use: reason contains the origin of certain 
concepts and principles. These do not come from the understanding and inferences may 
be drawn mediately. Mediate inferences infer one proposition from another by means of 
a third. (Kant sets this out in his Logic §§ 60-1).208 The structure of syllogistic reasoning 
is set out in his explication of the logical use of reason.209  
General logic corresponds with three “higher faculties of cognition: the understanding, 
the power of judgement and reason.210 Pure general logic “has to do with strictly a 
priori principles and is a canon of the understanding and reason.”211  Formal logic has 
no content of cognition and is concerned with the form of thinking only. It can therefore 
include in its analytical part the canon212 of reason,  
“the form of which has its secure precept, into which there can be a priori 
insight through mere analysis of the action of reason into their moments, without 
taking into consideration the particular nature of the cognition about which it is 
employed.”213  
That is to say that the application of logical rules (its “secure precept”) can distinguish 
truth from falsehood without needing to examine a specific, particular cognition.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Reason engages in ‘mediate’, syllogistic inference. Kant sets this out in two ways: an 
ascending and a descending function. In the former, reason discovers the conditions 
under which objects are as they are and we make true judgements. To be sure of this we 
must ‘ascend’ to the ultimate end of conditions, that is, an unconditioned totality.214 In 
searching for this unconditioned totality, reason is searching for the ultimate 
explanation of things. In the latter, reason has a narrow ‘descending’ function: ‘all men 
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are mortal’ provides the condition under which the mortality of any man X can be 
inferred from X being a man. 
Reason’s logical use (that is, traditional syllogistic reasoning) provides no insight into 
its nature as a transcendental faculty with a real, that is, metaphysical use.215 Kant 
expresses some embarrassment as he embarks on giving a definition of this “supreme 
faculty” and its twofold description as a faculty of principles, distinct from the 
understanding as a faculty of rules.216  This assertion does create a difficulty as to the 
distinction between principles and rules. A broad and a narrow sense of principles is 
made to clarify this. In the broad sense, a principle can be any universal proposition 
from which consequences can be deduced. Principles of the understanding are not 
cognitions from concepts alone but only in relation to intuitions. Principles in the strict 
sense217 however would produce synthetic cognition from concepts alone and it is these 
principles that Kant links to the use of reason.218 There is a paradox here. Kant, says 
Allison, is not claiming that reason can provide such cognition: it can’t (“if not 
impossible, is at least very paradoxical in what it demands”.219) But, 
“reason considered as distinct from the understanding, does involve such a 
demand in order to comprehend both how it gives rise to a natural and 
unavoidable illusion and how, liberated from the deceptiveness of this illusion, it 
yields regulative principles that are essential for the progress of the 
understanding within experience.”220  
Whereas rules are the means to unify appearances, reason unifies the rules of the 
understanding under principles. The understanding relates to intuitions (a first order 
function), reason to the products of the understanding (a second order function). The 
understanding is driven by the logic of explanation to increasingly comprehensive sets 
of rules.  
The rules of the understanding then must be united under unconditioned principles. 
Reason is the “faculty which secures the unity of the rules of the understanding under 
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principles.”221 It is a faculty of principles. Reason, in its logical function, infers. A 
syllogism is the inference that effects the conclusion from a ground (a ‘major’) via an 
intermediate conclusion (a minor) to a conclusion by a judgement.222 “Reason in 
inferring, seeks to bring the greatest manifold of cognition of the understanding to the 
smallest number of principles (universal conditions) and thereby to effect the highest 
unity of that manifold.”223 
 
3.6 Exploring reason in its ‘real’ use 
After syllogistics, Kant asks whether reason merely organises cognitions in packets 
related logically or whether it can provide an independent source of knowledge: “a 
genuine source of concepts and judgements that arise solely from it and thereby refer it 
to objects”.224 This will be developed as the third understanding of reason, its ‘pure’ or 
‘real use.’ In its real use, reason generates principles and concepts (ideas) that could not 
be encountered in experience (the world as a whole, the soul, God) and that stem alone 
from reason, yielding transcendent (a priori) ‘knowledge’. The alternative would be 
reason as “only a merely subordinate faculty that gives to given cognitions a certain 
form, called "logical form", through which cognitions of the understanding are 
subordinated to one another, and lower rules are subordinated to higher ones...as far as 
this can be effected through comparing them.”225 
‘All our cognition begins with experience’ begins the first Critique226, which is to say 
‘from the senses’.227 It goes from sensation to the understanding and ends with reason – 
the highest unity of thinking and the supreme faculty of cognition. But having made 
these assertions and on the point of defining this faculty, Kant professes embarrassment: 
reason has not one but two faculties.228  
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It is embarrassing also that we confront an unavoidable and necessary capacity, which 
seduces us into the use of illusory rational principles.229 While reason’s logical use 
presents no problems, its real use as a transcendental principle leads to ideas and 
concepts that cannot relate to the empirical world. Our highest faculty leads us to error. 
Purely rational principles may be illusory and cause metaphysical error, creating a 
scepticism about reason itself. Avoiding the misconstrual of the ideas of reason 
("transcendental illusion") is Kant's urgent task in the Dialectic. He must expose the 
illusions that produce metaphysical error; and vindicate reason to prevent scepticism 
about it in all other respects. He will argue that reason can act as a transcendental 
faculty producing its own concepts and ideas, beyond experience. One might be 
justifiably forgiven for scepticism about reason if it produces antinomies, in particular, 
failing to distinguish between two alternatives.   
Illusion arises from misuse of principles that should be applied to experience alone. 
Transcendental illusion is not to be confused with empirical illusion (a stick in the water 
that looks bent from a sensory deception) or logical illusion (rules of inference wrongly 
applied230). The problem arises because “experience never satisfies reason” so that we 
feel compelled “to look...beyond all concepts that one can justify through 
experience.”231  So we try to apply principles to the transcendent objects of God, the 
soul and the world-whole, about which we can know nothing because we can 
experience nothing. That is one of the consequences of possessing reason, motivating us 
to go beyond reason’s limits.  Kant draws an analogy with optical illusion saying that in 
both cases, we take “a subjective condition of thinking for the cognition of an 
object.”232 In the Prolegomena he expresses this more clearly:   
“since all illusion consists in taking the subjective basis for a judgement to be 
objective, pure reason’s knowledge of itself in its transcendent (over-reaching) 
use will be the only prevention against the errors into which reason falls if it 
misconstrues its vocation and, in transcendent fashion, refers to the object in 
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itself that which concerns only its own subject and the guidance of that subject 
in every use that is immanent.”233 
Categories cannot be applied if separated from sensibility, but their a priori status 
tempts us to think they can be applied beyond sensible objects.234 But perhaps it should 
be emphasised that transcendental illusion, having been recognised, cannot then be 
thought to deny the existence of God, soul and the world-whole: merely in 
acknowledging the illusion, to show that they are beyond our cognition. 
Analysing the structure of a simple syllogism, Kant points out that the universal 
principle governing all inferences of reason may be expressed in the formula: “what 
stands under the condition of a rule also stands under the rule itself.” The syllogistic 
function (reason in its logical function) is the key to discovering the transcendental 
principle unique to reason. From the logical procedure of the syllogism, Kant argues 
that reason orders the data provided by the understanding in a series of prosyllogisms.235 
He coins the “logical maxim” (“the proper principle of reason in general (in its logical 
use)”):  
“Find the unconditioned for the conditioned cognitions of the understanding, 
with which its unity will be completed.”236  
Because reason can draw mediate inferences in this way, the formal procedure of reason 
can be linked to the quest for even more general conditions: for the unconditioned. The 
latter is completeness as an epistemological ideal. This maxim becomes the principle of 
reason, an imperative, even if it lacks propositional form. But there is a clear parallel to 
the categorical imperative of practical reason and it has the same capacity to go beyond 
the bounds of sense. We can easily assume that it gives rise to knowledge, when we 
assume that “when the conditioned is given, so too is the whole series of conditions 
subordinated one to the other, which is also given.”237 This principle, identified as the 
supreme principle of pure reason, is the source of subordinate principles, all of which 
are transcendent and thus able to give rise to those concepts unique to reason which 
Kant terms “transcendent ideas.” Our knowledge is limited to those objects that can be 
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given to us in time and space. We can never reach the unconditioned. So the imperative 
(the principle of reason) cannot be realised. Reason can organise our knowledge that the 
understanding delivers into systems and its imperative remains aspirational for a 
complete whole of knowledge. Unfortunately, we slide from a subjective necessity of 
the connection of our concepts to a belief in the objective necessity in the determination 
of things in themselves.”238 We move from an epistemological recommendation to a 
metaphysical principle about reality. Rather we should strive for the greatest possible 
unity of experience with no guarantee of success.239 Although the unconditioned could 
never be given to us, Kant believes that the coherence or rationality of reason’s 
procedure has built into the necessary assumption that the unconditioned is given. This 
is necessary to “deploy the formal demand for systematicity in relation to the objective 
contents of the understanding.”240 It makes little sense to seek the unconditioned if we 
do not believe that it exists and Kant confirms this in writing: “…everyone presupposes 
that this unity of reason conforms to nature itself; and here reason does not beg but 
commands…”241 
Judging well or judging according to a priori principles: this defines reason as a 
fundamental faculty of judgement – and so Kant described it in his pre-critical writing 
("the higher faculty of cognition rests absolutely and simply on the capacity to 
judge.").242 Wolff243 had distinguished between understanding and ‘reason’: that is, 
reason could be understood in both a broad sense and in a narrower sense of a faculty 
that unites the rules of the understanding under unconditioned principles. Kant, as we 
can see, adopted this view.244 But Kant didn’t only endorse: he also extended this 
Wolffian view of reason. Humans are not entirely at the mercy of sensation, they are not 
determined in what they do entirely by nature, they are able to choose their actions: that 
is, they have freedom which enables choice of actions that go beyond nature’s 
principles. This ability to choose enables humans to exceed the limits of the 
understanding, to think about things beyond experience. ‘Freedom can go beyond every 
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proposed boundary.’245 The scope of what we know is less than the scope of what we 
can think. Reason, both theoretical reason in its real use and practical reason, can take 
us beyond what can be proved by experience, beyond what can be known, to belief in 
freedom, immortality and God. "Experience never satisfies reason.... (Reason) 
recognises limits but not boundaries: that is, it indeed recognizes that something lies 
beyond it to which it can never reach."246 Reason will go on asking questions, 
speculating about what lies beyond its boundaries because that is how we humans are 
constituted.  
Ideas of reason are essential to order the understanding. They are a product of reason in 
its real sense, including freedom, which can never be encountered in possible 
experience; in the example of freedom, it is a thought that we bring to the conception of 
ourselves insofar as we conceive of ourselves as agents, not a fact we might discover by 
empirical inquiry or introspection. Reason's ideas function regulatively and express 
conceptual necessities. As set out at the start of the Transcendental Dialectic, reason is 
to be explicitly differentiated from understanding, a power distinct from the 
understanding.247 If understanding is the faculty of rules, as set out in the transcendental 
logic, then reason is the faculty of principles.248 This enables Kant to expand on the 
transcendent ideas (and illusions) of reason - ideas that we cannot avoid thinking but for 
which there is no empirical support: freedom, God, the world as a whole and 
immortality. To these Kant gives the term transcendent objects. (The wholes of 
experience are not themselves objects of possible experience.249) The apparently a 
priori knowledge of transcendent objects is an illusion consisting of subjective ideas. 
Reason has the task after subsuming the particular under the general, of then 
determining the particular through the general in order that principles may be 
determined.250 
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   3.7 Ideas of reason 
In his Essay on Human Understanding John Locke apologises for relying on the word 
idea, it “being the term that serves best for whatsoever is the Object of the 
Understanding when a Man thinks.” He continues,  
“since the Things the Mind contemplates are none of them, besides itself present 
to the Understanding, ‘tis necessary that something else, as a Sign or 
Representation of the thing it considers, should be present to it: And these are 
Ideas.”251  
Ideas are, for Locke, representations: the term that Kant used – Vorstellungen. Both 
Hume and Berkeley used ‘ideas’ in a more restrictive sense252 and even Kant urges that 
those with the interests of philosophy at heart should be careful  
“to preserve the expression ‘idea’ in its original meaning, that it may not become 
one of those expressions which are commonly used to indicate any and every 
species of representation, in a happy-go-lucky confusion to the consequent 
detriment of science.”253  
And Kant proceeds to list a series of terms, concluding that “a concept formed from 
notions and transcending the possibility of experience is an idea or concept of 
reason.”254 
Kant's description of ideas of reason originates from Plato. He comments that Plato 
noted that our power of cognition feels a higher need than that of merely spelling out 
appearances and that "our reason naturally exalts itself to cognitions that go much too 
far for any object that experience can give ever to be congruent." Such ideas are "by no 
means merely figments of the brain".255 These considerations take Kant into the realm 
of the practical. Plato's ideas were found mainly in the practical, which rests on freedom 
and Kant comments on how the idea of virtue, for example, is one that we need to make 
any judgement of moral worth - despite perfection of virtue not existing. Indeed Kant 
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scoffs at the suggestion that it is 'ridiculous' to use such an idea under the “wretched and 
harmful pretext of its impracticability”.256 On the contrary, the idea is necessary. 
Freedom underlies the idea of virtue and is such an idea of reason. So too are ideas of 
perfection that apply to the regular arrangements of plants or animals, indeed any aspect 
of nature - even if it is impossible for any individual animal or plant to demonstrate this. 
In the empirical world at least such ideas can cancel the validity of empirical principles, 
although Kant makes a strong warning about deriving moral laws from what is done to 
what I ought to do.257 
Reason in its transcendental (and theoretical) use ultimately refers to the totality of 
conditions for conditioned objects: that is, to an unconditioned totality: "the 
transcendental concept of reason is none other than that of the totality of conditions to a 
given conditioned thing."258 As noted above, reason in its ‘real’ use sees no limits to 
discovery, there is always more to be discovered, explained and to know.  
"The concern of reason is to ascend from the conditioned synthesis, to which the 
understanding always remains bound, toward the unconditioned, which the 
understanding can never reach."259  
The ideas that reason creates are entirely distinct from the concepts or categories of the 
understanding. These ideas are concepts that are inferred, thought before experience and 
enabling comprehension in a parallel way that concepts of the understanding serve for 
understanding of perceptions. Kant calls them "transcendental ideas".260 These ideas of 
reason are, Kant emphasises, "only ideas". This does not mean that they are unimportant 
or can be disregarded. They can extend our thinking beyond the empirical and "perhaps 
make possible a transition from concepts of nature to the practical, and themselves 
generate support for the moral ideas and connection with the speculative cognitions of 
reason."261 (Kant sets aside practical considerations at this point.) The ideas of reason 
form a system which will be brought under three classes. Since the ideas are concerned 
with the unconditioned synthetic unity of all conditions in general,  
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"the thinking subject will be the object of psychology, the sum total of all 
appearances (the world) is the object of cosmology, and the thing that contains 
the supreme condition of the possibility of everything that can be thought (the 
being of all beings) is the object of theology."262  
This particular trichotomy of transcendental ideas has been criticised as making an 
artificial connection between the forms of syllogisms or the categories of relation and 
the ideas of the soul, the world as a whole and God: the connection between this logic 
and the traditional topics of Leibniz-Wolffian special metaphysics is too tenuous and 
based on an inadequate architectonic and an outdated logic.263 However these are ideas 
and their objective deduction is not possible. They are not objects of the understanding 
and cannot fall under the categories. As already noted, we cannot assume the 
unconditioned to exist, but we use a principle unique to reason as a logical precept, 
telling us to always seek out further conditions.264 The principle Kant sets out states that 
"if the conditioned is given, then the whole sum of conditions, and hence the absolutely 
unconditioned, is also given, through which alone the conditioned was possible."265 The 
principle is expressly synthetic: it concerns real existences, not just logical relations 
between concepts. It also transgresses the limits of experience and is therefore 
transcendent. As Gardner comments,266 transcendent metaphysics regards it as an 
objectively valid principle on a par with the transcendental principles of the 
understanding - but, as noted, Kant does not assume that implies the existence of the 
unconditioned, which may be a transcendental illusion. As he states earlier in the 
Analytic,  
“reason …in its endeavours to determine something  a priori in regard to objects 
and so to extend knowledge beyond the limits of possible experience, is 
altogether dialectical. Its illusory assertions cannot find place in a canon such as 
the analytic is intended to contain.”267  
He there describes the transcendental employment of reason as not objectively valid and 
as belonging to a “logic of illusion.”268  
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This is a different idea of dialectic of that from Plato, for whom it was the method of 
inquiry that leads, as the highest level of philosophy, to knowledge, - not a logic of 
illusion. However, like Plato, Kant believes that many ideas of reason function as goals 
or standards, both theoretical and practical, even as he privileges the special status of the 
ideas of the soul, the world as a whole and God. The ideas of reason are an example of 
how reason functions – what it is – and for which Kant will develop its role in 
syllogistic logic, special metaphysics, science and morality: in short, the key to his 
entire philosophical system. The purpose of Reason, in its logical employment as 
inference, is to obtain the highest possible unity, through subsumption of all multiplicity 
under the smallest possible number of universals. 
To sum up, I suggest that reason has at least three senses in Kant's philosophy: firstly, a 
general sense of what the human mind does, avoiding the contradictory and thinking, 
both in the abstract and the specific; secondly, a function in syllogistic logic; thirdly, by 
creating ideas that unify thought and order the objects of the understanding, reason is a 
faculty with a unifying, systematising and regulatory function, such that "all our 
cognition starts from the senses, goes from there to the understanding, and ends with 
reason".269 To express this differently, there is reason as the source of all a priori 
elements and a general faculty of the functioning mind; reason as a formal, logical 
faculty; and reason as a transcendental faculty, the source of ideas of reason.  
It can be concluded that Kant's use of 'reason' varies even within the expression of 
reason as speculative/theoretical. 
These three senses differ somewhat from the three of Kemp Smith. For him, the first 
sense is broadly similar, but as the source of all a priori elements, it includes those 
elements in sensibility as well as understanding. His second narrower sense is distinct 
from understanding, and closer to the transcendental faculty I have suggested.  
"It signifies that faculty which renders the mind dissatisfied with its ordinary and 
scientific knowledge, and which leads it to demand a completeness and 
unconditionedness which can never be found in the empirical sphere. Reason 
generates metaphysic"270   
and has its ideas, in contrast to the categories possessed by understanding. But thirdly, 
instead of reason as a logical faculty, he suggests that Kant frequently employs reason 
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and understanding as synonymous, thus "dividing the mind into only two faculties, 
sensibility and spontaneity." However, where he states that in A1-2 "understanding and 
reason are used promiscuously", those two words only appear three times making it 
difficult to accept this third sense. He also, of course, excludes reason as a formal, 
logical faculty for which there is clear support, as above.  
As between theoretical and practical reason, Kant makes this distinction clear in many 
places. Theoretical reason is concerned with cognition, with what we know:  with what 
is; practical reason is concerned with what we will and do: that is, with what ought to 
be.271  Reason is the highest faculty of knowledge in the theoretical realm and the sole 
source of obligation and autonomy in the practical realm. “Reason as the faculty of 
principles determines all the interest of all the powers of the mind but itself determines 
its own.”272 
 
3.8  Reason's function 
Although reason leads to illusion, it does not follow that by recognising this we free 
ourselves from illusion. By way of analogy, an astronomer still sees the moon as larger 
when it is rising even while appreciating that this is illusory.273 Similarly, 
"transcendental illusion does not cease even though it is uncovered and its nullity is 
clearly seen into by transcendental criticism." It will still tempt us to stray and 
transcendental dialectic is limited to alerting us to its fallacies. Our cognitive powers are 
limited: reason is a faculty that prevents error but is unable to judge objects. However 
Kant thinks that reason can have a necessary role in regulating or directing the 
understanding by its rules. Not only is reason not a principle of the possibility of 
experience or a constitutive principle for extending the world of sense beyond all 
possible experience, it can only function regulatively.274 Transcendental ideas do  
"have an excellent and indispensably necessary regulative use, namely that of 
directing the understanding to a certain goal respecting which the lines of 
direction of all its rules converge at one point, which although it is only an 
idea...nonetheless still serves to obtain for these concepts the greatest unity 
alongside the greatest extension."275  
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It is not the idea but the use of the idea that can be transcendent or immanent. Reason is 
the function that orders concepts of objects and gives them a unity which they can have 
in relation to the totality of series. Whereas the understanding must give unity to 
appearances for the sake of a unity of apperception, it is not sufficient for knowledge 
itself to form a unity. For that our judgements must be inferentially interconnected. It is 
reason that gives unity to knowledge by working on the understanding's manifold of 
judgements to create the unity of a system. 
Besides the function of ordering the understanding but not of adding to knowledge, 
reason has a defensive role: preventing error provided one is alert to such possibilities, 
acknowledging that they are often tempting. Thus reason never “relates directly to an 
object, but solely to the understanding.”276 The ideas of reason easily overstep the 
boundaries of experience creating illusion “which one can hardly resist even through the 
most acute criticism.”277 But reason is important in guiding judgements of the 
understanding. Reason does not employ concepts of the understanding; instead it 
regulates them. The “principle of reason is only a rule,”278   and not a constitutive 
principle for extending the concept of the world beyond experience.  Rather, “it is a 
principle of the greatest possible continuation and extension of experience, in 
accordance with which no empirical boundary would hold as an absolute boundary” and 
hence Kant calls it a “regulative boundary.” He repeats this claim elsewhere:  
“I assert: the transcendental ideas are never of constitutive use, so that that the 
concepts of certain objects would thereby be given, and in case one so 
understands them, they are merely sophistical (dialectical) concepts. On the 
contrary, however, they have an excellent and indispensably necessary 
regulative use, namely that of directing the understanding to a certain goal 
respecting which the lines of direction of all its rules converge at one point.”279  
The image of converging at one point is illustrated by an imaginary object lying outside 
the field of knowledge and therefore beyond empirical cognition as if that point were 
located like the objects seen behind the surface of a mirror: illusory, yet indispensable if 
one wants to see what lies in the background. To express this differently, reason is that 
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function that regulates the understanding, the “faculty of the unity of the rules of 
understanding under principles.”280 In this respect it gives cognitions a logical form, 
through which one is subordinated to another, that is, regulated.281 Reason creates 
systematic unity by rules that apply to the manifold of judgements. Instead of a mass of 
unconnected individual cognitions, reason can supply rules that will bring them 
together. This is essential for our scientific understanding – we can build up ideas of 
species and genera, develop hypotheses or form a research programme: identify a 
Linnaean classification, for example, or Mendeleev’s table of the elements. Such 
regulative ideas direct our understanding to further possibilities of experience that we 
may research and unify what we know into a whole of nature, where everything relates 
to everything else. Thus,  
“reason…quite uniquely prescribes…the systematic in cognition i.e., its 
interconnection based on one principle…this idea postulates complete unity of 
the understanding’s cognition, through which this cognition comes to be not 
merely a contingent aggregate but a system interconnected in accordance with 
necessary laws.”282  
This is a projected unity which helps us to find a principle for the manifold and 
coherently connecting particular uses of the understanding. This unity is one of nature.  
 
3.9  Reason and freedom 
Reason then has the function of unifying the understanding securing the unity of the 
rules of the understanding under principles.”283 Reason itself is autonomous - no other 
faculty supervises or directs it. It can only act on the basis of its interests. To decide on 
this, reason must be free. Freedom extends from the moral realm in deciding what we 
do, to the theoretical realm in deciding what is. Thus in the Groundwork, we cannot act 
otherwise than under the idea of freedom, "as if his will had been validly pronounced 
free also in itself and in theoretical philosophy."284 (my italics)  Freedom,  
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“in the cosmological sense, …[is] the faculty of beginning a state from itself, the 
causality of which does not in turn stand under another cause determining it in 
time in accordance with the law of nature. Freedom in this signification is a pure 
transcendental idea."285   
It follows that a concept of freedom is not descriptive of sense perception. 
Kant conceives freedom as the expression of an undetermined causality in two senses. 
In a cosmological sense (i.e. in theoretical reason) freedom is best understood as 
freedom from. This means that we are independent in our judgements. It is a 
spontaneity: transcendental freedom is a given. In the Groundwork he introduces the 
idea of practical freedom by first asserting transcendental freedom:  
"one cannot possibly think of a reason that would consciously receive direction 
from any other quarter with respect to its judgements, since the subject would 
then attribute the determination of his judgement not to his reason but to an 
impulse."  
This is reason free and independent of "alien influences". If we need to think of 
ourselves as free in order to ascribe our theoretical judgements to ourselves, this implies 
that we would need to think of ourselves as free even in order to represent ourselves as 
judging for reasons that we lack freedom. This makes the denial of freedom self-
refuting.286 
Freedom is dependent on transcendental idealism. "If appearances are things in 
themselves, then freedom cannot be saved."287  We know ourselves to be subjects of 
apperception,288 which is not empirically conditioned, and to have faculties that give 
rise to pure concepts - our understanding and reason. Kant asserts that "this reason has 
causality, or...we can at least represent something of the sort in it."289  This brings us to 
the point that we can, at least, think that we have grounds for our faculty of reason 
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possessing transcendental freedom. It is "at least possible."290 Morality has a foundation 
in reason. 
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4.1 Introduction  
I have discussed above (ch3) how reason orders the understanding without adding to 
knowledge. Reason creates ideas that extend our thinking beyond the bounds of sense 
and conceptualised by applying the categories by the understanding. Its ideas regulate 
the understanding. Ideas are "concepts of reason not derived from nature; on the 
contrary we interrogate nature in accordance with these ideas and consider our 
knowledge as defective, so long as it is not adequate to them."291  
I now explore reason's regulative function further, especially in science. Reason, with its 
ability to foster illusion, is easily considered negative and defensive. I will advocate 
that, per contra, it is positive, creative and, in particular, essential for new scientific 
knowledge.  
Reason’s ideas feature in the search for the unconditioned and man’s place in the 
universe. Beyond experience, reason gives teleological ideas, crucial for our research to 
expand science. Ideas of the soul and God must also be considered. I then give an 
account of the postulates, firstly in theoretical reason, where they contribute to the use 
of modal categories; but secondly and especially in practical reason. The postulates are 
sometimes seen as some sort of parallel to the ideas of theoretical reason for practical 
reason. The postulates will be explicated as essential concepts for demonstrating the 
unity of theoretical and practical reason.  
Having established the roots and structure of Kant’s reason, my aim is to chart its 
trajectory to its final united end in the highest good.  
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4.2 Science and Reason’s creative ideas  
Today "science" connotes "natural science" and hence covers physics, chemistry, 
zoology etc. The 18th century German equivalent of Wissenschaft indicated any 
systematic body of knowledge. This implied an organisation around first principles 
from which the rest of knowledge might be derived. Euclid's geometry, for example, 
was a model of a "scientific" exposition of knowledge. A variety of disciplines - even 
theology or metaphysics - might be called "sciences".292   
In its ideas, reason proposes unobservable entities leading to the construction of 
theories. The hypotheses it postulates come from a power to create experiments to find 
evidence for its ideas – it is an active power that interrogates nature searching for 
explanations beyond mere “accidental observations” - empirical groping in the dark. 
Kant uses the metaphor of a law court:  
“Reason, in order to be taught by nature, must approach nature with its 
principles in one hand, according to which alone the agreement among 
appearances can count as laws, and, in the other hand, the experiments thought 
out in accordance with these principles – yet in order to be instructed by nature 
not as a pupil....but like an appointed judge who compels witnesses to answer 
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the question he puts to them…This is how natural science was first brought to 
the secure course of a science after groping about for so many centuries.”293   
Kant was familiar with the writings of Francis Bacon for he quotes from the Preface of 
Bacon's Great Instauration as a motto at the start of his first Critique. Bacon's new 
scientific methodology was based on the investigator purging himself of prejudices in 
observing nature and rejecting the mediaeval interpretation of Aristotelian theory. 
(Belief in direct observation allegedly caused Bacon’s death after stuffing a fowl with 
snow, said Hobbes). Kant emphasised, by contrast, the need for principles to guide 
observation and experiment. 
The ideas of theoretical reason play a key role in science, just as the postulates do in 
morality. In showing that the Enlightenment’s achievements in natural science were 
grounded in the same regulative principles that support our actions in morality, religion 
and philosophy, Kant could provide support for the latter (and against Hume). Natural 
science is not founded on the empiricist models of Bacon, Newton or Hume, but on a 
notion of reason fully applicable in less certain areas.294  
The paradigm example of a science was mathematics, a product of pure reason 
according to both Aristotle and Plato. Mathematics appears certain and universal; and 
whether one emphasised or denied the importance of experience in human knowledge, 
they agreed that mathematics was the most characteristic product of reason (perhaps 
especially Euclid’s geometry). Analytic truths do not form part of knowledge: rather 
they provide principles necessary for ordering and systematising knowledge derived 
elsewhere. Mathematical concepts must be constructed in intuition. This accounts for 
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the objectivity of mathematical truths – an account consistent with Kant’s account of the 
objectivity of knowledge in general.295 Mathematical knowledge neither is nor can 
therefore be provided by pure reason. The continuous examination of reason’s 
principles by experience obviated a critique in empirical use and 
“was likewise unnecessary in mathematics, whose concepts must immediately 
be exhibited in concreto in pure intuition, through which anything unfounded 
and arbitrary instantly becomes obvious.”296  
Metaphysics is not to be modelled on mathematics for metaphysics has no empirical 
component. It is intuition that gives content and meaning to reason’s concepts and 
principles. Empirical and pure intuitions discipline reason but in its transcendental use a 
discipline is required against “an entire system of deceptions and delusions”.297 If 
mathematics only becomes knowledge by needing intuition and logic, then it fails in 
any attempt to imitate them within philosophy.  
Kant’s philosophy of mathematics therefore has consequences for his notion of reason. 
Reason’s proper function is not the search for knowledge. Yet reason “in what are 
called “ideas” shows a spontaneity so pure that it goes far beyond anything sensibility 
can offer.”298 Sensibility is passive and only affected by things, while understanding can 
only produce concepts by its own activity, “whose sole service is to bring sensuous 
ideas under rules and so to unite them in one consciousness.” Concepts of the 
understanding require experience for any significance.299 When nature is interrogated in 
the way Kant pictures, explanations of experience are suggested by ideas that go beyond 
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experience. Asking questions in that way carries the implication that it could have been 
otherwise or no question would be necessary. The understanding is able to know 
nothing beyond what is given at present nor to know the noumenal world:  
“Without reason we would have no thoroughly coherent employment of the 
understanding, and in the absence of this no sufficient criterion of empirical 
truth. In order therefore, to secure an empirical criterion we have no option save 
to presuppose the systematic unity of nature as objectively valid and 
necessary.”300  
The notion of order itself gives meaning to the assumption of nature’s intelligibility. 
Reason enables us to know empirical reality. 
We also need reason to set ends and purposes. Certain causal regularities must also be 
presupposed in order to apply the concept of causality. Without regulative principles of 
reason, understanding could not function ‘coherently’ because empirical laws cannot be 
derived from the categories, although they are subject to them.301 Further we have to 
assume that the order of nature is intelligible or the notion of order would be 
meaningless. Kant is demonstrating the need for regulative principles of reason in every 
crucial aspect of our experience.302 It is paradoxical that the regulative ideas that go 
beyond experience are essential to discover empirical laws.  
 
4.3 Other roles for reason’s ideas? 
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In his essay "Speculative Beginning of Human History" of 1786,303 Kant interprets the 
beginning of human history with repeated references to the Book of Genesis. He 
suggests that ideas of reason are essential to plan the future:  
"Reason's third step....was the reflective expectation of the future. This ability 
not merely to enjoy life's present moment but to make present to himself future, 
often very distant time, is the distinguishing characteristic of man's superiority, 
for in conformity with his vocation he is at the same time also the most 
inexhaustible source of cares and trouble, which the uncertain future arouses and 
from which all animals are exempt."304  
Finally, he asserts a fourth and final role for reason's ideas. Reason "conceived himself 
...to be the true end of nature, and in this regard nothing living on earth can compete 
with him." It is the possibility of reason and its ideas that leads Kant to claim man's 
equality with  
"all other rational beings...especially in regard to his claim to be his own 
end...This step is at the same time also connected with man's release from nature's 
womb,"305 
 - and he relates it to the rejection from paradise after the Fall.306 Ideas of reason must 
be able to be applied to the understanding in various ways, so that scientific judgement 
is another expression of freedom. Principles that we need to create scientific knowledge, 
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such as a principle of parsimony or Ockham's razor, are chosen ideas, not forced upon 
us by the understanding. Such regulative principles provide a motive to structure our 
experience and systematise it. This emphasises our dependence upon regulative 
principles and the constant temptations of transcendental illusions by treating regulative 
ideas as constitutive ones. 
The Unconditioned is another idea of reason, another regulative principle, that Kant sees 
as essential to pursuing knowledge. In asking the conditions for something, one 
inevitably asks for the conditions of the conditions, and so on in an infinite regress. It is 
the unconditioned that drives us to go beyond all appearances and beyond the 
boundaries of experience.307 This unconditioned is the totality of all conditions; and, 
since we cannot experience a totality, it follows that the unconditioned must be beyond 
experience. Reason has to discover the conditions under which objects are as they are: 
that is, explanation must be pushed to its limits. If our cognition from experience 
conforms to the objects as things in themselves, then the unconditioned cannot be 
thought at all. But, he argues, "if these objects as appearances conform to our way of 
representing, then the contradiction disappears."308 If we have encountered the 
representation of something, - i.e. we have not (because we couldn’t) encountered the 
thing in itself – then we can’t have experienced the unconditioned. “The unconditioned 
must not be present in things insofar as we are acquainted with them."309  
The concept of the unconditioned enables reason to speculate beyond the bounds of 
sense with its ideas which the understanding cannot do. Theoretical reason itself cannot 
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cross that boundary (and “advance in the field of the supersensible”). Practical reason 
can, so that the concept of the unconditioned links theoretical and practical reason:  
"Now, after speculative reason has been denied all advance in this field of the 
supersensible, what still remains for us is to try whether there are not data in 
reason's unconditioned, in such a way as to reach beyond the boundaries of all 
possible experience, in accordance with the wishes of metaphysics, cognitions a 
priori that are possible, but only from a practical standpoint. By such procedures 
speculative reason has at least made room for such an extension even if it had to 
leave it empty; and we remain at liberty, indeed we are called upon by reason, to 
fill it if we can through practical (my italics) data of reason."310  
These ideas of the unconditioned give rise to: the concept of substance giving rise to the 
idea of the soul as the ultimate subject; the concept of causation giving rise to the idea 
of the world-whole as a completed series of conditions, and the concept of community 
giving rise to the idea of God as the common ground of all possibilities. The idea of the 
unconditioned therefore occupies a crucial role in Kant's philosophy.  
"This unconditioned is always contained in the absolute totality of the series if 
one represents it in imagination. Yet this absolutely complete synthesis is once 
again only an idea; for with appearances one cannot know, at least not 
beforehand, whether such a synthesis is even possible...reason thus takes the 
path of proceeding from the idea of a totality."311  
A full explanation demands an account of the conditions that led to the current state of 
affairs; it is an analytic proposition that once the conditioned is given, a regress in the 
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series of its conditions is set as a task.312 It is “nothing but the logical requirement of 
assuming complete premises for a given conclusion.”313 The point at which no further 
regress can be made, at which the given and hence necessary is reached, would be the 
unconditioned – which is actually an impossibility314:  
“within experience, every appearance is conditioned, always to progress from 
each member of the series, as a conditioned, to a still more remote member.”315  
The unconditioned is a goal to which we aim as we try to know more while realising 
that there is always more to know. By this idea of reason we interpret the world as 
intelligible, postulating systematic order in nature and claiming that empirical 
regularities are laws of nature and hence necessary. Science uncovers, rather than 
constructs nature’s systematicity. Science could not even start without the assumption 
that nature as a whole forms a system according to empirical laws.316  
 
4.4 Beyond the empirical 
The systematisation of nature enables us to postulate objects beyond the empirical. We 
can theorise and provide explanations for the unobservable. For example, Kant proposes 
a theory of evolution:  
“Certain water animals transform themselves into marsh animals and from these, 
after some generations into land animals.”317  
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Although the regulative use of reason can be wrong, we can use reason’s ideas to create 
hypotheses. The concepts will not be what Kant terms as “properly constitutive”. If a 
principle is assumed, we couldn’t prove its universal validity. The reason is that we 
couldn’t know all the possible consequences that would flow from it. Hence he 
concludes that:  
“this use of reason is only regulative, bringing unity into particular cognitions as 
far as possible and thereby approximating the rule to universality. The 
hypothetical use of reason is therefore directed at the systematic unity of the 
understanding’s cognitions, which, however, is the touchstone of truth for its 
rules.”318 
Reason is constantly striving for a unity and a universality, not able to achieve one. 
We can ascend to an interpretation of unity at one level (“the first law keeps us from 
resting satisfied with an excessive number of different original genera”) and equally 
“distinguish sub-species within it” before applying a universal concept.319 Wisely, I 
think, he does not specify when a particular approach should be applied: that is for the 
judgement of the investigating scientist. 
 
4.5 Teleology as an idea of reason 
Principles of teleology also exemplify ideas of reason. Kant explained nature in terms of 
its mechanisms, but believed that the universe must be considered as purposive and thus 
as the product of a wise and omnipotent deity. He was personally impressed with the 
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wonder and purposiveness of the world and hence sympathetic to teleological ideas and 
their role in the activities of reason:  
"The present world discloses to us such an immeasurable showplace of 
manifoldness, order, purposiveness, and beauty.... so many and such 
unfathomable wonders ....that our judgement upon the whole must resolve itself 
into a speechless, but nonetheless eloquent, astonishment."320,321  
He defines a principle for judging the internal purposiveness in organised beings as  
"an organised product of nature...in which everything is an end and reciprocally 
a means as well. Nothing in it is in vain, purposeless, or to be ascribed to a blind 
mechanism of nature.”322 
Bioscience cannot be conducted without teleological principles. However it does not 
follow that these principles of design demonstrate the existence of a designer. That 
would make the principle constitutive and not regulative. Kant contrasts two "quite 
different" statements. On the one hand, we could say that certain things in nature could 
only exist through a cause with intentions: that is, a deity, arguing that the observation 
of design implies the designer. But, on the other hand, it may be that I can only judge 
the possibility of those things because of the way my cognitive faculties are constituted, 
which demand an idea of intention. The former is about a fundamental objective 
principle; but the latter a subjective principle for the reflecting power of judgement, 
"hence a maxim that reason prescribes to it."323 
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Although Kant addressed teleology from 1762 onwards, in the third Critique he 
systematically expounded a new principle linking aesthetic and teleological judgements. 
Common aesthetic judgements suggest similarities among human minds “without 
depending on determinate predicates of particular objects".324 Teleology may also have 
suggested to Kant  
“an a priori principle about the relation between the human mind and the nature 
that surrounds it, including other human minds that can give us confidence in the 
validity of our judgements without directly giving us new concepts of 
objects".325  
These types of judgements he called “reflecting judgements”, both in teleology and 
aesthetics. In a reflecting judgement326 we are not given a concept (as in a determining 
judgement) under which to subsume a particular. Instead we must find a concept or rule. 
A mediating concept between the concepts of nature and of freedom will enable a 
transition “from the purely theoretical to the purely practical, from lawfulness in 
accordance with the former to the final end in accordance with the latter, in the concept 
of a purposiveness of nature.”  In that way we can come to know the possibility of a 
final end in nature.327 
Guyer writes,  
“Kant saw how he could take the existence of both natural and artistic beauty 
and our sense of the purposiveness in the organisation of nature as evidence that 
human beings as moral agents can nevertheless be at home in nature, and even 
as of value in preparing ourselves for the exercise of our moral agency".328  
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If we are only complex mechanisms, we can have no moral agency. Kant’s science 
overtly acknowledges no purposes. The concepts of sensible nature and of supersensible 
freedom both have their domains. Between them is a gulf that cannot be bridged by 
theoretical reason. It is as if they exist in different worlds. Although nature can have no 
influence on freedom, it should be possible for freedom to be able to influence nature. 
Free choice impacts on the sensible world and the natural world is constructed in such a 
way that it can be influenced by freedom’s choices: 
“(T)he concept of freedom should make the end that is imposed by its laws real 
in the sensible world; and nature must consequently also be able to be conceived 
in such a way that the lawfulness of its form is at least in agreement with the 
possibility of the ends that are to be realised in it in accordance with the laws of 
freedom."329  
Kant's assertion of the impossibility of a transition from the concept of nature to that of 
freedom will be discussed further in ch7as its complexity demands.330 In the third 
Critique, Kant explores “reason’s own legitimate though problematic demand for 
complete systematic unity in explanation, including the explanation of nature.”331  
Teleological thinking is common, from Aristotle, for whom the mature organism 
is ‘that for the sake of which’332 growth has occurred, to modern biology. Physiology, 
for example, has been described as “the technology of healthy achievements”333: good 
digestion, effective locomotion, accurate sensations etc. We ask: what are valves in the 
heart for, what do nerve fibres actually do, why have olfaction? The absence of 
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teleology in biology seemed absurd to Kant for whom merely mechanical principles 
cannot explain organised beings. Not even a genius equal to Isaac Newton, “could make 
comprehensible even the generation of a blade of grass according to natural laws that no 
intention has ordered.”334 The anatomists who investigate the structure of plants and 
animals assume that the structural intimacies have necessary purposes. Kant 
emphasises, “they could just as little dispense with this teleological principle as they 
could do without the universal physical principle."335  
Kant, an admirer of Newton, had to relate teleology and Newton’s mechanistic universe. 
Although all judgements involving purpose can be considered teleological, I focus on 
Kant’s concern about purposes in nature – not explanations of individual human desires 
or those that supposedly explain existence: 
“Even an observer of nature finally comes to like objects... when he discovers in 
them the great purposiveness of their organization, so that this reason delights in 
contemplating them, and Leibniz spared an insect that he had carefully 
examined..."336 
Teleological judgements in nature are material and objective337 in contrast to those in 
aesthetics (formal and subjective), mathematics (formal and objective) or human 
purposes (material and subjective). Further, no absolute teleological judgements are 
justified where there is advantageousness of one thing for another: withdrawal of sea for 
sandy strata, sand for pine trees and so on338 - this is relative and external 
purposiveness, the one is a means for another, not an end. A thing with natural ends has 
special characteristics, being: (1) an individual whose “parts... are possible only through 
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their relation to the whole”339, (2) with parts “combined into a whole by being 
reciprocally the cause and effect of their form”340 and (3) “generates itself”341. 
Kant justifies teleological explanation of natural causes. A natural end or purpose is not 
a constitutive concept of either the understanding or of reason. This does not obviate a 
role for such ends or purposes. The reflecting power of judgement can use the concept 
of teleology to guide research and thought in a similar way that we think analogically of 
our own causality in accordance with ends – “not, of course, for the sake of knowledge 
of nature."342 It provides explanation. 
An idea of teleology may be useful in our thinking regulatively even if the relationship 
between the parts and whole of an organism is a mystery, like that of moral freedom. 
But the a priori ordering principles are ours, not nature’s. A teleological judgement can 
be imposed on a causal explanation enabling the unity of the realms of nature and of 
purpose into one system.343 I have already noted how Kant thought it could suggest 
evolution.344 Teleological explanation is, for Kant, a heuristic device, supersensible and 
subjectively valid, that doesn’t tell us what is really going on in nature.345 Thinking 
regulatively doesn’t determine what the truth is; rather, it is about method – the way we 
go about thinking in searching for a unity that we hope may exist. “Transcendental ideas 
express the peculiar vocation of reason” as “a principle of the systematic unity of the 
use of the understanding.”346 In determining the truth, we seek coherence between what 
we read into experience (space, time, categories) and what we sense (what we read from 
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it). Taking what is regulative to be constitutive “divides reason against itself.” It is 
constitutive principles that enable the application of concepts to objects and thus extend 
our cognition. Reason’s ideas are not constitutive and reason cannot be the source of 
knowledge on its own account.  
Some suggest a less certain regulative element of Kant’s teleology. Walker writes, 
“those principles which were called constitutive of experience help to determine what is 
real; the regulative principles help to determine what is rational and so might 
themselves be called constitutive of rationality."347  His suggestion is that regulative 
principles are essential for constitutive principles to be accepted as rational and 
therefore to function. To that degree, regulative principles have a small constitutive role: 
namely that of supporting the rationality of constitutive principles. But is Walker 
confusing Kant’s intention? Or is Kant confusing his readers? Against Walker, the 
distinction between constitutive and regulative ideas appears clear with, for example, 
the firm declaration that “transcendental ideas are never of constitutive use.”348 Yet 
Kant himself writes that “for the law of reason to seek unity is necessary, (my italics) 
since without it we would have no reason and, without that, no coherent use of the 
understanding."349 Even for Kant, the “metaphysical idea of the organic had virtually 
become a necessary condition of experience itself," says Beiser.350 And teleology is 
crucial in analysing the organic. Beiser, thinks that Kant was not clear and firm in his 
distinction between the constitutive and the regulative in the light of the latter 
quotations.351 Proceeding as if nature is systematically ordered is not sufficient to 
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motivate inquiry: it must be so ordered. But this view is against most of Kant’s writing: 
he returns to this issue in the third Critique, where he claims that the power of 
judgement attributes to nature a transcendental purposiveness on the grounds that we 
must make such an assumption for experience of nature and research into it.352 Despite 
the suggestions of Walker and Beiser of Kant’s so-called ‘vacillations’, the arguments 
requiring a constitutive role for the ideas of Kant’s teleology remain unconvincing. 
Nothing is lost if our thinking proceeds on an as if basis, nor is Kant suggesting any 
gain by enlarging the constitutive role of reason’s ideas. 
Ideas of reason then are not facts about nature but demands upon it. I have spelt this out 
in the case of the transcendental idea of teleology; and have also discussed the special 
ideas of God, the world whole and the soul in the previous chapter and also below. But 
there are many ideas that function as goals or standards: for example, the practical idea 
of a just constitution353 or the theoretical ideas of “pure earth, pure water, pure air,”354 
and a “fundamental power of the mind.”355 These ideas open the way to explanation, 
theory, hypothesis, possibility and experiment. From this scientific truth may emerge. 
For practical ideas, they open the way to a state of affairs that ought to exist but does 
not and which our actions should aim to achieve.  
 
4.6 Two further ideas of reason 
Two further ideas of reason are given an exposition at the end of the Appendix.356 These 
are the ideas of the transcendental deduction of the soul and of God. A transcendental 
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deduction, he reminds us, is required in order to use an a priori concept. With a hundred 
pages of the Critique still to go, he tells us that a deduction,357 (differing from that for 
the categories), for these entities must be possible to achieve "the completion of the 
critical business of pure reason."358 They are, moreover, preceded by a section359 
described by Kemp Smith as extremely self-contradictory, wavering between a 
subjective and an objective interpretation of the ideas of reason. The probable 
explanation, he thinks, is that Kant is here recasting older material.360 Another 
commentator adds that the following deduction "is highly oblique."361 This is a harsh 
judgement by Kemp Smith. The point seems clear that Kant is advocating an idea of 
reason that views the search for unity as the creation of a system. This idea comes from 
us and not only directs the understanding in its search but also claims objectivity. A 
transcendental principle has to be pre-supposed through which a systematic unity, as 
pertaining to the object itself, is assumed a priori to be necessary.362 He continues 
rhetorically in asking how diversity in nature could be regarded if it is only a “concealed 
unity if we could regard that unity as contrary to the actual nature?” In such 
circumstances, “reason would proceed directly contrary to its vocation.”363 
Nevertheless, it does seem that we are proceeding on an as if basis. We can do this if we 
are prepared to conceive transcendent objects in analogical terms: that is, as analogues 
of real things, not in themselves as real things. This “hypothetical” use of reason is not 
constitutive but must be regulative.364 
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Things are given to theoretical reason. If an object is given “absolutely”, my concepts 
will determine the object. But if something is given only as an object “in the idea”, there 
is really only a schema, not a specific object. The schema does however serve to 
represent other objects to us; and will do so in accordance with their systematic unity, 
by virtue of the relation of other objects to the object given in the idea.  Kant draws a 
parallel in proposing that the concept of a highest intelligence is similarly a mere idea 
(i.e. it does not relate straightway to an object.)365 Again, it is "only a schema." My 
concepts cannot work on this either to produce a specific object. This “idea” has the role 
of maintaining the greatest systematic unity in the empirical use of our reason. Thus 
things must be considered as if (Kant's emphasis) their existence was due to a highest 
intelligence, not that it demonstrably actually is. The value of the idea is then heuristic 
and polemical, not ostensive. It doesn’t show how the object is made up, but it does 
show that we ought to seek after its constitution and the connection of empirical objects. 
If we consider ideas that are psychological, cosmological or theological, we cannot refer 
them directly to any object corresponding to them. It is then a maxim of reason to 
proceed in accordance with such ideas.366 This deduction therefore yields no object and 
cannot be constitutive: rather the ideas are regulative. We must consider everything that 
might belong to possible experience as if this experience constituted an absolute unity, 
dependent and conditioned in the sensible world and as if the sum total of all 
appearances had a single supreme and all sufficient ground. This leads Kant to conclude 
that it is from us that the idea of a most wise cause comes, not from a highest 
intelligence (if such an intelligence exists).  
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Ideas of reason then are not items of knowledge but bearers of guidance.367  The unity 
of reason is the unity of a system. What is given to pure reason are not  
"objects to be unified for the concept of experience but cognitions of 
understanding to be unified for the concept of reason, i.e., to be connected in one 
principle."368  
The ideas function by providing motives for science and presuppositions necessary for 
its pursuit.369  
 
 
4.7 The postulates 
The term 'postulate' was familiar to Kant from Meier's Logic textbook, which he had 
both read and annotated. Meier used the German term  'Heischeurtheile' meaning "a 
judgement on demand". This relates to the Latin 'postulatum', a demand or request. 
Hence Kant's use of the term as meaning an unproven claim required by a particular 
context. 
Kant discusses postulates at two notable points in his Critiques: as postulates of 
empirical knowledge and as postulates of pure practical reason. His derivation for the 
use of this term comes from the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle.  'Postulate' is a term 
that is used interchangeably with 'axiom': defined as "a statement for which no proof is 
required and which, thus, occurs as a premise of many arguments but as the conclusion 
of none."370 This status arises because its truth is self-evident, typically as in Euclid's 
geometry. Alternatively, it requires no proof because it constitutes an implicit definition 
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of the terms it contains or contributes, with other axioms, to such a definition. In the 
first Critique, the term 'postulate' appears as a "postulate of reason" to seek the 
unconditioned;371  and as "postulates of empirical thinking in general" as a principle of 
the pure understanding.372 (In mathematics, it is an assumption used as a basis for 
mathematical reasoning.) Postulates of empirical thinking have the function of 
synthesising the form of appearances (mere intuition), its matter (perception) and the 
relation of these perceptions (experience). They relate the appearances to the faculty of 
knowledge.373 Modal categories (possibility, actuality, necessity)374 are transformed by 
the postulates to become cognised by the subject. The categories of modality do not 
enlarge our knowledge: rather they are principles which explain the concepts of 
possibility, actuality and necessity in their empirical employment. Postulates of 
empirical thought are concerned with theoretical reason, the 'is'; postulates of pure 
practical reason with the 'ought'. They are therefore clearly distinguished in their roles. 
A postulate of pure practical reason, then, is a rational belief without evidence (- in that 
respect a parallel to the concept of ideas discussed above -), theoretically undecidable 
but practically necessary. Kant clarifies this further in a footnote in his second Critique 
where he describes the confusion that could arise if postulates of pure practical reason 
are confused with postulates of pure mathematics. The postulates of pure mathematics 
possess apodictic certainty about an action previously theoretically cognised a priori. 
By contrast, the postulates of pure practical reason propose the possibility of objects: 
God and the immortality of the soul. These derive  
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“from apodictic practical laws, and therefore only on behalf of a practical 
reason, so that this certainty of the postulated possibility is not at all theoretical 
hence also not apodictic i.e. it is not a necessity cognised with respect to the 
object but is, instead, an assumption necessary with respect to the subject's 
observance of its objective but practical laws, hence merely a necessary 
hypothesis."375 
Before his first Critique, Kant does not distinguish between postulates, theoretical ideas 
and hypotheses.376 The term 'postulate' was used in a theoretical context.377 In a note in 
the late 1770s, he comments,  
"a postulate is a practical immediately certain proposition. But one can also have 
theoretical postulates for the sake of practical reason, such as that of the 
existence of God, of freedom, and of another world."378  
4.8      What is the role of the postulates? 
Kant continued to use 'postulates' for theoretical and practical reason, as well as the 
interchangeable term 'hypothesis'. The postulate becomes construed as a concept 
essential for a functional role where the existence of the object corresponding to that 
object is not claimed. Thus the concept of 'God' may be essential to support the idea of a 
highest good, without necessitating the actual existence of God. Thus,  
"the transcendental concept is necessary, not the transcendental proof...The 
necessity of the divine being as a necessary hypothesis either of pure concepts of 
                                                          
375 CPractR 5:11n 
376 Frederick Rauscher, Naturalism and Realism in Kant's Ethics (Cambridge: CUP, 2015), p.151. 
377 Immanuel Kant. ‘Inaugural Dissertation (1770)’ in David Walford (ed), ‘Theoretical Philosophy 1755-
1770.’ (Cambridge: CUP, 1992).  2:402, 2:418 
378 R3133, 16:673 
107 
 
possibility or of experience in this world, and the latter as hypothesis of 
morality. Absolute necessity cannot be proved."379 
 (In the current context, I am more concerned with the postulates of pure practical 
reason: freedom, God and the immortality of the soul).  
The term 'hypothesis' becomes distinguished in the critical writing as concerning 
theoretical reason only. It is the role of hypotheses, as noted earlier in this chapter, to 
connect our experience with explanation, grounding a regulative principle (idea) of 
reason with heuristic intent. They arise to solve particular problems. Transcendental 
hypotheses do not represent objects of cognition. In function, Kemp Smith expresses the 
view that Kant’s transcendental method “is really identical with the hypothetical method 
in physical sciences.”380 We cannot, for example, have any insight in concreto into the 
soul, although this idea of reason makes it possible to think the unity of powers of mind. 
This use of an idea of reason is valuable. But a transcendental hypothesis can offer 
nothing, for it cannot concern itself with the empirical, the world of appearances. It has 
no direct explanatory power for anything empirical. Hypotheses cannot ground 
theoretical propositions but can defend them by frustrating the "opponent's illusory 
insights." Or as he puts it in a polemical phrase, "hypotheses are therefore allowed in 
the field of pure reason only as weapons of war."381 An opponent may assert that sea 
mist is a wizard’s magical poisonous vapour, but we can defend against the truth of this 
transcendent assertion in dealing with the necessity of a valid empirical basis. 
Hypotheses are valid "only relative to opposed transcendent pretensions."382  
                                                          
379 R4580, 17:600 
380 Norman Kemp Smith A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, p.xxxviii 
381 CPR A777/B805 
382 CPR A781/B809 
108 
 
Although in the first Critique, "postulate" does not refer to moral claims and 
"hypotheses" is limited to theoretical claims, towards the end of the entire Critique in 
the Canon,383 Kant offers the most detailed discussion of the comparison of the 
epistemological status of theoretical and practical reason before the Groundwork.  Kant 
raises the claim that the concept of God may refer to an actual object. If "human 
reason....accomplishes nothing in its pure use" and the "greatest and perhaps only utility 
of all philosophy of pure reason is ...only negative", then what remains is the 
"unquenchable desire to find a firm footing beyond all bounds of experience"384 and 
leads to the hope that practical reason will guide us. As regards the objects of the 
freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul and the existence of God, the theoretical 
interest of reason is "very small".385 These objects lie chiefly within the purview of 
practical reason so that investigating nature will not help us. There can be no canon of 
theoretical reason because synthetic cognition of pure theoretical reason is impossible. 
Pure reason cannot create knowledge: that requires the use of the understanding to 
which reason will apply its rules. If a canon is a general law or rule or principle or 
criterion by which something is judged, then it cannot be applied to pure theoretical 
reason’s claims because theoretical reason has only the modest function of protecting 
against falsehood or guarding against error. Only practical reason can have a canon 
where the practical concerns moral laws, which permit a canon. (Practical law creates 
its objects, by contrast with theoretical reason to which objects are given). As concepts 
or ideas of reason, God, freedom and immortality are permitted concepts due to their 
relationship to the moral law. "If these three cardinal propositions are not at all 
necessary for our knowing, and yet are insistently recommended to us by our reason, 
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their importance must really concern only the practical."386 This leads to his famous 
three questions: what is to be done if the will is free, if there is a God, and if there is a 
future world?387 The plain interpretation here is not whether there is a concept that 
exists of God, but whether God exists. And the latter is a theoretical question that Kant 
has already addressed in the fourth antinomy of pure reason and elsewhere. What is 
added in the canon is the distinction between such belief as practical or "doctrinal"388 
with Kant seemingly defending the latter on teleological grounds that he had previously 
dismissed when discussing knowledge, not belief in God.389  
In claiming to cognise (- to know-) a priori, Kant asserts that we cannot be concerned 
with belief or opinion: we know. For example, mathematics is made up of synthetic a 
priori judgements. It follows that a mere opinion about mathematics is not allowed. “It 
is absurd to have an opinion in pure mathematics: one must know.” On the other hand, 
in a practical relation for the absolutely necessary ends of morality, we can take 
something that is theoretically insufficient to be true as a belief.390 Moral belief differs. 
My duty is to fulfil the moral law whose ends are fixed for me. The condition of those 
ends, which brings them all together and validates them is the existence of God and a 
future world. On this view the postulates of God and a future world become essential to 
morality. Hence the assertion that “I will inexorably believe in the existence of God and 
a future life."391  
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However, these grounds are subjective, based on moral certainty, and it is therefore 
impossible on moral grounds to know there is a God. As it is "woven with my moral 
disposition", Kant cannot say "It is morally certain that there is a God," only "I am 
morally certain etc."392 Kant's conception of belief in the canon is similar to the use of 
'postulate' in the pre- critical and earlier writing in the first Critique: implicitly also a 
stronger hypothesis from practical reason.  
Kant deals with the postulates in most detail in his second Critique. The frequent use of 
the term "exists" in connection with immortality and God suggests that Kant is using the 
postulates as an existence claim regarding transcendent entities. Against this, he does 
not claim to prove the existence of God through the postulates, although, in the words of 
one commentator,393 "Kant's failure to prove that such supersensible objects are real 
does not entail that he is committed to anti-realism about them, nor does the possibility 
of scepticism." That is to say, the inability to prove the existence of God or immortality 
by either theoretical or, through the doctrine of the postulates, by practical reason, does 
not mean that we can dismiss the possibility of their existence as real. Regardless of his 
actual stance, a realist may believe that the validity of the moral law involves a 
commitment to the reality of transcendental freedom, God or immortality on Kant’s 
account i.e. the postulates.394 
 
4.9 Justifying the postulates? 
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Postulates may result from a need of pure practical reason.395 The near contemporary 
opposition to this statement came from Winzenmann396,397, who argued that where need 
is based on inclination one cannot postulate the existence of its object.398 Wishing 
something has no relevance as to its being the case. To the question as to whether 
rational belief always requires evidence in favour of its truth, Kant says 'no'. There may 
be occasions where the principle that rational belief always requires supporting 
evidence is not valid. In order that a belief may be warranted without evidence, two 
conditions must apply. Firstly, no evidence or a priori argument could decide or refute 
the belief: it is theoretically undecidable. Secondly, if one holds the moral law to be 
binding, one is subjectively necessitated to hold that belief. That is rational: one 
couldn’t hold the moral law and reject belief in the postulate. It is 'practically necessary'. 
Here then is Kant's justification for the concept of the postulate. It "is a theoretical (my 
italics) proposition (i.e. a proposition aimed at capturing 'what is', aiming at being true) 
that is both theoretically undecidable and practically necessary."399  
In arguing that this rational belief is not a command,400 Kant modifies his earlier 
assertion that exact conformity of happiness and moral worth is impossible to conceive 
by us - and hence the need for the postulate of God's existence. He now adds that it may 
be impossible for our reason to imagine such an exact relationship of proportionality 
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between happiness and moral worth, but it cannot be proved impossible according to 
nature’s universal laws.401  
The case for the postulate of God seems weaker, for Kant now appears to concede that 
proportionate happiness may be possible after all without God: reason cannot decide 
this objectively. But he adds that this necessity for God "can never fall into unbelief."402 
Since subjectively we cannot disbelieve the need for such a link between morality and 
happiness, the implication is that belief in God remains Kant's position. Kant has 
already acknowledged the impossibility of proving God's existence from knowledge of 
the world403: there is only one way to arrive at "this cognition, namely, as pure reason to 
start from the supreme principle of its pure practical use...and determine its object."404 
The concept of God belongs to morals, not physics.405  
The function of God as a concept - or indeed as an actuality - is a postulate of practical 
reason in order to serve a function, namely that of justifying the highest good. 
Theoretical reason, of course, has no role in the generation of the (moral) postulates. It 
has been suggested that "the practical extension of our cognition by the postulates does 
not concern the existence of God and immortality, but only the objective reality of our 
concepts of them."406 This follows from Kant’s exposition of the requirement of 
practical reason for the postulates. Although theoretical cognition is justified in 
assuming the postulates, it doesn’t expand their use for theoretical purposes; and the 
postulates are essential for practical reason to realise the highest good with the concept 
of God.407 It does not follow that actual existence is excluded. Kant thinks we have a 
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consciousness of a duty to God both for theoretical and practical purposes, but that this 
is an idea that proceeds from our own reason i.e. not from revealed religion.408 When 
Kant writes that the postulates receive "objective reality",409 he means that the content 
of these ideas is specific enough to refer to determinate objects. His argument is that an 
“apodictic practical law” makes necessary conditions of them in what it commands we 
have as an object. If the practical law commands a certain specific object (or ‘end’), 
certain conditions, the postulates, are essential for the end - which here is the highest 
good. They are not cognitions but transcendent thoughts “in which there is nothing 
impossible.”410 Otherwise the postulates would be mere 'forms of thought' without 
'sense and reference'. "All that is gained by the postulates for the purposes of theoretical 
cognition is that otherwise merely 'logically possible' and thus 'problematical' concepts 
now...have real possibility."411 
Apart from the footnote below, I set aside the controversy interpreting Kant's Opus 
Postumum.412  
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 One commentator suggests that the key concept in understanding the need for and role 
of the postulates of practical reason is that of the reductio ad absurdam practicum.413 If 
an end is impossible of attainment, I am not obliged to pursue it. That impossibility 
implies logical impossibility rather than practical impossibility. For example, if I am 
going to participate in a 100 metre sprint race with Usain Bolt, it is a practical, but not a 
logical, impossibility that I will win. In the case of moral action, I cannot be required to 
attempt what is logically impossible to achieve: ought implies can. Kant exemplifies 
this rule in stating that if the highest good is impossible of attainment, then the moral 
law which promotes it is false: it is "fantastic and directed to empty imaginary ends."414 
On this basis, defending the moral law means defending the (logical) possibility of the 
highest good. The reductio ad absurdam practicum arises because if God's existence or 
immortality is denied, the moral law must be denied; but this is absurd because the 
moral law is known to be valid, as shown in the Analytic of the second Critique. Kant 
appears to modify this viewpoint in the third Critique in writing,  
"this proof....is not meant to say that it is just as necessary to assume the 
existence of God as it is to acknowledge the validity of the moral law, hence he 
that whoever cannot convince himself of the former can judge himself free of 
the latter. No!"415  
He goes on in this passage to explore its ramifications. The moral law is apodictic, 
independent of theoretical reason.416 The Antinomy of practical reason417 that Kant sets 
up concerns theoretical illusions, but about morality: and it is theoretical illusions that 
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concern Kant in the first Critique.418 I discuss the antinomy of practical reason in more 
detail in ch7 and ch9. 
Kant's argument using the ad absurdum practicum applies also in considering the third 
postulate, that of freedom: 
"The concept of freedom...constitutes the keystone of the whole structure of a 
system of pure reason, even of speculative reason...freedom is real, for this idea 
reveals itself through the moral law."419  
Indeed freedom and the moral law are equated at times or seen to imply each other.420 
Kant views the moral law as the 'fact of reason'421, at least in the second Critique.422 The 
moral argument for freedom must rest on the way in which it "reciprocally implies" the 
moral law.423 First he asks where freedom comes from: where does our knowledge of 
the unconditionally practical start? He answers: "it cannot start from freedom". We have 
no immediate consciousness of freedom, nor can we derive it from experience. The 
former is impossible as our first concept of freedom is negative; and experience cannot 
give it to us either, because experience leads us to the law of appearances only. The 
answer is therefore the moral law of which we are conscious as soon as we draw up 
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maxims of the will for ourselves. If we ask how we become conscious of the moral law, 
it is similar to awareness of pure theoretical principles: by attending to the necessity 
with which reason prescribes those principles to us and to setting aside all empirical 
conditions. In sum,  
"one would never have ventured to introduce freedom into science had not the 
moral law, and with it practical reason, come in and forced this concept upon us. 
But experience also confirms this order of concepts in us."424  
The moral law commands us to will autonomously and determine our wills according to 
the legislative form of our maxims. Moral volition must therefore be by grounds that are 
not events in nature: that is, a free will. Wood states: 
"Freedom is then the condition which must be assumed, presupposed, and 
believed of our own will if moral volition in general is to be conceived as a 
possibility for us."425  
Freedom must be postulated for this kind of volition. Only a will that is free can realise 
the ideas of God and immortality by accepting and willing the highest good. Freedom 
must be postulated for this end in obedience to the moral law to be promoted. 
Summarising: if my will is not free, I can consider denying autonomous willing; to obey 
the moral law I must will autonomously; denying a free will means denying that I obey 
the moral law; but, I am aware that I must observe the moral law unconditionally. 
Hence I reach an absurdum practicum, an intolerable conclusion about myself as a 
moral agent.  
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The moral arguments for all three of the postulates of practical reason are thus 
essentially similar. All of them, says Kant, “proceed from a principle of morality.”426 
The principle of morality, in its turn, is not a postulate; rather it is a law, the moral law, 
whose function is to determine the will and thus necessitate, with immediate effect, 
right conduct. All three postulates are presuppositions and all three have a practical 
reference necessarily. Moral conduct requires all three of the postulates as conditions of 
its realisation. When Kant writes that they give objective reality to the idea of 
theoretical reason in general, the suggestion appears to be that God and immortality 
gain their reality through their connection with freedom. None of these three extend 
theoretical cognition although all three give reality to ideas of theoretical reason in 
general (Kant’s italics). ‘Freedom’, ‘God’ and ‘immortality’ as postulates have 
objectivity as concepts – which is not the same as an ontological claim that freedom, 
God and immortality exist. Theoretical reason is unable to prove that. Considered as 
ideas of theoretical reason, all three are not cognitions but “transcendent thoughts in 
which there is nothing impossible.”427 Morally, all three are essential to moral conduct. 
All three postulates are essential to the concept of the highest good as I will argue in ch9 
and on that basis the arguments for the three are essentially similar. Immortality “flows 
from” the necessity for time to fulfil the moral law’s requirements; freedom from the 
need to presuppose independence from the world of sense and to determine one’s will 
according to the intelligible world’s law; and God from the “necessity of the condition 
for such an intelligible world to be the highest good” – to assume that we must 
presuppose an independent good that is highest. And that is the existence of God.428 He 
concludes that “no sophistry will ever convince even the most common human being 
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that they are not true concepts.”429 Transcendent thoughts assist in the pursuit of 
reason’s interests and it is to the latter concept that I now turn.  
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5.1 What does Kant mean by 'interest'? 
Reason has interests. As the faculty of principles, it is reason that determines the 
interests of all the powers of the mind including its own:430 a creative role extending the 
features of reason explicated in ch3 and ch4. Summarised in the second Critique, “(t)he 
interest of its speculative use consists in the cognition of the object up to the highest a 
priori principles.”431 That is, theoretical reason’s interest lies in knowing things 
according to intuitions processed by the understanding in the categories.  “That of its 
practical use consists in the determination of the will with respect to the final and 
complete end.”432 That is, practical reason’s interest lies in determining ‘Willkür’ so that 
we do what we either want (pathological) or ought (moral) to do to realise an end (thus 
linking interest to inclination (pathological) or to practical reason (moral)). Three 
questions bring reason’s interests together. “What can I know? What should I do? What 
can I hope?”433 As I will argue in chapter seven, reason’s interest will be shown to be 
“complete in practical use alone.”434 
In this chapter, I will further define ‘interests’ and claim that this concept may be used 
in different ways in theoretical reason. Those ways may be subjective and impossible to 
express in an exact rule. In practical reason, the concept must be different in some 
respects because it is possible to make a distinction between interests that are mediate 
and immediate. I will demonstrate this distinction. I will argue, practical reason has an 
interest in promoting theoretical reason. The concept of interests also plays a role in 
Kant’s aesthetic philosophy and its relation to the moral.    
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5.2 What is the interest of theoretical reason? 
 After considering ‘interest’ in theoretical reason, its use in practical reason can be 
compared to ascertain the consistency of Kant’s interpretation.  
In the first Critique, Kant refers to two conflicting interests of reason: 
“[R]eason shows two interests that conflict with each other: on the one side, an 
interest in the domain (universality) in regard to genera, on the other an interest 
in content (determinacy) in respect of the manifoldness of species; for in the first 
case the understanding thinks much under its concepts, while in the second it 
thinks all the more in them. This expresses itself in the very different ways of 
thinking among students of nature; some of whom (who are chiefly speculative) 
are hostile to differences in kind, while others (chiefly empirical minds) 
constantly seek to split nature into so much manifoldness that one would almost 
have to give up the hope of judging its appearances according to general 
principles.435  
Reason’s interests in genera and species differ. Variety and agreement are in tension. 
On the one hand are those whose orientation in thinking is to seek unanimity in nature: 
that is, to seek common features and then group entities together. Kant instances the old 
scholastic rule: one should not multiply principles without necessity. On the other hand, 
such unity may not be a true unity or unanimity of features but a "concealed unity": that 
is, a convenient regulatory way of interpreting nature but not belonging to its essence. 
Thus "reason is free to admit that it is just as possible that all powers are different in 
kind and that its derivation of them from a systematic unity is not in conformity with 
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nature."436 On the one hand, we can presuppose a systematic unity of substances’ many 
powers437 in species, genera and families or, on other hand, we can abandon the search 
for unity (an idea that “has been pursued so eagerly in all ages”) and use the principle of 
species which requires  “manifoldness and variety in things”.438 We can, in the jargon of 
medicine (and other disciplines), be lumpers or splitters.  
This terminology is traditionally attributed to Charles Darwin from a letter to the 
botanist JD Hooker of August 1, 1857 in which he wrote, "It is good to have hair 
splitters and lumpers", in the context of the classification of species and genera in 
plants. The same approach has been used in literary studies: for example, in classifying 
Shakespeare plays, the splitter will insist on the authority of one correct text, the lumper 
on all texts with certain common features.439 A microbiologist comments, as another 
example, that  
"bases for differences involve choices of characters and of ideas applied, 
the narrowness of expertise of workers in the field, the amount of 
utilizable [reliable] data available, and the degree of recognition of 
balance relative to groups at the same or nearby levels... Neither lumping 
nor splitting...is necessarily "bad," and different situations may justify 
one or the other action. This raises the more than merely philosophical 
question for drawing conclusions of the taxonomic closeness or 
separateness of any groups of organisms." 440  
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The same issue arises in other fields. These include economics,441  history,442 
languages,443 and even liturgical studies.444  Lumpers and splitters are, then, opposing 
factions in any discipline that has to place individual examples into rigidly defined 
categories. To return to our example of medicine, it may suit us – that is, satisfy our 
reason's interest - to discuss 'connective tissue disease' or to discuss sub-species of 
rheumatoid, polyarteritis, lupus, scleroderma and so on. How we classify will fulfil the 
interests of our reason in different ways. Kant even suggests a second principle to 
contrast with the parsimonious one of the scholastics: namely, the varieties of entities 
are not to be diminished rashly. Our conclusion (or acknowledgement of the search for 
both theoretical unity and also the attractions of empirical differentiation) is that interest 
is signifying a pre-commitment to a way of thought about how things are. That way of 
thought is not rationally founded - we could, rationally, consider nature either way and 
have an interest in so doing. Our interest here cannot be determined by reason itself. In 
this context however, interest as a concept belongs to theoretical and not to practical 
reason.  
Kemp Smith445 suggests that the examples that Kant uses to illustrate his argument are 
best ignored. I concur. His psychological, chemical, and astronomical examples hinder 
rather than help in the light of modern science. Citing the concepts of “pure earth, pure 
water, pure air”446 as being “concepts of Reason” is especially bewildering. They are 
empirical hypotheses, formulated for the purposes of purely physical explanation, not 
universal, regulative principles. 
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Whether reason's conflicting interests are truly conflicting or whether either may be 
valid depends on its context. Suppose we are splitters: in the case before us we interpret 
our data to diagnose polyarteritis. The emphasis in our knowledge concentrates upon the 
specific features of entities that apply to a group within the greater number. We insist 
that we have a discrete entity named polyarteritis and that our knowledge of that entity 
is based on scientific data identified in the literature as ' polyarteritis'. Upon those data 
and the conclusions drawn from them - that is, upon that knowledge - we manage the 
problem before us: a patient with particular symptoms and signs. We have committed 
ourselves to a way of thinking in which small specific entities are the key to 
interpretation. Let us suppose that new data become available. These data are not about 
the specific entity of polyarteritis but concern the larger umbrella entity of 'connective 
tissue disease'. We find these data sufficiently convincing to influence actions we may 
take or recommend. They represent a different way of managing the problem before us, 
yet equally valid as the specifics that have guided us so far. Our interests are then 
divided. We have an interest in both interpretations, rationally indistinguishable. 
Choosing one this morning will not exclude our interest in the other tomorrow 
afternoon. Both will have the status of (interim) knowledge. How we construe the 
patient’s interests rests upon the interests of reason, indeed is reason’s interest. 
Thus from the viewpoint of a modern philosopher of science, “there is no objective 
reason to prefer the unified over the dis-unified explanation. Science has room for both 
lumpers and splitters.”447 Nevertheless, there surely has to be a reason for preferring the 
position of the lumper rather than that of the splitter. The choice is not random. Those 
reasons belong to practical reason which determines what we ought to do with the 
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interpretation that theoretical reason offers us and will determine the maxim upon which 
we will act. It is practical reason's interests that determine the acceptability of which of 
theoretical reason's claims should be enacted, which theoretical reason cannot resolve 
itself. In this scenario, it appears that practical reason can claim primacy. Hence my 
claim above that practical reason has an interest in promoting theoretical reason. 
5.3 What is the interest of practical reason? 
 In his practical philosophy, Kant has rather more to say about interests and it differs 
from the above account. ‘Interest’ is first introduced and defined in Groundwork448 in a 
footnote that relates to a preceding discussion in which Kant has observed that, while 
objective laws should determine the will, “this will is not by its nature necessarily 
obedient.” Imperatives state what should be done or avoided, determined by practical 
good by means of practical reason (a principle that holds for us all). An interest is then 
defined as “the dependence of a contingently determinable will on principles of reason.” 
Although a perfectly good will would come under objective laws of the good, it is 
subjective, as something practically (and contingently) determinable. To express that 
differently, it requires an interest to act on the dependent will (which is not always 
conforming to reason). Interest drives a finite rational agent towards an end.449 The 
“human will can take an interest in something without therefore acting from interest.” 
Kant then distinguishes the practical interest in the action from the pathological interest. 
This latter refers to the object of the action – in a sense creative of consequences. 
Pathological interests are in natural ends that satisfy desires. In practical interest, we 
take an interest in something, and in pure practical reason “all so-called moral interest 
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consists simply in respect for the law.”450 There is no higher interest than following the 
moral law, although if asked to justify this, “we could give…no satisfactory answer.451 
It just arises from “our proper self”.452 Its validity does not come from the fact that the 
law interests us, for that would be heteronomy.453  
Later in the Groundwork, he writes, 
"An interest is that by which reason becomes practical, i.e., becomes a cause 
determining the will. Hence only of a rational being does one say that he takes 
an interest in something; non-rational creatures feel only sensible impulses.”454  
If we have an interest in something, we will want to fulfil an end. That end may be 
something that we desire. Moreover, desire can be an effect rather than a cause of 
reason’s determining the will455. The feeling of respect, as I will explore in ch6, is or 
may be a product of this determination of the will. Recognising our duties, we may 
desire to do them. Kant describes this feeling of pleasure as an interest: “a connection of 
pleasure with the faculty of desire that the understanding judges to hold as a general 
rule…is called an interest.”456 Reason has the capacity to induce this feeling “of 
pleasure or delight in the fulfilment of duty.”457 Our awareness of inclinations creates 
interests. Non-human animals may have instinctive wants, but cannot reason. Kant 
continues: 
“Reason takes an immediate interest in an action only when the universal 
validity of the maxim of the action is a sufficient determining ground of the will. 
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Only such an interest is pure. But if it can determine the will only by means of 
another object of desire or on the presupposition of a special feeling of the 
subject, then reason takes only a mediate interest in the action, and since reason 
all by itself, without experience, can discover neither objects of the will nor a 
special feeling lying at its basis, this latter interest would be only empirical and 
not a pure rational interest. The logical interest of reason (to further its insights) 
is never immediate but presupposes purposes for its use."458 
Unpicking the detail of this apparently definitional explication, firstly only rational 
beings can have interests. Kant repeats this assertion in the second Critique: an interest 
"can never be attributed to any being unless it has reason."459 A non-rational animal 
cannot therefore have interests. An interest arises from the concept of an incentive 
(Triebfeder); indeed an interest signifies "an incentive of the will insofar as it is 
represented by reason." The moral law is the incentive in a morally good will, for which 
empirical ('pathological') incentives cannot have influence. For a morally good will then 
the "moral interest is a sense-free interest of practical reason alone."460 In this way an 
interest becomes a cause determining the will. If we have an incentive for a particular 
action, we should have a maxim for our action. All actions by a rational creature must 
have a subjective ground, an underlying principle, and this is incorporated in its maxim 
- indeed a maxim is a subjective principle. A maxim will therefore be based on our 
interest; and a maxim of universal validity - that is, a law - will be, in Kant's words 
"morally genuine only if it rests solely on the interests one takes in compliance with the 
law." The ‘interests one takes in compliance with the law’ could mean those interests 
which comply with the law; or, this phrase could refer to one’s interest (single) in 
                                                          
458 G 4:460n 
459 CPractR 5:79 
460 CPractR 5:79 
128 
 
complying with the moral law.  The former in supposing a multiplicity of interests 
seems the more likely interpretation. In this way Kant links three concepts: incentive, 
interest and maxim. An interest is that by which reason becomes a cause determining 
the will.  
Is there common ground between the three concepts of interest, incentive and maxim? 
Are they linked? If free from pathological interests, our interest will be rational and its 
purpose will be to obey the moral law, which will be both incentive and provide its 
object. To obey the moral law is to think a maxim that excludes self-love and its 
objects, to reject sensuous incentives. So Kant does link these three concepts. A (pure) 
interest makes pure reason a cause of the will i.e. provided the interests of self-love are 
excluded. If the interest is pure then the maxim of the action will have universal 
validity. Reason thus determines the will. "An action that is objectively practical in 
accordance with this law, with the exclusion of every determining ground of inclination, 
is called duty."461   If such grounds are excluded, only duty remains as incentive, and so 
the action is practically necessary. In submitting to the law, there may be displeasure in 
the action as we deny sensory incentives or interests ("constraint for the sensibly 
affected subject"), but if this comes from our own reason - as it must - the constraint 
also offers something "elevating".462 This effect on subjective feeling "can thus be 
called self-approbation."463 Kant continues,  
"...inasmuch as pure he cognised himself as determined to it solely by the law 
and without any interest, and now becomes conscious of an altogether different 
interest subjectively produced by the law, which is purely practical and free; and 
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his taking this interest in a dutiful action is not advised by any inclination; 
instead, reason through the practical law absolutely commands it and also 
actually produces it, because of which it has a quite special name, that of 
respect."464 
All three concepts presuppose that our natures are held back, our choices of action 
impeded, our Willkür limited by the objective law of practical reason. We have "a need 
to be impelled to activity by something because an internal obstacle is opposed to it."465 
Our reason is imperfect, but this should be the role of practical reason with whose 
objective law we should comply. Kant offers a paean of praise for practical reason: 
"There is something so singular in the boundless esteem for the pure moral law stripped 
of all advantage - as practical reason, whose voice makes even the boldest evildoer 
tremble and forces him to hide from its sight."466 Thus a "mere intellectual idea" has an 
impact on feeling that theoretical reason does not and this "feeling is inseparably 
connected with the representation of the moral law in every finite rational being." I shall 
return to discussion of the significance of moral feeling in ch6. However, to be clear at 
this stage, this feeling is not pathological and therefore identifiable with pleasure, for if 
so, it would be futile to seek it a priori. Rather it must relate to the practical only and 
the form, not content (any object), of the law. Its result is to produce an interest in 
compliance with the law called moral interest, "just as the capacity to take such an 
interest in the law (or respect for the moral law itself) is the moral feeling properly 
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speaking." "For everything practical, insofar as it contains incentives467, is related to 
feelings."468  
The concept of interest has an important role in its relation to freedom. Freedom is a 
postulate of practical reason that cannot be proved but must be presupposed as a 
property of the will of all rational beings. "A free will and a will under moral laws are 
one and the same."469  Whether a rational being makes a theoretical or a practical 
judgement, it does so without coercion or compulsion from any outside agency. 
"Reason must regard itself as the author of its principles independently of alien 
influences... the will of such a being cannot be a will of his own except under the idea of 
freedom."470 This leads to the differentiation of having (or, more precisely in this 
context, not having) an interest as opposed to taking an interest. For in answering the 
question why he should subject himself to the principle expressed in a maxim, Kant 
asserts that "no interest impels (Kant's italics) me to do so471....but that" [he] must "still 
necessarily take (again, Kant's italics) an interest in it and have insight into how this 
comes about." The latter use suggests that 'interest' can be interpreted in its ordinary 
everyday sense: interesting ourselves in some event or subject when we wish to pursue 
it and so on. Here too, we are taking an interest in exploring further the interest and 
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what it might mean. The former, by contrast, is using 'interest' to suggest any inclination 
that would yield a reward that the moral law either promises or a punishment that it 
threatens. To express that differently, the moral law may promote a course of action or 
actions that will prevent the realisation of pathological interests. It will impact on the 
interests that I already have. Acting out of this sort of inclination, of course, would not 
be acting morally but heteronomously. If my will did not give rise to a law, my will 
would have to be constrained by something else in order to conform with it. The law 
would have to carry some interest then "by way of attraction or constraint."472 
If my interest is considered to bind me to a law, it can never be a universal law. If I am 
bound by an interest - and therefore self-love - I am bound only by desire for reward or 
fear of punishment. This reason cannot support a universal law, for my interest will 
differ from others. Since there could always be circumstances in which the reward won't 
be realised, my self-interest will be better served in evading the law. However, because 
I am self-legislating my reason will accept and abide by the moral law because of my 
pride in its authorship - not the hope of reward or fear of punishment.473  
Interest as "incentive of the will insofar as it is represented by reason"474 can influence 
action insofar as action is decided by some assumption of the consequences of the 
action. We may make a judgement about the laws of nature or of morals in a given 
situation; we may be right or wrong about that; but insofar as we deliberate, our 
conception will determine what we do (or, for theoretical reason, think). The 
consequences from this may be very different from what it seemed to us beforehand - 
entirely different to the impulses of the moment. Based on what I think is knowledge of 
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myself and of the world, I act on a thought out policy and not on impulse. This is 
possible because the impulse can be integrated and controlled by interest. Interest has a 
dispositional governing character, sustained by putative knowledge of the meaning of 
situations and of the consequences of alternative action. Interest is therefore impulse 
that has been conceptually weighed and in part conceptually directed. Expressed 
differently, in addition to the interest in the moral law (which is purely rational, or 
autonomous), there is the interest that is grounded in our feelings (and therefore 
heteronomous). Willing and desiring are not synonymous: will is the activity of 
determining our practical faculties to seek an end, set by a maxim, but desire is the 
passive experience of representing an object accompanied by a feeling of pleasure.475 
Our feelings don't simply arise: they enable or promote a considered reflective decision, 
based on possible consequences and on our understanding of the world.  Intelligent 
action is action whose motive is an interest guided by appropriate conception and not 
simply blind impulse.476  
5.4 ‘Interest’ and the Metaphysics of Morals.  
Kant says more about interest in the Metaphysics of Morals, offering the definition 
quoted above.477 Again interest is linked to feeling, here to pleasure. This "combination" 
or "connection" seems to be that implied in the notion of practical pleasure described 
shortly before. Thus, the capacity of having pleasure is moral feeling, and the pleasure 
necessarily connected with desire is practical pleasure, whether it is the cause of the 
desire, or its effect. We can set aside what Kant terms 'contemplative pleasure' (or, 
'inactive delight', or 'taste') and consider practical pleasure only. The latter relates to the 
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determination of desire "caused and preceded by such pleasure." Habitual desire, he 
says, is called 'inclination' and interest is therefore the connection between practical 
pleasure and inclination so far as it is judged valid by the understanding according a 
universal rule.  Kant appears to be considering the sort of general combination 
implicated in habitual desire, but as represented as such by the understanding. Such a 
relation is not just the generic connection that any pleasure in an object's existence has 
with the faculty of desire, but a specific connection of the pleasure figuring in the 
enjoyment of a certain object with that faculty, a connection residing in an habitual 
determination of the latter - an inclination - to have that same thing as its object. So 
although this connection might hold without the subject's being aware of its generality, 
it is only through such awareness that there is any interest. Kant immediately goes on 
however, to identify an interest of the sort in question - an "interest of inclination" - 
with the pleasure itself, not, as initially suggested, with the combination of the pleasure 
with the faculty of desire. This view is confirmed in the third Critique where he states 
that interest is "the satisfaction that we combine with the representation of the existence 
of an object.478  I follow Engstrom479 in interpreting this to mean that in the presence of 
an inclination in a connection between the pleasing experience of some object and the 
faculty of desire, a rational being may, on noticing this general connection, represent it 
conceptually, through a rule. Given the rule's generality,  
"the pleasure must itself be represented through a concept of the object, the 
representation of whose existence it accompanies. In such a case, the pleasure 
will count as an interest.” 
                                                          
478 CPJ 5:204  
479 Stephen Engstrom, ‘Reason, Desire and Will’, in Lara Denis (ed), Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: A 
Critical Guide. (Cambridge: CUP, 2010), p.41. 
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We can distinguish between an object of inclination, which could simply be a 
representation in an animal's imagination, and an object of interest whose representation 
is through a concept figuring in a rule by which the subject represents the object's 
relation to its own faculty of desire, or to itself as a living being. Kant does not identify 
this conceptual representation as an act of the faculty of desire. Although it is based on 
inclination, it cannot be the inclination. Nor can it be a wish, a choice, or an exercise of 
the will. But since he takes maxims, which are exercises of the power of choice480 to be 
founded on interest,481 482 he must see it as the basis for a certain form of desire. A 
maxim goes beyond interest in that it first introduces a conception of action through 
which the object of interest is to be made actual. 
Kant’s discussion of practical pleasure is concluded with a comment on the other way 
such pleasure may be combined with desire, as the latter's effect rather than its cause. 
Here the pleasure "must be called an intellectual pleasure and the interest in the object 
an interest of reason.”483 He is also indicating that insofar as reason determines the 
faculty of desire, it does so in a practical use, under the name of the will. Freedom is a 
transcendent concept for theoretical reason and cannot be cognised or instanced in 
experience. Its role in theoretical reason is entirely regulative therefore and not 
constitutive. In reason's practical use, freedom proves its reality by principles, which are 
laws of a causality of pure reason for determining choice.484  
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5.5 ‘Interest’ in the third Critique 
Kant offers another reflection on interest in his third Critique. He remarks that "to will 
something and to delight in the existence of the same, that is, to take an interest in it, are 
identical."485 The implication of the latter quotation is that we take an interest whenever 
we will something, whether (i) on the basis of immediate inclination, (ii) on the basis of 
considered judgement on the basis of our inclinations generally, or (iii) purely out of 
respect for the moral law. Willing implies reason and not impulse, so we do not will on 
immediate inclination. But we do will out of considered judgement on the basis of 
inclinations; and we will out of respect for the moral law. Taking an interest is equated 
with delighting in the existence of something willed: they are the same thing. On such a 
basis, interest is defined as an emotional feeling: that of delight. This is different with 
feeling as respect rather than delight. It does continue to mean that interest is equated 
with inclination, with willing limited to considered judgement of inclination or respect 
for the moral law.  
Now, Kant begins his third Critique with a key assertion about judgements of beauty (or 
more accurately, aesthetic judgements). These do not involve the understanding, nor 
lead to cognition. It is the subjective feeling of satisfaction or pleasure (or displeasure) 
that constitutes the aesthetic judgement. This satisfaction is "without any interest".486 
Interest is then defined as "the satisfaction that we combine with the representation of 
the existence of an object." The point that Kant is making is that if we consider whether 
the object of our judgement should exist or whether it is useful or a project of vanity, 
then we have gone beyond the immediate response of aesthetic judgement and 
combined that satisfaction with something else: the representation of the existence of 
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the object. In making our aesthetic judgement, we should have no interest in whether it 
exists or not: a glorious palace conjured up in my imagination should evince the same 
response whether it exists or not. Thus, for a judgement of beauty "one only wants to 
know whether the mere representation of the object is accompanied with satisfaction in 
me...not how I depend on the existence of the object."487 That is, when we have an 
interest in something, its existence produces a satisfaction or feeling of approval 
(Wohlgefallen). A judgement of pure beauty excludes such consideration and is one 
without interest. "One must not be in the least biased in favour of the existence of the 
thing, but must be entirely indifferent in this respect in order to play the judge in matters 
of taste."488 Interest is related to desire:  
"a satisfaction always has at the same time a relation to the faculty of desire, 
either as its determining ground or else as necessarily interconnected with its 
determining ground."  
Desire must relate to approval in the existence of things and therefore interests 
accompany desires. There is a distinction between acknowledging the importance that a 
judgement of beauty is disinterested with saying that it is uninteresting: on the contrary, 
it may be very interesting. As Kant says, "it is not grounded on any interest but it 
produces an interest; all pure moral judgements are like this. But the pure judgement of 
taste does not in itself even ground any interest."489 It only becomes interesting to have 
taste in society. Interest is however linked to the practical. Something that is good in 
itself pleases by means of reason alone, but the useful is good for something, that is, as 
a means. Both these varieties of the good (in itself and as a means) involve the concept 
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of an end, "hence the relation of reason to willing, and consequently a satisfaction in the 
existence of an object or of an action, i.e., some sort of interest."490 Having discussed 
the differences between the agreeable and the good, Kant argues that both have an 
interest in their object.  This includes that  
"which is good absolutely and in all respects, namely the morally good, which 
carries the highest interest with it...To will something and to have satisfaction in 
its existence, i.e., to take an interest in it, are identical."491  
Summing up, the distinction between judgements of beauty and moral judgements is the 
absence in the former of interests and the essential presence of interests in the latter. 
Aesthetic judgements are neither grounded in interest nor productive of interest. Indeed 
the concept of interest appears to have been introduced in this section of the Critique in 
order to contrast the aesthetic with the moral interests of practical reason.  
Having re-asserted the necessary absence of interest in making judgements of taste, 
Kant raises the possibility of combining the object about which the judgement has been 
made by an indirect link to “a further pleasure in its existence (as that in which all 
interest consists)”.492 This additional element could be inclination – that is, something 
empirical. Alternatively it could be something intellectual – that is, “as a property of the 
will of being determinable a priori through reason.” Both of these contain a satisfaction 
in an object’s existence. It follows that both could offer “the ground for an interest in 
that which has already pleased for itself and without respect to any sort of interest.”493  
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Empirically, it is in society that the beautiful interests. Human beings are social animals, 
then inevitably individuals communicate feeling to others in making judgements of 
beauty. Kant asserts – somewhat implausibly, I think- that a lone human on a desert 
island would not decorate the dwelling (s)he has constructed or plant some flowers, 
lacking as s/he does a community. There would be no contentment without an audience. 
Kant’s argument leads him to advance the idea that the satisfactions derived from the 
company of others and assists a “transition from sensory enjoyment to moral feeling.”494 
He makes the bolder claim that this would encourage “a mediating link in the chain of 
human faculties a priori, on which all legislation must depend.”495 This however is not 
fully justified although an empirical interest in taste “indulges” inclination, enabling a 
blending with “all the inclinations and passions that achieve their greatest variety and 
highest level in society.” 
So much for the empirical interest in the beautiful: Kant now comments on the 
intellectual interests.  
People who are interested in aesthetics (“virtuosi of taste”) are often “vain, obstinate 
and given to corrupting passions.”496 This is not a promising start for proposing a link 
between the aesthetic and the moral. Well intended people have often tried to assert a 
link between those predisposed to beauty and the virtuous. If that is not true, then moral 
feeling is different from a feeling for the beautiful and couldn’t even be united with it. 
Kant concedes this but does assert that it is a mark of a “good soul” to take an 
immediate interest in the beauty of nature: someone like this is likely to the sort of 
disposition favourable to moral feeling497 (although he distinguishes beautiful forms of 
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nature from mere “charms” in which interests are empirical.) A person with an interest 
in beautiful objects in nature (a bird, a wild flower etc) will want to protect it and has an 
intellectual interest in it as both its form and existence will please. But the interest 
would be destroyed by the discovery that the flower was artificial or the bird song an 
imitation, for it would be a mere illusion that nature had produced it. The immediate 
interest is grounded on the intuition and reflection that nature had produced it: “it must 
be nature or taken to be nature by us, for us to be able to take an immediate interest in 
the beautiful.”498. One could have an “interest of vanity” only in decorating the room 
with the fake. We have faculties of judgement for taste, not grounded upon interest; and 
of intellectual judgement for determining forms of practical maxims, not grounded on 
any interest but producing one.499 At this point, Kant makes one of the most crucial 
judgements in his third Critique: that of using the concept of interests in justifying the 
linkage between the moral and the beautiful. 
Reason has a unifying function. It produces an immediate interest in the moral feeling 
and the ideas that it creates have an objective reality (a priori and universal). Nature, he 
argues, should show some sign that it has “some sort of ground” by which to assume a 
correspondence with what it produces “with our satisfaction that is independent of all 
interest.” He writes: 
“…reason must take an interest in every manifestation in nature of a 
correspondence similar to this; consequently the mind cannot reflect on the 
beauty of nature without finding at the same time to be interested in it. Because 
of this affinity, however, this interest is moral, and he who takes such an interest 
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in the beautiful in nature can do so only insofar as he has already firmly 
established his interest in the morally good.”500 
This brings us to Kant’s conclusion: a predisposition to a good moral disposition in 
someone who is immediately interested in the beauty of nature should be suspected in 
such a person.501 
This conclusion may initially seem unconvincing and “too studied.” It seems odd to 
suggest that nature speaks to us figuratively in code. However it is those who are trained 
to the good that can, “even without clear, subtle and deliberate reflection” grasp this 
analogy between the pure judgement of taste,  
“which, without depending on any sort of interest, allows a pleasure to be felt 
and at the same time to be represented a priori as proper for mankind in general 
and the moral judgement, which does the same thing on that basis of concepts, 
leads to an equally immediate interest in the object of the former as in that of the 
latter: the one grounded on objective laws, the former a free interest.”502  
The interests aroused by beautiful art and beautiful nature differ. Art may be deceptive 
in aiming to represent nature and evoke the same interest as nature; but alternatively it 
may be aimed explicitly to satisfy us and hence evoke an immediate interest “by means 
of taste” but a mediate one in “the cause on which it is grounded”, that is, its end. Kant 
concedes that nature can have a similar effect if it is associated by us with a moral idea. 
However in the latter case it is the quality inherent in it, that gives rise to this 
association that interests immediately.503 White in the lily disposes us to ideas of 
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innocence, birdsong to joyfulness and contentment. The receptivity to an interest in its 
contemplation is what Kant calls the feeling for beautiful nature and he considers those 
unable to take such an interest as “coarse and ignoble” in their thinking, censoriously 
adding that they confine their pleasures “from the bottle”.504 
Finally in considering the interpretation of interest, a short comment on logic 
should be added. Logic provides the rules of thinking itself, whether theoretical or 
practical, valid for all thinking,505 as in ch3. The logical interest of reason quoted above 
from the Groundwork "presupposes purposes for its use": that is to say that it serves the 
interest of whatever kind of reasoning in which it is employed. Its interest cannot 
determine whether one form of reason, whether theoretical or practical, has primacy 
over the other.  
In Kant's view, an interest belongs to beings who are partly rational and partly sensuous. 
Moral interest is identified with the feeling of respect. Accepting that moral interest 
consists in respect for the law, we must explore his understanding of moral feeling, 
especially as respect for the law.  
"It is natural enough that he should turn to consider the feeling element in 
morality after he has established the categorical imperative. It may seem strange, 
it must seem strange, that so strong a feeling should be aroused by a morality 
which has been so abstractly analysed. How is it that man believes himself to 
feel his personal worth in obedience to the categorical imperative and to estimate 
the worth of mere pleasure as nothing in comparison with this?”506  
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The latter question, that Paton articulates rhetorically, reflects Kant's own doubt that we 
can ever discover or make comprehensible an interest which the human being can take 
in moral laws. Yet he says,  
"he does really take an interest in them, the foundation of which in us we call 
moral feeling, which some have falsely given out as the standard for our moral 
appraisal whereas it must rather be regarded as the subjective effect the law 
exercises on the will, to which reason alone delivers the objective grounds."507  
The distinction between the interests of pure reason and those of theoretical and 
practical reason must be explored further, linked with the associated assertions of the 
primacy of practical reason in the context of reason's unity. Before reaching those 
issues, I will explore further the connection of action with feeling and the importance of 
so-called moral feeling for Kant. Feeling, after all, at first glance might appear to be 
diametrically opposed to reason and hence destructive to the idea of its unity. 
'Interest' as it applies to theoretical reason and 'interest' as it applies to practical reason 
(moral interest) turns out to be a broader concept than simply having or pursuing an 
interest. It may be empirical or conceptual. It is relevant to aesthetic judgement; to 
respect for the moral law and to moral feeling; to both theoretical and practical reason; 
and even to the primacy of the latter over the former.  
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6.1 Introduction 
Kant's insistence that moral worth comes from acting from the moral law has led many 
readers to discount any role of feeling in his moral philosophy. Isn’t Kant’s philosophy 
an exploration of reason and its interests, not feeling? Actions based on incentives that 
are not moral but whose origin is desire ("pathological") are of no moral worth, even if 
they are in conformity with duty. One commentator caricatures this as follows: "he 
cares more about rules than about ends, he is wedded to impersonal calculation, he is 
unwilling to acknowledge his own particularity, he eschews all feeling, even kind and 
warm feelings. All the while he insists on duty for its own incomprehensible sake and 
generally comes off as a very cold fish."508 This is an old view – as in Friedrich 
Schiller's satire: 
"Scruple of conscience. 
Gladly I serve my friends but, alas, I do it with pleasure 
Hence I am plagued with doubt that I am not a virtuous person. 
Ruling 
Surely, your only resource is to try to despise them entirely,  
And then with aversion, do what your duty enjoins you." 509 
 
"Poor poetry and worse criticism," says Paton,510 but still believed.511 Kant refuted this 
view directly in writing that love is  
“an indispensible addition to human nature’s imperfection (to that aspect of it 
whereby man must be coerced to do what by virtue of laws reason prescribes to 
human nature). For what one does not do gladly he does so grudgingly – even to 
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the point of sophistical pretext to avoid duty’s command – that this incentive (of 
duty) cannot be counted on to any great degree unless the command is 
accompanied by love.”512 
Setting this late clarification aside, this erroneous view clearly originates from the 
Groundwork. If someone does an action "without any inclination, simply from duty; 
then the action first has its genuine moral worth"513 and "an action from duty is to put 
aside entirely the influence of inclination and with it every object of the will".514 Or 
again, in discussing an honourable deed,  
"I assert...an action (of this kind), however it may conform with duty and 
however amiable it may be, has nevertheless no true moral worth but is on the 
same footing with other inclinations...for the maxim lacks moral content, namely 
that of doing such actions not from inclinations but from duty."515   
In the later second Critique,516 he writes that "what is essential to any moral worth of 
actions is that the moral law determine the will immediately", which appears to mean 
'not by feeling'. Shortly after he adds that for an action compatible (only) with duty but 
motivated by means of a feeling, the action will not contain morality. As Geiger puts 
it,517 Kant's moral philosophy "is often faced with the charge that in its conception of 
moral agency feelings play no part whatsoever."  
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In this chapter, I want to take issue with Hume’s assertion that “reason can never 
produce any action or give rise to volition.”518 I will argue that feeling is not only an 
important feature of Kant’s theory of (moral) action but also relates to reason through 
the concept of respect. This requires an interpretation of respect as feeling, and with it 
an awareness of how this fits into Kant’s taxonomy of emotions or feelings, and a 
demonstration that respect can be related to reason. It should bring us to the view 
articulated towards the end of his active career: 
“...respect for the moral law within us would thus be moral feeling..., which does 
not constitute an end of the natural predisposition except so far as it is the 
motivating force of the will.”519 
 
6.2 Is there a role for feeling in motivation? 
In the 1920s, Field asserted that "Kant's fallacy lies in thinking that just the bare 
knowledge that an action is of a certain [moral] kind is sufficient to move us to do that 
action."520 This counter-intuitively suggests that moral motivation is free of feeling. 
Reason alone surely does not move us to action. It is problematic for us to believe that 
an action cannot have moral worth if there is supporting inclination or desire; or to 
judge a grudging or resentfully performed act done from duty to be morally superior 
than if it had been done from love or with pleasure. We are more attracted to Aquinas’s 
view that “it pertains to the perfection of moral goodness that a man should be moved 
                                                          
518 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), Book II, Part II, 
Section III. Harmondsworth: Penguin 1969 
519 Rel 6:27 
520 GC Field, ‘A Criticism of Kant’, in Wilfred Sellars and John Hospers (eds), Readings in Ethical 
Theory , 2nd edn (New York:Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970), pp.704-7 
147 
 
towards the good not only by his will but also by his sensitive appetite.”521 Perhaps the 
key here is that while reason alone may not move us, respect for reason may and Kant is 
clear that we hold the moral law in respect. "All so-called moral interest consists simply 
in respect for the law."522 
This raises questions: firstly, is respect a feeling? If so, is it the result of the moral law 
or the motivating feeling for our moral actions? Does Kant hold a consistent view of 
respect? What place is there for virtues that appear, sometimes briefly, in the 
Metaphysics of Morals? What place for love, beneficence, conscience, sympathy, 
compassion and their opposites? If morality is not grounded in our sensuous and 
affective natures, (Aquinas’s “sensitive appetites”), how are we moved by moral 
considerations at all? How can we account for moral motivation if divorcing the basis of 
morality from the pathological and therefore motivational side of human agents? 
In ch2, I alluded to the influence of British 'sentimentalist' philosophers on Kant's moral 
theory. But although Kant retained a place for feeling in his moral psychology, he did 
not return to moral sense theory during the critical period. It is not our feelings that 
determine the worthiness of our actions or determine their status as moral or prudent 
according to the mature Kant; rather it is his mature view that feeling may have a role in 
our motivations and that awareness of our actions complying with or breaking the moral 
law may lead to feelings. Thus he writes that moral feeling "is the susceptibility to feel 
pleasure or displeasure merely from being aware that our actions are consistent with or 
contrary to the law of duty."523 While Kant may have maintained a continuing regard for 
the work of the British sentimentalists, his use of the term "metaphysics of morals" from 
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the 1760s onwards signifies the change in his thinking.524 Concepts and principles must 
be the foundation of moral judgement: a beneficent action done entirely out of 
sympathy lacks moral worth. No moral sense theorist could agree such a claim. I claim 
that ‘respect’ is interpreted by Kant as feeling i.e. it has a subjective dimension. On that 
basis, feeling has quite a big place in Kant’s philosophy. In order to make progress in 
this discussion, word use and translation must also be considered. 
 
6.3  Respect as feeling? 
Kant's initial response as to whether respect is 'feeling' is that it is feeling with a 
difference. Thus he writes,  
"...though respect is a feeling, it is not one received by means of influence; it is, 
instead, a feeling self-wrought by means of a rational concept and therefore 
specifically different from all feelings of the first kind, which can be reduced to 
inclination or fear. What I cognize immediately as a law for me, I cognize with 
respect which signifies merely consciousness of the subordination of my will to 
a law without the mediation of other influences on my sense. Immediate 
determination of the will by means of the law and consciousness of this is called 
respect, so that this is regarded as the effect of the law on the subject, and not as 
the cause of the law."525 
This seems an odd answer. It argues firstly that respect is somehow a different sort of 
feeling than other feelings that we experience, such as love or envy. It does not exist 
from “means of influence.” Secondly, it is "self-wrought" which suggests that unlike 
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love, it can be commanded, like beneficence from duty.526 And thirdly, it is an effect of 
the moral law, reinforcing the view that feeling does not create the moral law in a 
Hutchesonian sleight of hand. It seems that Kant wants to have his cake and eat it. On 
the one hand “respect is a feeling” while on the other it is created by “a rational 
concept.” We ask what is the relationship between feeling and rational concept? 
Clarifying Kant’s terminology, the word 'respect' itself requires discussion. The German 
word that Kant uses is 'Achtung'. One scholar, HJ Paton, translates this as 'reverence' 
and substitutes for what he considers Kant's unsatisfactory third proposition527 in the 
Groundwork: "to act for the sake of duty is to act out of reverence for the law." (He also 
invites comparison from the second Critique: "that the action takes place from duty, that 
is, for the sake of the law alone.") 528 Paton's preference for 'reverence' relates to the 
associations in English of the word 'reverence' with religious emotion; and Paton argues 
that  
"Kant himself feels most intensely this emotion of reverence for the law, and 
that both from his description and from the language he uses, the feeling in 
question is something almost akin to religious emotion."529   
In it "I feel at once humbled and also uplifted and exalted." Moreover Kant himself 
translates 'Achtung' into the Latin 'reverentia'. But Achtung does not include fear as 
Paton suggests: rather, the instance he quotes in the Metaphysics in describing 
conscience asserts awe as being "respect coupled (my italics) with fear."530  It is 
noteworthy that elsewhere in the Metaphysics where 'reverentia' is used, Kant repeats 
                                                          
526 G 4:399 
527 G 4:400 
528 CPractR 5:81 
529 HJ Paton, The Categorical Imperative, p.63. 
530 MM 6:438 
150 
 
his assertion in the Groundwork that respect is "something merely subjective, a feeling 
of a special kind."531 Words can have several meanings: Paton's association of the 
German word 'Achtung' as the equivalent of 'look out' or, in French, 'Attention' is 
irrelevant.532 Kant himself occasionally uses 'Respekt' but also 'Ehrfurcht' when he 
clearly means 'reverence'.533 He also uses 'Achtung' in clearly different ways. For 
example, in the third Critique, when discussing the quality of the satisfaction in the 
judging of the sublime, he defines 'Achtung' as "the feeling of the inadequacy of our 
capacity for the attainment of an idea that is a law for us"534 while he uses the Latin 
'observantia' to indicate the attitude owed to all human beings simply as human 
being.535 Even in English, ‘respect’ sometimes relates to a person's character or 
achievements but sometimes merely to the office that is held; and respect comes in 
degrees - esteem would be a word conveying a higher regard than simple respect, so that 
respect-worthiness varies. There is respect that is owed to all, even if undeserved; and 
there is respect which is earned, or as Baron puts it, “in some other way a case of special 
merit.”536 Paton is in a minority of philosophers in using the term 'reverence', but in 
agreement that respect or reverence both describe a feeling. I will continue majority 
practice in using 'respect' in this thesis. Respect then is a feeling that either results from 
the recognition of the binding effect of the moral law on our wills or is created by it. To 
act from respect for the moral law is the same as to act for the sake of duty. 
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This discussion, in turn, relates to a wider interest in feeling, whether reason-related or 
reason-caused affects, which Kant expounds late in his career: notably in the 
Metaphysics of Morals (1797) and his Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view 
(1798), although Kant discusses reason- caused affects as early as the third Critique of 
1790. He uses a variety of terms, often overlapping or not capable of an exact 
translation: inclinations (Neigungen), affects (Affekten), passions (Leidenschaften), 
desires (Begierden). ‘Emotion’, for example, can be Gefühl, Empfindung, Affekt or 
Rührungen. Inclination, defined as habitual sensible desire,537 may relate to hunger 
(non-moral) or love for others (moral); and it cannot be a reliable motivation or criterion 
of moral action. We can have strong or weak inclinations and inclinations for the wrong 
as well as the right. Inclinations come from nature, not reason, and therefore are not a 
product of freedom. To be moral, “reason must exercise dominion over sensibility.”538 
However the denial of a moral role to inclination does not exclude such a role to all 
other feelings. Sensible feeling underlies our inclinations and “is the condition of that 
feeling we call respect.”539 If we desire something we represent it with a feeling of 
pleasure; moral willing or desiring is only possible with some kind of feeling. Desire 
necessarily involves feelings.540 
In the Metaphysics Kant states that moral feeling is a ‘moral endowment’ that nobody 
has a duty to acquire.541 He defines it as “the susceptibility to feel pleasure or 
displeasure merely from being aware that our actions are consistent with or contrary to 
the law of duty.” The representation of a possible action leads us to determine our 
choice through a feeling of pleasure or displeasure.  That feeling can be moral or 
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pathological. Upon the former is a feeling that can only follow the law. This appears to 
argue against respect as a feeling being an initiator of action. It is pathological feeling 
that “precedes the representation of the law.” Moral feeling is not directed to an object 
and therefore cannot be called a ‘sense’; moreover no human is entirely without it for if 
that were the case he would be “morally dead.” We all have it within us to some degree 
therefore; there can be no duty to acquire it for we have it. Thus our obligation is to 
cultivate it and “to strengthen it through wonder at its inscrutable source.”542 Kant 
emphasises the distinction between moral feeling and moral sense: the latter implies a 
capacity for a perception, which can add to cognition. 
 
6.4  What is the relation between motivation and the feeling of respect? 
Towards the end of 1773, Kant wrote a letter to Markus Herz (1747-1803):  
"The highest ground of morality must not simply be inferred from the pleasant; 
it must itself be pleasing in the highest degree. For it is no mere speculative idea; 
it must have the power to move. Therefore, though the highest ground of 
morality is intellectual, it must nevertheless have a direct relation to the 
incentives543 of the will."544  
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Here Kant is puzzling over motivation to action. Where does it come from? Is it the case 
that practical reason itself - the moral law - can motivate and that moral feeling is its 
product and not the stimulus to moral action? Here is what is recorded in the Collins 
lectures545:  
"Moral feeling is the capacity to be affected by a moral judgement. My 
understanding may judge that an action is morally good, but it need not follow 
that I shall do that action which I judge morally good: from understanding to 
performance is still a far cry. If this judgement were to move me to do the deed, 
it would be moral feeling; but it is quite incomprehensible that the mind should 
have a motive force to judge. The understanding, obviously, can judge, but to 
give to this judgement of the understanding a compelling force, to make it an 
incentive that can move the will to perform the action - this is the philosopher's 
stone!" 
The “philosopher's stone” is the underlying problem of explaining how a principle of 
reason can move us to act without ordinary feelings of pleasure (or pain) i.e. how it can 
act as an incentive. Parallel to this is the explanation of how moral feeling follows from 
moral judgement i.e. the opposite of the British sentimentalists' views. "Respect.... is the 
effect of the law on the subject and not as the cause of the law."546 Is, we might ask, 
respect the result of the recognition of the moral law when we restrain our egoistic 
tendencies of choice: an essentially negative feeling that is too late to explain the 
structure of prudential motivation?547 
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It is impossible, Kant thinks, for a full explanation or answer to our questions to be 
made. Thus, in the third part of the Groundwork, "reason would overstep its boundaries 
if it took it upon itself to explain how pure reason can be practical." He continues, "the 
subjective impossibility of explaining the freedom of the will is the same as the 
impossibility of discovering and making comprehensible an interest which the human 
can take in moral laws.”548 Kant concedes that pleasure features:  
"in order for a sensibly affected rational being to will that for which reason alone 
prescribes the "ought", it is admittedly required that his reason have the capacity 
to induce a feeling of pleasure or of delight in the fulfilment of duty, and thus 
there is required a causality of reason to determine sensibility in conformity with 
its principles. But it is quite impossible to see, that is, to make comprehensible, a 
priori, how a mere thought which itself contains nothing sensible, produces a 
feeling of pleasure or displeasure."549 
 
6.5 Further considerations about incentives of pure practical reason 
Perhaps, if we cannot explain the freedom of the will or how our consciousness of it can 
be a determining factor in our conduct, we can at least give some account of the 
inexplicability. It might be expected that part of that account will relate our noumenal 
existence to our phenomenal one. The source of our moral feeling rests on a noumenal 
cause so, of course, it cannot be known. 
Kant devotes the third chapter of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason to its (i.e. pure 
practical reason's) incentives. In parallel with the first Critique, he explains that both 
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Critiques have an analytic. In theoretical reason this is concerned with cognition and 
therefore from where cognition begins: in an aesthetic i.e. from intuition and therefore 
sensibility. By contrast practical reason is concerned with making the objects of 
cognition real.  Thus, he states that the Analytic of pure practical reason divides the 
whole sphere of all the conditions of its use quite analogously with that of theoretical 
reason but in reverse order.550 This third chapter is (although not so entitled), thus the 
Aesthetic of Pure Practical Reason ("if I may be allowed to use, on the basis of analogy 
[this term] which [is] not entirely suitable").551 The challenge is to reconcile the idea of 
incentives in the sensible world with the noumenal world of the moral law; and to 
navigate the boundary between the psychological and the moral. How is a sensible 
being affected by the principles of pure practical reason?  
Kant had speculated about the role of good conduct motivating itself in the first 
Critique, but rapidly rejected the idea of rewards for good conduct (perhaps a lingering 
idea to be repudiated from a more orthodox Lutheranism of his early years). He wrote,  
"It is necessary that the entire course of life be subordinated to moral maxims; 
but it would at the same time be impossible for this to happen if reason did not 
connect with the moral law, which is a mere idea, an efficient cause which 
determines for the conduct in accord with this law an outcome precisely 
corresponding to our highest ends, whether in this or in another life. Thus 
without a God and a world that is now not visible to us but is hoped for, the 
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majestic ideas of morality are, to be sure, objects of approbation and admiration 
but not incentives for resolve and realisation." 552, 553 
In the third chapter of the Analytic he starts by affirming (again) that "the incentive of 
the human will...can never be anything other than the moral law"554 if this is applying to 
the will in which incentive is understood as the subjective determining ground. The 
assumption that is often made is that the moral law is adequately represented by the 
categorical imperative; and that respect for the moral law motivates obedience to that 
law independently of any moral feelings - the moral feelings result from the expression 
of that obedience, not being causative of it. The solution to the “philosopher’s stone” 
remains elusive. Perhaps we “cannot know the source of moral feeling because it rests 
on the assumption of a non-natural cause; and cannot for the same reason know it to be 
impossible.”555 In what follows I will endeavour to construct a view on how practical 
reason does or could produce moral feeling on Kant’s view. 
 
6.6 How does practical reason produce moral feeling? 
As long as the action conforms with the moral law, it will contain 'legality' if not 
morality. What Kant wants to do is to show what the moral law effects, in the light of 
the impossibility of knowing why it can be an incentive. In order to permit the moral 
law to influence the will, perhaps we must search for an alternative or complementary 
incentive. Kant then states that it is hazardous to let any other incentive cooperate 
alongside the moral law - so called over-determination. Having dispensed with that 
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idea, Kant now seeks in the rest of the Analytic to determine how the moral law can 
become the incentive.556 His conclusion: that "respect for the law is not the incentive to 
morality....This feeling (under the name of moral feeling) is therefore produced solely 
by practical reason."557 The argument runs as follows:558 
 1. As sensible beings, the matter of the faculty of desire (=objects of inclination) 
force themselves upon us. 
 2. Hence we strive to make maxims of our subjective determining grounds of 
choice  into objective determining grounds of the will (=self-love). That is, that 
happiness should have priority in our choices.  
 3. Self-love that makes itself law giving is self-conceit. 
 4. The moral law - which is objective - excludes the influence of self-love and 
infringes on self-conceit… What infringes on our self-conceit humiliates.  
 5. So, the moral law humiliates every human being when he compares it with the 
sensible propensity of his nature. 
 6. If something humiliates, it awakens respect for itself. 
 7. Therefore the moral law is even subjectively a ground of respect. 
 8. Everything in self-love belongs to inclination, which rests on feeling. 
 9. Therefore, what infringes upon the inclinations in self-love must also 
influence feeling. 
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 10. Therefore the moral law can affect feeling (my italics) (a negative effect) 
(but positive with respect to the restricting ground of pure practical reason)." It excludes 
inclinations and propensities to make them the supreme practical condition. For this no 
special kind of feeling need be assumed, under the name of a practical or moral feeling 
preceding the moral law and serving as its basis."559  
 
Inclinations arise from (usually repeated) pleasing experiences. Principles based on an 
object of desire are always empirical as the pleasure is a subjective determining ground 
of choice.560 The awareness of this object of sensible desire is pleasing, so that I want 
more of it. Any such hopes will produce pleasure at the prospect or disappointment 
(pain) at failure to achieve the object. The moral law is different: it is an objective 
determining ground and insofar as I follow it, I will experience pain if my desires are 
outside the demands of the moral law i.e. merely compatible. Even if the moral law 
would not prevent the attainment of my objects or was unlikely to do so, the form of the 
will's determination is enough to upset my inclinations - and hence the pain."All 
inclinations are pained at the prospect of the will's being determined by the moral 
law."561  
 
6.7  The relevance of the concepts of Self-love and Self-conceit 
I now pursue the concepts of self-love and self-conceit further, given their importance in 
this relationship of respect and feeling. In this, I largely follow the analysis offered by 
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Engstrom.562 Regard for oneself (or selfishness, Selbsucht) covers the two key concepts 
of self-love (Selbstliebe) and self-conceit (Eigendünkel). Both of these are feelings of 
rational creatures for they link to inclinations with an essential presumption for their 
own validity. They are not like such feelings as hunger, sexual appetite, thirst etc. Self 
love is a predominant benevolence to oneself, self-conceit a satisfaction with oneself. 
Self-love tends to believe that one's inclinations should over-ride others'. Both 
exemplify how a pathologically determined subject will maintain self directed concerns. 
In contrast to self-love (a form of love), self-conceit (a form of esteem) is not "natural 
and active in us even prior to the moral law,"563 but posterior, so to speak, to the moral 
law. Self-love and self-conceit are directed to oneself in the parallel way that love and 
respect (as a form of esteem) relate to others. Any object of inclination can be 
something we love. Leibniz loved his insects,564 a benefactor his beneficiaries, Kant his 
carrots. Self-love tends to believe that my benevolence to myself extends to my holding 
that I am a suitable object for the benevolence of any other person, that is, it has a 
tendency to objectivity.565 Self-love making itself lawful can be called self-conceit, says 
Kant - that is, the latter arises from the former. Just as self-love can become self-esteem 
through the activities that determine our happiness, so a cognitive activity to 'lay down 
the law' for others lies at the heart of self-conceit. As Engstrom puts it,566 in self-love, a 
passive, experiencing subject liable to feel pleasure and pain, gives rise to an active, 
cognising subject, knowing what ends should be pursued. Esteem is directed at other 
persons and relates to respect, which is also "always directed only to persons, never to 
things."567 The second difference between self-love and self-conceit is that the latter is 
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always relative - a comparison of ourselves with others as worthy of greater esteem. 
Conceit is not satisfied in being the same as others and leads to deprecating them or 
regarding them with contempt. It makes practical judgements on the superior rectitude 
of the self conceited agent. It implies re-phrasing the famous opening proposition of the 
Groundwork as: 'Nothing in the world can be regarded without qualification as good, 
except MY will.'568 In the Religion, Kant argues that man has a propensity to evil, 569 
"evil by nature, ...so that evil can be predicated of a man as a species." Of the incentives 
of the moral law or of inclination, man often subordinates one to the other, although 
how self-conceit arises from self-love is left unexplained by Kant. Self conceit can only 
be recognised from experience, a posteriori, and therefore belongs to our nature in a 
secondary way.  
 
6.8 Is there a link to beneficence and love? 
I have noted Kant's use of 'infringement' in the above box (statement 4). How is this? 
The extent of our beneficence (i.e. of our doing good) is limited by the tension between 
doing good for and to others without knowing the true needs for happiness of the 
recipient of our largesse, when we have needs for happiness ourselves.570 Self-love is 
limited in our making others the object of our duty of beneficence: "I ought to sacrifice 
a part of my welfare to others without help of return." This limitation is a restriction, not 
of an inclination, but of a maxim of self-love. Kant says much the same in the second 
Critique.571 The significance of this is that self-love is trying to maintain claims that 
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purport to have the standing of practical cognition and hence limited by the standard of 
the objective validity constitutive of such cognition - i.e. universal legislation. The 
positive benefit is that the duty to widen one's benevolent concern beyond oneself 
eventually gives rise to a feeling of love for them. Self-conceit is a contrast, for it tries 
to identify the objective standard of practical knowledge with oneself - with one's 
capacity to estimate the moral worth of things as previously noted. To do this, it must 
usurp the moral law. The moral law must reject such claims: and hence Kant's use of the 
term 'strike down'. "The certainty of a disposition that agrees with this law is the first 
condition of all worth of the person...and all pretension prior to this is false and contrary 
to law."572 
Self-conceit and the moral law are in competition. Anthropomorphising them, they are 
deadly enemies, extending beyond humiliation to hatred of reason and the moral law on 
the part of self-conceit. This describes "those who ridicule all morality as the mere 
phantom of a human imagination overstepping itself though self-conceit."573 
In addition to presupposing a consciousness of the moral law, self-conceit believes it 
has the capacity to make law. Its claim is to place the standard of one individual, based 
on self-love, as having universal validity - something that belongs alone to the moral 
law. By comparison, self-conceit is as nothing. The mortification (to use Engstrom's 
term) of self-conceit is the first effect of the moral law on feeling and brings with it a 
feeling of respect - a positive outcome. This diminution of self-conceit and 
magnification of the moral law has an indirect positive effect on feeling. Hence the 
moral law establishes itself as incentive, Triebfeder. This account broadly falls into line 
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with that outlined below, in which moral feeling has its effect broadly on virtue and 
moral worth.  
In realising that we have over-valued the pursuit of happiness, we become aware of our 
capacity to free ourselves from 'pathological' incentives. Our rational nature is greater 
than our inclinations. This realisation must elicit a kind of pleasure in us, that of self-
respect. Kant adds that removal of a hindrance is the same as contributing to causality. 
His conclusion at this point is therefore that, "because of this, this feeling can now also 
be called a feeling of respect for the moral law while on both grounds together it can be 
called a moral feeling (Kant's italics).”574 Moral feeling, as respect, is thus the 
phenomenological effect of the moral law which alone moves us to action. A contrary 
view is that the “moral law determines the will directly, and then follows the feeling of 
respect, which subsequently determines the choice to act accordingly. Kantian moral 
motivation must be presumed to generate moral action through a motivational sequence 
involving moral feeling of sufficient strength.”575 Since Kant urges us to cultivate and 
strengthen our capacity for moral feeling, strength of moral feeling must affect moral 
choice. Against this, he states later that “respect for the moral law is the sole and also 
the undoubted moral incentive.” 576  
 
6.9 The affectivist and intellectualist view of respect as feeling 
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Kant’s use of the term ‘philosopher’s stone’577 indicates that he found the question of 
how the moral law can provide an incentive that moves the will to action perplexing.  
“Nobody can or ever will comprehend how the understanding should have a 
motivating power.”578 
Moreover: 
“It is quite impossible to see...how a mere thought which in itself contains 
nothing sensible produces a feeling of pleasure or displeasure.”579 
The pathological and therefore motivational side of human agents is interpreted as 
grounded in our affective (i.e. sensuous) natures. Yet Kant rejected the British 
sentimentalists’ view of moral sense. Kant suggests that ‘respect’ – that is respect for 
the moral law -, which he argues is moral feeling, answers the question of how we are 
moved by moral considerations. On this solution, respect580 as a moral feeling bridges 
the gap between the moral law and the capacity of humans (as sensuously affected 
beings) to be motivated.581 This introduces an accusation of heteronomy as autonomous 
beings should depend solely on the moral law without ‘pathological’ feeling. “The 
incentive of the human will can never be other than the moral law.”582  
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Responses to this accusation have included the suggestion that respect can only function 
as a moral motive insofar as it has a non-feeling dimension. Respect as a feeling may be 
a non-moral motive; respect as non-feeling isn’t a non-moral motive. It may be respect 
that identifies or brings to consciousness the moral law. Kant writes, “Immediate 
determination of the means of the law and consciousness of this is called respect.”583 On 
this view, respect is a judgement about the value of the moral law that must be obeyed. 
But respect itself as feeling is not the motivating factor and the accusation of 
heteronomous action can therefore be rejected. 
  
Such an interpretation would support the so-called intellectualist side of this debate, but 
with a continuing role for respect: respect is a judgement and has made us conscious of 
our duty. To this degree, Reath 584 (an intellectualist) sees respect as having both an 
intellectual and an affective side: a view judged by Louden585 as a reasonable gloss on 
this remark from the Groundwork.586 
Reath defines the “intellectual” aspect of respect as recognising the moral law as a 
source of value, unconditionally valid, and overriding relative to other kinds of reasons. 
In particular, it outweighs the reasons provided by one’s desires. We acknowledge the 
law’s authority and are motivated to act accordingly. Inclinations influence the will 
through the value which the agent supposes them to have but the moral law can limit 
their influence by showing that they do not have this value and presenting a higher 
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value. The affective side for Reath is a feeling or emotion that is experienced when the 
moral law checks the inclinations and limits their influence on the will. He refers to 
Kant in the Groundwork: “respect is properly the worth that infringes upon my self-
love.”587 Since Kant here is suggesting that respect is not an incentive existing before 
our recognition of the moral law, Reath concludes that “the feeling of respect is an 
incentive only in an attenuated sense.”588 Altman articulates a similar position in 
writing: 
“The moral feeling of self-approbation and subsequent “elevation” of the rational being, 
both of which follow from a pure moral interest, oppose the lower faculty’s pursuit of 
happiness as a subjective end thereby thwarting sensible pleasure in favour of positive 
moral feeling.”589  
To be moved by respect for the moral law, as the “direct determination of the will by the 
law, and the consciousness of this determination”, is to recognise the moral law as a 
source of value, and to feel respect is to experience the constraints which the moral law 
imposes on our inclinations, avers Reath.590  
Thus Kant thinks that this respect aids good conduct, by counteracting the obstacles 
created by our inclinations.591 He writes, “(R)espect for the moral law must be feeling 
insofar as the law weakens the hindering influence of the inclinations by humiliating 
self-conceit.” Kant is clear in avoiding a view that uses natural desire as there is no 
antecedent feeling to morality, with no motivational factor beyond the recognition of the 
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validity of the moral law. “This feeling (under the name of moral feeling) is therefore 
produced solely by reason.”592 
The affectivist view, by contrast, has been defined as the feeling of respect for the moral 
law having the role of a moral incentive with real affective force in the mechanism of 
moral motivation. Affectivists, although opposed to the intellectualist interpretation,  
“need not deny that Kantian moral motivation initially arises from an intellectual 
recognition of the moral law. Contrary to intellectualists, however, they maintain 
that it also depends on a peculiar moral feeling of respect for law, one 
consequent to the initial recognition or moral judgment the intellectualists 
emphasize exclusively.”593 
Kant himself is not as clear as we might hope in commenting on how the moral law 
affects the will. He does give the warning that we might expect:  
“it is quite impossible to see, that is, to make comprehensible a priori how a 
thought which itself contains nothing sensible produces a feeling of 
pleasure….for that is a special kind of causality…about which we can determine 
nothing a priori…..This much is certain: it is not because the law interests us 
that it has validity for us (for that is heteronomy) and dependence  of practical 
reason upon sensibility, namely upon a feeling lying at its basis in which case it 
could never be morally lawgiving.”594  
This view is articulated in a related passage in the second Critique:  
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“If the determination of the will takes place conformably with the moral 
law but only by means of a feeling, of whatever kind, that has to be 
presupposed in order for the law to become a sufficient determining 
ground of the will, so that the action is not done for the sake of the law, 
then the action will contain legality indeed but no morality.”595 
The fact that the action involves respect is not enough to make it moral. An affectivist 
may argue that “feeling” means pathological feeling. On this reading, in saying we 
cannot be motivated by feeling of any kind, Kant means by pathological feeling of any 
kind, as exemplified by the moral sense of the Scottish sentimentalists. Respect for the 
moral law would be a non-pathological feeling. Thus Kant also writes (in a complex 
paragraph) that the moral law “has influence on the sensibility of the subject and effects 
a feeling conducive to the influence of the law upon the will.”596 Here the moral feeling 
of respect seems to be mediating between moral law and the will. 
Other pages in the second Critique also appear to support the affectivist view that the 
feeling of respect is necessary to motivate moral conduct. For example,  
“the moral law…is also a subjective determining ground – that is, an incentive – 
to this action inasmuch as it has influence on the sensibility of the subject and 
effects a feeling conducive to the influence of the law upon the will.”597 (Quoted 
in box statement 10 above):  
“respect for the moral law must be regarded also as a positive though indirect 
effect of the moral law on feeling insofar as the law weakens the hindering 
influence of the inclinations by humiliating self-conceit, and must therefore be 
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regarded as a subjective ground of activity – that is, as the incentive to 
compliance with the law – as the ground for maxims of a course of life in 
conformity with it.”598  
Ware599 argues that only an affectivist view makes sense of this. For if we recognise the 
moral law as having the necessary and sufficient authority to move us, there would be 
no justification for commenting on reason’s effecting “a feeling conducive to the 
influence of the law upon the will.” Nevertheless, it is still reason in the form of the 
moral law that initiates the moral action and is the prime motivator. 
So, at this stage in the thesis, we have seen that Kant’s texts do not give a clear answer, 
which leads many to resort to speculating as to what Kant should have said rather than 
what he actually wrote. Reath’s interpretation, which acknowledges a role for respect as 
feeling, albeit a limited one, does avoid the trap of permitting heteronomy of the will, 
while providing a response to the repeated assertions of respect as moral feeling. But 
equally, from an affectivist perspective, if the will’s intellectual recognition of the moral 
law causes respect as feeling, action will result from autonomy, not heteronomy. 
Respect can be seen as a non-pathological feeling. 
 
6.10 Might feeling be motivational in developing moral character? 
A recent commentator has suggested a compromise to reconcile insights of the 
affectivist and intellectualist positions, while avoiding the shortcomings of each.600 The 
key proposal is that while the motivational power of respect arises from its nature as 
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pleasurable feeling, the feeling does not directly motivate individual dutiful actions. 
Rather, the feeling is motivational in that after a morally good action, the resultant 
pleasure contributes to the cultivation of virtue in the agent and, consequently, morally 
good actions in the future. At one extreme, the feeling of respect motivates moral action 
in the same way that pathological pleasure motivates non-moral action601 (a stronger 
view than discussed above) while, on the other extreme, intellectualists, as noted above, 
argue that any moral feeling has no role in motivation and, consequently, cannot link 
respect and pleasure. Holberg proposes that a broader question should be addressed: not 
whether respect as a moral feeling motivates individual moral actions but a broader 
question of how respect contributes to cultivating virtue and so moral agency more 
generally. Will it or can it improve our moral worth and assist our progress to 
approaching the highest good? If dutiful willing is 'pleasant-in-itself', can we gain moral 
strength and so cultivate virtue through dutiful willing?  
The textual evidence, she asserts, although capable of differing interpretations, favours 
the intellectualist claim that the pleasurable feeling aspect of respect is not how 
individual actions with moral worth are produced. Sensibly given interests play a role in 
the agent's reasoning towards action and empirically formed interests shape the 
individual subject's conception of what 'things going well' would consist in. Subjective 
interests and inclinations must be excluded in determining the will as a power of choice 
in forming maxims. She then expounds the feelings of pain, as above, and the 
humiliation produced by the moral law and its resultant raising of esteem for the moral 
law. The problem, as already noted, is that this doesn't provide a satisfying account in 
describing an incentive to moral action, again as noted above. But Kant, she thinks, is 
making a point about conceptual priority in describing the feeling of respect i.e. that the 
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will wills freely. Respect is motivationally idle if the feeling of respect is not a 
necessary step in the production of individual acts of good willing. Rather she thinks 
that respect is motivationally active by being the ground for maxims of a course of life 
in conformity with the moral law.  A further suggestion is that knowledge and feeling 
cannot be separated in this process. This is true whether we are considering knowledge 
of and feeling for the law; or feeling for myself as moral agent. Kant's view is that fully 
knowing or recognising the law involves being moved by the law in the right way: that 
is cognising the law is to will the law to have the feeling of respect for the law.  
Insofar as she is arguing for a limited intellectualist position, Holberg’s exposition can 
broadly be reconciled with the limited affectivist position of Reath. In placing the 
emphasis on moral worth as contributing to a positive encouragement, albeit indirect, 
from respect as Treibfeder of moral action, she offers an attractive compromise solution 
to Kant’s lack of a compellingly clear interpretation, commented on in 6.10 above.  
 
6.11 Does the third Critique add to this analysis? 
In the third Critique, Kant again asserts that the feeling of respect is one of pleasure: 
"...in the critique of practical reason we actually derived the feeling of respect 
(as a special and peculiar modification of this feeling, which will not coincide 
exactly either with the pleasure or with the displeasure that we obtain from 
empirical objects) from universal moral concepts a priori....we did not actually 
derive this feeling from the idea of the moral as a cause, rather it was merely the 
determination of the will that was derived from the latter. The state of mind of a 
will determined by something, however, is in itself already a feeling of pleasure 
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and is identical with it, thus it does not follow as an effect: the latter would only 
have to be assumed if the concept of the moral as a good preceded the 
determination of the will by the law."602  
This item of text offers both clarification and confirmation of Kant's view of the 
difference of respect as special in its independence of the phenomenal world and of the 
relation of respect and pleasure, most notably that the will is not determined by pleasure 
of respect. Good willing is identical to moral feeling so cannot be brought about by it. 
Moral feeling can only follow upon the representation of the law.603 We should also 
note that feelings of pleasure in the third Critique relate to the beautiful and sublime, 
not to action or desire. Virtue is a disposition to will from and for duty and will evince a 
cultivated sensibility. The pleasure of moral action is anti-krastic, strengthening the 
will's choice without affecting that choice and helping us to develop our moral agency.  
"...Consciousness of this ability of a pure practical reason (virtue) can in fact 
produce consciousness of mastery over one's inclinations, hence of 
independence from them and so too from the discontent that always 
accompanies them and thus can produce a negative satisfaction with one's state, 
that is, contentment which in its source is contentment with one's person. 
Freedom itself becomes in this way ...capable of an enjoyment."604  
We cannot free ourselves from desires and inclinations discordant with the moral law. 
Pleasure in the moral supports our commitment to the ends that reason sets for the self.  
"The capacity for simple respect for the moral within us would thus be moral 
feeling, which in and through itself does not constitute an end of the natural 
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predisposition except so far as it is the motivating force of the will...the property 
of such a will is good character."605 
In conclusion, we cannot know how reason exercises causal force of motivationally 
effective feeling. But I believe that I have demonstrated that respect is such a feeling 
that plays an often effective role: but one that  justifies both an affectivist and 
intellectualist interpretation. Moral action can be motivated by a feeling of respect and 
can do so because it is a feeling, not in spite of it.606  
So, at this stage in the thesis, Kant has worked out his understanding of reason, and led 
his readers to a discussion of its roles and interests. Paradoxes and contradictions appear 
to exist in the Triebfeder of reason, but overall in the six chapters the unity of reason 
has been indicated. In the following three chapters, the challenge is to develop the unity 
of reason, in its structure and its ends. Only unity can realise a compelling vision of the 
end of all things. To proceed, I will consider the primacy of practical reason, the 
arguments for reason’s unity and a united reason’s culmination in the highest good. 
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7.1 Introduction 
The distinction between reason’s theoretical and practical functions (or ‘faculties’) is 
emphasised by Kant up to the final sentence of the preface to his “entire critical 
enterprise.”607 This chapter commences with a comparison of these two faculties, 
acknowledging that reason would be incoherent if they contradicted each other because 
there is only one reason – as I will examine in ch8. The two faculties differ, but must 
harmonise. The relationship and characteristics of the one to the other are addressed by 
Kant in his advocacy for the primacy of practical reason.  
In his Metaphysics, Aristotle writes that  
“all men desire to know....even when we are not going to do anything, we prefer 
sight to almost everything else. The reason is that this, most of all the senses, 
makes us know and brings to light many differences between things.”608  
Elsewhere he writes, “...it is plain then that wisdom is knowledge combined with 
comprehension, of the things that are highest by nature."609 The distinction between 
theoretical and practical reason was noted by him: the nous theoretikus and the nous 
prakticus. “There are two parts to the soul of man and a good man has excellencies in 
both, with a practical and a speculative principle.”610 The ancients thus recognised the 
differing faculties of reason, but believed that theoria, theoretical reason, had primacy: 
it was the highest good for man. Kant’s advocacy of the primacy of practical reason 
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therefore constitutes a radical departure from the ancients. In what follows, I will argue 
in its support.  
I begin by establishing the differences between theoretical and practical reason. I 
suggest that practical reason’s primacy represents an earlier stage in Kant’s philosophy 
than the relevant section in the second Critique: a better starting place is the 
Groundwork. Nevertheless this does not diminish the importance of the key section in 
the Critique, for it is here that Kant provides his deduction of the doctrine. So I will 
both describe and assess the arguments put forward in support of the primacy doctrine. 
Having established the doctrine, I will then attempt to apply it to issues for which it is 
important: for Kant’s moral theology, for the concept of freedom, for reason’s 
coherence, for reason’s unity, for reason’s advocacy of politics and for reason’s 
teleology. The first of these arguments is a relatively limited view of the primacy which 
I will term the “narrow view.” In this narrow view, the doctrine’s key feature is its 
reference to the postulates of pure practical reason: immortality and God. This contrasts 
with its reference to wider issues which constitute the “broad view,” relating to the 
structure and nature of reason.611 “The transcendental improvement of our rational 
cognition is...merely the effect of the practical purposiveness which pure reason 
imposes on us.”612 
 
7.2 The characteristics and interests of theoretical and practical reason 
Kant must define the relationship between theoretical and practical reason in order to 
construct a unified view of human life.613 If, for example, a theoretician claimed that 
theoretical reason is the only rational activity open to us, then practical reason would be 
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second-rate thinking and morality a fantasy. (As thorough going determinists may of 
course think.) If, by contrast, theoretical reason was not respected, we would, in Kant’s 
words, be open to every nonsense and delusion of the imagination. Religious or other 
fanatics would reject scientific theory for the will of God or some crazy doctrine like 
vitalism. Homeopaths would take over medicine, global warming deniers would take 
over climatology, cranks, quacks, mountebanks and magicians of every variety would 
ply their trades. Freedom should place no hindrance in the way of the mechanism of 
nature.614 How then do theoretical and practical reason differ? Which characteristics 
feature if practical reason has primacy? 
First, theoretical reason is concerned with nature, whereas practical reason is concerned 
with morality. Material philosophy deals with determinate objects and divides into laws 
of nature and laws of freedom.615 Thus, “metaphysics is divided into the metaphysics of 
the speculative and the practical use of pure reason.”616 (By the latter, Kant means 
reason’s moral function and not its function as rules of skill – how to do things, what he 
terms the “technically practical” and which arises from natural concepts of cause and 
effect.)617 In the third Critique, the difference in the metaphysics of theoretical and 
(morally) practical reason is reiterated using geographical metaphors: territory, domain, 
field, residence (domicilium). The faculty that relates concepts to objects exercises its 
legislative function by the understanding through concepts of nature and is therefore 
theoretical; legislation through freedom is practical.618 Those are their respective 
domains in this metaphor. The domain of the concept of nature is the sensible; the 
domain of the concept of freedom is the super-sensible. A metaphysics of nature is 
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theoretical (=speculative) and relates to appearances, whereas in its practical use it is a 
metaphysics of morals, relating to things in themselves. Metaphysics has existed ever 
since humans have thought or reflected but the theoretical and the practical have been 
confused. This distinction between the two elements of cognition, one of which is in our 
power a priori and the other a posteriori is important for Kant for it has often been 
“very indistinct, even among professional thinkers.”619 This lack of clarity has led to a 
failure to determine the bounds of sense. Some empirical principles are more important 
than others and of wider application (i.e. “higher”). This is probably a throwback to 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics, where it is suggested that “theoretical kinds of knowledge to be 
more of the nature of wisdom than the productive”620 (i.e. than perhaps the ‘technically 
practical’). There is a hierarchy with those understanding more universal principles 
ranking above those dealing with particulars only. Thus Kant raises the suggestion that 
boundaries could be defined by the degree of subordination of a particular under a 
universal. It isn’t clear how this might work: indeed the suggestion seems to be that it 
wouldn’t. It would confuse the theoretical and the practical with the higher and the 
lower with respective criteria and dividing lines unclear. Where, if some empirical 
principles are higher than others, and where in “the series of such a subordination.... is 
one to make the cut that distinguishes the first part and highest member from the last 
part and the subordinate members?”621 One needs to be able to differentiate that which 
can be cognised completely a priori from that which can be cognised only a 
posteriori.622 Otherwise, this makes little sense. The metaphysical division of theoretical 
and practical reason is upheld. 
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Second, the objects of theoretical reason are not only appearances i.e. objects of 
possible experience, belonging to nature. Such objects are phenomenal. They are also 
given. Indeed, nature is the “sum total of given objects whether they are given by the 
senses or, if one will, by another kind of intuition.”623 For example, he writes,  
“all experience contains in addition to the intuition of the senses, through which 
something is given, a concept of an object that is given in intuition or 
appears.”624 (My italics).  
Or, in the second Critique, he refers to “objects as could be” or that may be “given” to 
the understanding.625 By contrast, practical reason is said to create its objects: as he 
expresses it in the first Critique, “making the object actual.”626 Practical reason  
“is concerned with the determining grounds of the will, which is a faculty either 
of producing objects corresponding to representations, or of determining itself to 
effect these objects…that is, of determining its causality.”627  
In its practical use, reason is a metaphysics of morals, relating to things in themselves. 
Morality must link to the noumenal world for in the phenomenal world of appearances, 
laws can only be those of nature and causation can only be natural.  
In the third Critique, reason is described as a priori legislative through both theoretical 
and practical domains.628 Legislation through concepts of nature takes place through the 
understanding and is therefore theoretical. I interpret Kant to mean that theoretical 
reason only legislates through concepts which derive from the understanding, not from 
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theoretical reason itself. Only in the practical, can reason be legislative. By virtue of 
cognition of nature, theoretical cognition can “draw inferences from given laws to 
conclusions that still stop short at nature.”629 Theoretical and practical reason must co-
exist. 
Third, theoretical reason is concerned with what is (or might be or has been), practical 
reason with what ought to be (or should have been). Theoretical cognition is “that 
through which I cognise what exists, and practical cognition as that through which it is 
cognised a priori what ought to happen.”630 This is the ‘is/ought’ distinction: “The 
philosophy of nature pertains to everything that is; that of morals to that which should 
be.”631  
Theoretical reason concerns knowledge. As noted in ch3, theoretical reason creates 
systematic unity by rules that apply to the manifold of judgements, enabling the 
combination of concepts of the understanding and intuitions to generate knowledge, the 
laws of nature. By contrast, “a practical rule …prescribes action as a means to an effect 
that is the aim.”632 As he expresses later, “practical reason deals not with objects to 
cognise them but with its own power to make them actual…with a will which is a 
causality.”633 So there is a distinction in knowing or doing. In discussing 'hope', which 
involves both theoretical and practical reason, a similar distinction is re-affirmed.634 In 
the Canon, Kant interprets the interest of theoretical reason as seeking satisfaction in 
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answering the question, what can I know? The second question is “merely practical” in 
asking what should I do?635 
These distinctions are highlighted in that of interest which Kant describes in the key 
paragraphs specifically on the priority.636 An interest is possessed by every faculty of 
mind. So theoretical reason's interest is in cognition637 "up to the highest a priori 
principles" - in knowledge (as in the third distinction above). Reason itself as the 
supreme determining faculty, the faculty of principles, must determine its own interest 
and all the interests of the powers of the mind (see ch5). The interest of practical reason 
will be in the "determination of the will with respect to the final and complete end."638 
That is, it is creative (as in the second distinction above). The key concept of interest 
has been discussed above in ch5.  
In one sense theoretical reason matters to practical reason because its interests concern 
cognitive outcomes that, in the end, matter to what we do. ‘What is’ matters to ‘what 
ought’. We could re-phrase this in saying that the practical is ultimately supreme, but its 
interests must be united with those of the interests of theoretical reason. Perhaps 
‘united’ is not the most appropriate English word and ‘integrated with’ might be 
preferable: but the point is that the two forms of reason with their respective interests 
truly have a common end. In that sense they are united. On this understanding we might 
say that theoretical reason is an application of practical reason. It is plain, as discussed 
above, that there are differences in their objects: the one given, the other created. But in 
examining reason’s unity and in supporting practical reason’s primacy, the key to both 
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lies in the relationship of their respective interests rather than in the more obvious 
difference between their objects. Theoretical reason, on this understanding, can be 
subsumed under practical reason: fully integrated. That is a more radical interpretation 
than immediately apparent in the key section of the second Critique. 
It should not be assumed from the contrasts between theoretical and practical reason 
that they have no shared interests. Given what has been proposed in the last paragraph, 
we should expect that they would. God and freedom can concern both theoretical and 
practical reason as mentioned at the start of the second Critique.639 This is plainly the 
case in the first Critique from the discussion in the third antinomy for theoretical reason 
and in the section on God’s existence in the second Critique for practical reason.640 
   
7.3 What does the primacy of the practical mean? 
A distinguished Kant scholar notes that in the first Critique, experience was shown to 
establish the bounds of theoretical reason. From this we conclude that theoretical reason 
has no jurisdiction over the beliefs that morality requires us to hold. Hence our 
conclusion: “this is the primacy of practical reason.”641 Further, theoretical reason 
cannot limit our thinking in ways required by the moral law. On this basis, the primacy 
doctrine appears as a defensive position against the illegitimate encroachments of 
theoretical upon practical reason. Kant himself gives a slightly different account in 
writing:  
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“Unter dem Primate zwischen zwei oder mehreren durch Vernunft verbundenen 
Dingen verstehe ich den Vorzug des einen, der erste Bestimmungsgrund der 
Verbindung mit allen übrigen zu sein.”  
I quote this in the original German for I think Gregor’s translation obscures Kant’s 
meaning. Thus, in English, Kant says that he understands primacy between two things 
connected by reason to mean the "prerogative of one to be the first determining ground 
of the connection with all the rest."642 
Gregor's translation of 'Vorzug' as 'prerogative' would be clearer as 'priority over' or 
even 'preference over', given the association of the word 'prerogative' with authority and 
rights in ordinary English usage; and 'Bestimmungsgrund' as 'determining ground' might 
be clearer if its synonyms of 'determinant', 'determining reason' or simply 'basis' are also 
considered. This would then read that primacy between theoretical and practical reason, 
connected as they are by both being reason, means the priority of one over the other as 
basis of the connection with the other. Kant then continues, “In a narrower practical 
sense, it signifies the prerogative (again, 'priority') of the interest of one insofar as the 
interest of the others is subordinated to it” (but with the condition that it cannot be 
inferior to any other). Kant states that theoretical reason would have primacy if practical 
reason could not offer anything as further than theoretical reason’s insights. Why is 
this? Why, if nothing “further” means an equality of insights, should theoretical reason 
have primacy?  
One aspect of reason cannot dictate to another: reason can’t be self-contradictory. But if 
the insights of practical and theoretical reason are in some sense equal, wouldn’t 
theoretical reason have primacy because what it can offer is cognition of nature that is 
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given to us: it can establish what is, not merely what ought to be? Practical reason’s 
primacy must assume a lack of contradiction (- a condition of reason itself-) and, 
crucially, something further. Specifically, what practical reason does offer is the 
postulates of pure practical reason: rational beliefs without evidence, theoretically 
undecidable but practically necessary i.e. necessary for morality. The primacy doctrine 
is asserting that what matters most to us is what we do rather than what is and that 
practical reason can assert the necessity of the postulates. The two expressions of reason 
are not in conflict: there is no opposition in what is to what ought to be. They represent 
different interests.  
The acceptability of theoretical reason uniting concepts of practical reason is posed by 
Kant in a complex lengthy sentence at 5:120. Breaking this interrogative into its 
components, Kant asks whether theoretical reason tries to unite practical reason’s 
concepts with its own or whether it rejects them. If it rejects them, is it because they 
can’t be shown in experience – which they can’t? And even though they are non-
contradictory, is it because they may ‘infringe’ on interests of speculative reason? Or 
because the boundary of theoretical reason will be compromised and open it to all sorts 
of nonsense? Although they are transcendent for it – as God and the postulates are – it 
can “try to unite them” with itself, “as a foreign possession handed over to it.” 
Theoretical reason can, Kant suggests, adopt God and the postulates into itself. But it 
cannot remove its bounds or it will be open to imaginative delusions and monstrosities, 
of which Kant instances Mohammed’s paradise or the fusion with the Deity of the 
theosophists and mystics. 
Since pure reason can be practical, as proved by the moral law, it remains reason based 
on a priori principles. Theoretical reason will continue to reject “monstrosities”; and 
practical reason, although unable to affirm certain propositions, will be able to affirm 
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them if they don’t contradict it. That is, “as soon as these same propositions belong 
inseparably to the practical interest of pure reason.”643  Such propositions are not 
opposed to theoretical reason’s interests, which as we have seen, concern cognition and 
the understanding. Kant reminds us that the interest of theoretical reason remains the 
“restriction of speculative mischief.” Theoretical reason then cannot deny propositions 
which it is unable to establish: they remain empty possibilities until postulated by 
practical reason. Whether judging in the practical or theoretical, reason still judges from 
a priori principles. Therefore theoretical reason must accept propositions which “belong 
inseparably to the practical interest.”  
This primacy of practical reason is based on a priori grounds. It is therefore necessary 
and not contingent; not, that is, dependent on ‘pathological’ or empirical factors. Unless 
this were the case, theoretical and practical reason would be in conflict. “Without this 
subordination a conflict of reason with itself would arise.”644 And because what we do 
matters more to us than what we know, Kant notes that all interest is ultimately 
practical. Even the interests of theoretical reason are brought to completion in practical 
use. 
 
7.4 The primacy of practical reason: the relevance of the postulates 
The main direct and explicit account of Kant's assertion and defence of the primacy of 
practical reason lies in Section III (On the primacy of pure practical reason in its 
connection with speculative reason) of Chapter II in Book II in the second Critique.645 
This account is sandwiched between a discussion of the antinomy of practical reason 
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(sections I and II) and of two of the postulates, that of the immortality of the soul 
(section IV) and of the existence of God (section V). This emphasises the relevance of 
the primacy doctrine to the postulates, and the emergence of the primacy from the 
antinomy. We shall see that the postulates, in turn, bear on the concept of the highest 
good. At a first glance, the emphasis of the link to the postulates strikes us as the key 
feature of the doctrine rather than the broader statement that what we do is more 
important than what we know. In clarifying the role of the postulates and a narrow view 
of the primacy doctrine, the relevance of Kant’s moral theology is crucial. Its exposition 
and justification occupies a surprisingly short and dense section, (III), partly quoted 
already.  
In this section, the primacy of practical reason is interpreted as a doctrine concerning 
the relationship between theoretical and practical reason over the status of the postulates 
of pure practical reason. God, freedom, and immortality of the soul cannot be justified 
by theoretical reason for they are outside its boundaries, beyond the world of sense. 
However practical reason can postulate their existence without evidence, as set out in 
my discussion of the postulates (ch4). In focussing on the postulates, this reasoning 
represents a narrow interpretation or expression of the concept of the primacy of 
practical reason. This narrow interpretation of the primacy doctrine refers solely to the 
so-called "right" of practical reason to extend into the realm forbidden to theoretical 
reason. Kant sets this out in the first Critique’s Doctrine of Method, contrasting 
theoretical and practical reason. He claims that the person asserting a synthetic 
proposition from pure reason who fails to know enough to make the proposition certain, 
then neither can his opponent refute it. But he goes on to show that practical reason does 
have “the right”646 to assume something which would be unacceptable for theoretical 
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reason. “It thus has a possession the legitimacy of which need not be proved and the 
proof which it could not in fact give.”647 This realm is that of the noumenal (or 
unconditioned), which theoretical reason is denied. As a result, the objective reality of 
the postulations of God, freedom, and immortality that are necessary to the fulfilment of 
the moral requirements of reason can be asserted from a practical standpoint. Such 
“ideas” or postulates are problematic or merely thinkable according to theoretical 
reason’s reflections. 
To expound the relationship of the postulates to theoretical reason further, Beck’s 
rephrasing of the primacy issue is a helpful clarification: 
“Have we a right to use concepts of reason and to assert objects for them, which 
are beyond the sphere of knowledge marked off for and by theoretical 
reason?"648 
This emphasises the limitations of theoretical reason rather than the imperialism of 
practical reason. Turning to the third Antinomy in the first Critique (which concerns 
causality and freedom), Beck reminds us that theoretical reason was unable to decide 
between thesis and antithesis. But theory is, of course, not the only use of reason; the 
needs of practice forces a decision upon us in favour of the thesis. Without a doctrine of 
primacy, there would be no way of escaping from the dilemma of deciding which 
assertion of reason to follow: "except by confessing allegiance to one or other of the 
conflicting doctrines, such a person would be in a state of ceaseless vacillation."649  But, 
says Kant, where practice is concerned ("doing or acting"), then "this play of merely 
speculative reason would disappear like the phantom images of a dream, and he would 
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choose his principles merely according to practical interest." Theoretical reason cannot 
resolve the difference between thesis and antithesis, but the needs of daily decision 
making leads to practical reason’s primacy. One notes that there is a genuine conflict 
here: not that theoretical reason asserts something incompatible with practical reason. 
Theoretical reason strives to reach the unconditioned but will never achieve this and its 
interest is in doing whatever promotes this function. As Beck points out, its true interest 
is not in some special cognition or definition of the unconditioned but only preventing 
theoretical folly. There is one reason with two interests not two reasons with opposing 
interests. The things of faith can go beyond theoretical reason but not beyond reason 
simpliciter.650 
I will now pursue two approaches in justifying the primacy of the practical, based on 
Kant’s account in this section of the second Critique. In one I explicate the text to 
suggest that the primacy rests upon an interpretation of practical reason’s superior 
cognitive and conative powers. To achieve that, it will be necessary first to say 
something about the antinomy (or antinomies) of practical reason. In the second, I want 
to use the text to outline a logical deduction, advocated by a German scholar. With the 
doctrine justified, it will then be possible to explore its further ramifications. But first it 
is necessary to explore the postulates in the antinomy of practical reason to understand 
why they are postulated. This argument now follows. 
 
7.5 The antinomy of practical reason 
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In the concept of the highest good (to be set out in ch9), virtue is combined with 
proportionate happiness. It will form the final end (telos) of reason. The combination of 
the two component entities, virtue and happiness, must be either analytic or synthetic. 
Given that the two components are entirely different elements, it is impossible for the 
concept to be analytic: 
“Two determinations necessarily combined in one concept must be connected 
as ground and consequent, and so connected that this unity is considered 
either as analytic (logical connection) or as synthetic (real connection), the 
former in accordance with the law of identity, the latter in accordance with the 
law of causality.”651  
A person who seeks his own happiness cannot analyse his behaviour and conclude it is 
virtuous.652 The combination is cognised a priori by a transcendental deduction because 
“it is a priori (morally) necessary to produce the highest good through the freedom of 
the will”.653 The combination is synthetic and one of cause and effect. As Kant points 
out, this means that the desire for happiness must be motivational to virtuous action or 
virtue must be the cause of happiness. However, a desire for happiness is not a moral 
motive – and therefore cannot ground virtue. On the other hand, happiness requires 
knowledge of nature, so that virtue cannot deliver happiness. On this basis the highest 
good becomes impossible to achieve. If it cannot be achieved, then on the principle of 
‘ought implies can’, the moral law which promotes the highest good becomes directed 
to imaginary ends. It would be, Kant says, “fantastic and...false.”654 
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So much for the bare outline of the antinomy of practical reason. But it has attracted 
scathing criticism, most notably from Beck who opines that  
“it is really quite a poor thing, wholly unable to carry this great historical and 
systematic burden.655 We shall also find, regrettably, that Kant’s usual high-
quality workmanship is not much in evidence in the discussion of the 
antinomy.”656  
Against this, another commentator states that “few are seriously tempted to reject its 
fundamental systematic and philosophical importance within Kant’s practical 
philosophy,”657 while conceding that the “consensus is that Kant’s text is sloppy.” 
If the antinomies of pure reason in the first Critique are examined, their pattern is clear. 
Reason comes into conflict with itself because intuition gives us only the conditioned 
while the noumenal world of things in themselves offers the unconditioned. 
Appearances will never be completely determined. The antinomies of pure reason are 
therefore resolved by distinguishing between appearances and things in themselves, 
noting that the idea of the world as a totality, and therefore fully determinate, is the 
world of things in themselves – beyond the reach of our knowledge. 
Turning to the antinomy of practical reason, the dissimilarities with the antinomies of 
the first Critique are perhaps the first thing to strike us. There are no statements of thesis 
or antithesis, nor explicit contradictory propositions. Allowing for these expository 
omissions, some reconstructing becomes necessary. This is essentially what I have set 
out above in concluding that the moral law must be fantastic or false. Since we don’t 
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believe that the moral law is false, the underlying assumption of a transcendentally real 
world must be challenged (as in the antinomies of pure reason). It becomes possible that 
the inability of virtue to create happiness in this world of appearances may not obtain in 
the noumenal world. Kant then argues that the postulates of God and immortality are 
presupposed for the highest good to be possible in this way. Only immortality gives us 
opportunity for moral progress, only God can apportion happiness fairly. In comparison 
with the theoretical antinomies, the highest good here takes the role of the 
unconditioned totality, indeed the idea of the highest good is generated by practical 
reason as an unconditioned totality.658 Another way of looking at this is to return to the 
Groundwork and note that the synonym of the highest good is referred to there as the 
‘Kingdom of Ends’, defined as “a whole of rational beings as ends in themselves as well 
as of the particular ends which each may set for himself.”659 The Formula of Humanity 
shows that Humanity can be regarded as unconditionally good and, more than that, a 
source of justification for things that only have conditional goodness.660 
Despite his criticism of Kant’s antimony of practical reason, Beck is not entirely 
dismissive of it. It may not be an antinomy “in any strict sense” because, despite Kant 
expressing concern with the “self-contradictions of pure practical reason”,661 the two 
propositions are not contradictory; and secondly, the argument as set out does not fit 
Kant’s own definition of an antinomy given in the first Critique.662 I have commented 
on these dissimilarities with the antimonies of pure reason above. Beck seems to 
concede that, as above, the answer is not dismissive, but some reconstruction is needed. 
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This is what he actually does and comes up with the following: 
 
“Thesis: the Highest Good is possible. Proof: the moral law requires it. 
Antithesis: the Highest Good is impossible. Proof: the connection between virtue 
and happiness is neither analytical nor synthetic663a priori nor empirically given. 
Resolution: The antithesis is true of the sensible world if the laws of nature have 
exclusive sovereignty; the thesis may be true of the intelligible world because 
the synthetic connection of virtue (as ground) to happiness (as consequent) is not 
absolutely impossible.” 
In his analysis of the antinomy of practical reason, Allen Wood suggests that there is 
not one, but two antinomies.664 This view is based on the differences between section 
IV (immortality) and V (the existence of God) in which separate dialectic arguments 
threaten the practical possibility of the highest good. But the arguments in both cases 
depend on a dialectic in which the possibility of the highest good and of morality is 
deniable, only to be rescued by the postulates from the error. In the case of immortality, 
the impossibility of attaining holiness or perfection makes “endless progress” the “real 
object of our will. This endless progress is possible only on the basis of the existence 
and personality of the same rational being continuing endlessly.”665  It follows that the 
highest good is at least possible. With its possibility the antinomy is resolved.  
The difficulty with this simple exposition is the concept of time. Is immortality or 
“continuing endlessly” to make moral progress endless time? Without time is 
immortality meaningful? Kant states that “the temporal condition is nothing”666 to the 
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“eternal being”; and that “where there is no time no end is possible.”667 If the argument 
is that endless progress is outside time, then such progress is, so to speak, a change of 
gear from temporal progress. Kant quotes the New Testament in his essay on the End of 
all Things: 
“In the Apocalypse (10: 5-6) [John writes] “Then the angel...swore by him who 
lives forever...that henceforth time shall no longer be.”668  
If this is correct (and Kant assumes that the angel did not want to speak nonsense), then 
there can be no change, because change requires time. If change is impossible, then 
“endless progress” is similarly impossible for progress implies change. However Kant 
offers no solution. In the longer analysis of eternity in which Kant’s writing consists of 
an examination of Christian doctrine, he reaches the conclusion that with regard to 
“cognitions and assertions of this sort reason simply transgresses the limitations of its 
insight.”669 The objects of these ideas “(if they have any) lie entirely beyond the scope 
of our vision.”670 Arranging the furniture in heaven is as pointless an activity for a 
philosopher as for a theologian, prophet or priest. Wood’s best suggestion is not that we 
can say anything about a supersensible life but to accept the importance of conceiving 
the possibility of fulfilling moral strivings in transcendent existence. Or maybe the joy 
of striving only, never fulfilled. 
As Kant (- and Wood-) points out, while the argument in section IV deals with morality 
and immortality, the second component of the highest good, proportionate happiness 
has still to be addressed in resolving the antinomy (or the second of the two antinomies 
in Wood’s analysis). The issue is not whether happiness might accompany virtue, but 
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whether virtue causes it and does so proportionately to our worthiness to receive it. 
Humans are not capable of creating this causal connection between virtue and 
happiness. Again the antinomy is solved in noting that happiness and virtue are not 
systematically connected in the world of sense but can be in the noumenal world.671 
This does not exclude some connection in the world of sense, only that it is not a full or 
systematic one. But as with immortality, our inability to know anything about a future 
life means that we cannot know whether happiness would be desired in it. If happiness 
is enjoyed by man’s sentient nature, then it may be partly or entirely irrelevant to any 
super-sensible existence. (Equally, of course, we are unable to assert the contrary.) After 
pointing out that the systematic connection that we seek cannot be found in the world of 
sense, Kant proposes the postulate “of a cause of all nature, distinct from nature, which 
contains the ground of this connection,” as a “supreme determining will.” Such a being 
is an intelligence – that is, a rational being – whose will is a causality. From here, Kant 
concludes that God is necessary for the highest good (a proposal I will discuss in ch9): 
“Therefore the supreme cause of nature, insofar as it must be presupposed for the 
highest good, is a being that is the cause of nature by understanding and will (hence 
its author), that is, God....it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God.”672 
It is not strictly relevant here to pursue Kant’s moral theology further, but to note that 
the postulates of pure practical reason are theoretical propositions which serve a rational 
function. They contradict nothing in theoretical reason, although originating in 
considerations of practical reason. If theoretical reason is to open its doors to practical 
reason, as in the primacy doctrine, the implication from this analysis of the antinomy of 
practical reason is that the two postulates of immortality and of God will be accepted 
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into theoretical reason and “although they are transcendent for it, try to unite them 
....with its own concepts.”673 Kant’s conception of God is anthropomorphic: holy 
lawgiver, just judge, good governor. Although we should try to purify the concept of 
God from such human ideas, reducing our concept will render it free of extending 
theoretical reason and emphasise that God is well suited to satisfy our moral needs.674 
 
7.6 Justifying the priority of practical reason 
An answer has already been given to Kant’s questions:  
“Which interest is supreme? Whether speculative reason which knows nothing 
about all that which practical reason offers for its acceptance, must accept these 
propositions and although they are transcendent for it, try to unite them….with 
its own concepts…or whether it is justified in obstinately following its own 
separate interest…?”675  
That answer has been that practical reason is supreme and that theoretical reason should 
not follow its own separate interest.  Practical reason, on a limited view, has a right to 
extend into the realm forbidden to theoretical reason. Theoretical reason’s boundaries 
are clearly limited by the bounds of the sensible world. But while demonstrating the 
limitations of theoretical reason might make us ask if practical reason could not have 
primacy, it is not enough to establish it. The answer to Kant’s questions requires further 
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comment and justification beyond the dismissive opinion that “it is fairly evident that 
the (central argument)...does not amount to much.”676  
An argument can be set out as follows:  
1 Pure reason can be practical, proven by the moral law. 
2 The highest good is the end of practical reason (actually of all reason) 
3 ...which needs the postulates & Ideas 
4 ...which theoretical reason must use.  
5 Practical reason widens our knowledge beyond the world of sense. (Practical 
reason does have “the right” to assume something which would be unacceptable 
for theoretical reason.)  
6 “It thus has a possession, the legitimacy of which need not be proved and the 
proof which it could not in fact give.” This realm is that of the noumenal (or 
unconditioned), which theoretical reason is denied.677  
7 As a result, the objective reality of the postulations of God, freedom, and 
immortality that are necessary to the fulfilment of the moral requirements of 
reason can be asserted from a practical standpoint. Such “ideas” or postulates are 
problematic or merely thinkable according to theoretical reason’s reflections. 
Although we still have no knowledge of things in themselves i.e. the noumenal, 
we can believe in the postulates because practical reason links us to the 
noumenal. (Their legitimacy as regulative assumptions of theoretical reason is 
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made subjectively certain.) Their acceptance for theoretical reason is faith, but it 
is rationally justified faith. Kant has rejected the proof of God’s existence in the 
first Critique and resurrecting this idea by theoretical reason could only be 
“speculative mischief”. But practical reason tells us that God’s existence (and 
that of immortality) are essential for the highest good. The solution to this 
conflict is the importance of the primacy doctrine.   
9 These cognitions go beyond the boundaries of all experience: cognitions that are 
possible a priori but only from a practical standpoint. 
10 Practical reason has superior cognitive power as it has something to give to 
theoretical reason. The acceptance of the postulates by theoretical reason is a 
rationally justified faith, although the postulates remain postulates. Practical 
reason is ‘filling out’ the ‘ideas’ of reason that theoretical reason cannot defend 
or understand. In that way, practical reason is a metaphysically superior mode of 
cognition 
Thus practical reason has primacy. It has superior cognitive power.678 Theoretical 
reason can demonstrate the possibility of freedom, but only practical reason can 
demonstrate its reality.679 
In addition, secondly, if theoretical reason is not subordinated to practical reason, it 
would “close its boundaries” and accept nothing from practical reason. The latter would 
then, he says, “extend its boundaries over everything.”680 If needed, it “would try to 
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include” theoretical reason within them. A conflict within reason would then occur. 
Since reason must not contradict itself, the implication is again the subordination of 
theoretical reason. It follows that practical reason must have primacy. 
Thirdly, cognition (theoretical or practical) can relate to its object either by determining 
it or creating it (“making it actual”) by theoretical or practical reason respectively.681 
Practical reason does not depend on anything but itself, defining itself against 
inclinations.682 The free decisions that conform to the requirements of reason alone are 
brought into existence by practical reason’s unique power. This conative power is not 
possible for theoretical reason because theoretical reason is not concerned with action. 
(Conative acts of the mind are those associated with the initiation of action.) In moral 
reasoning we can appeal to our own rational self-consciousness to determine what is 
actual, shaping our intentions according to the moral law. That is to say that practical 
reason creates its objects, as already noted: we do not reason practically to know them. 
This moral law is not only something we are aware of in our minds but we are also able 
to be aware of the conditions of freedom, God and immortality necessary for its 
existence and its final object, the highest good.683 So, practical reason also has more 
conative power than theoretical reason and, because it has more power than theoretical 
reason, it also has the right to primacy.  
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7.7 A deduction of the primacy of practical reason 
In the sections above, I have set out arguments in favour of the primacy of practical 
reason over theoretical reason: superior cognitive power and superior conative power. I 
have further supported this conclusion with three reasons given by Kant in the key 
passage in the Critique. Willaschek684 believes that Kant is offering a syllogistic 
deduction to demonstrate the primacy doctrine. He believes this approach is closer to 
Kant’s intentions and links it to the writing in the Jäsche logic 685 as a disjunctive 
syllogism. The process consists of substituting propositions for the three disjuncts in a 
syllogism, each reflecting and relating to Kant’s argument in this part of the Critique 
(5:120-121). Logical disjunction is an operation on two logical values, typically the 
values of two propositions, that has a value of false if and only if both of its operands 
are false. The general form of the argument, constructed in disjunctive dichotomies with 
three operands, is in two steps: firstly, decide between A or non-A; secondly, if non-A, 
decide between B or non-B (alias C). In each step we decide between two opposed 
propositions. We therefore have two disjuncts at the first step (A or non-A) and two 
disjuncts at the second step (B or non-B). Propositions that reflect and relate to Kant’s 
argument in this part of the Critique (5:120-121) are substituted for A, B and C. For 
example, the first proposition A is, “practical reason may accept only claims 
authenticated by theoretical reason.” This proposition is a declarative derivation from 
the conditional first sentence of the second paragraph of 5:120. (“If practical reason may 
not assume and think as given anything further than what speculative reason of itself 
could offer it from its insight, the latter has primacy.”) And so on.  
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For reasons of space, a detailed explication of the syllogism is not possible. Suffice it to 
say that three possible conclusions emerge: primacy of either theoretical (A) or practical 
(B) reason or of neither (C). The syllogistic analysis can be summarised in the 
following:  
1 Either theoretical reason has primacy (A) or practical reason has primacy (B) or 
neither has primacy (non-B =C); 
2 either theoretical reason or practical reason must have primacy (not non-B); 
3 theoretical reason does not have primacy (not A); 
4 Thus, practical reason has primacy (B). 
This explication supports Willaschek’s contention of a logically valid argument 
supporting the primacy doctrine. A more detailed account would aid comprehension, 
but space does not permit. In short however, I don’t think this is closer to Kant’s 
intended route to proving the primacy, although I accept the conclusion itself. And it 
reinforces the arguments already adduced, although again focussing the deduction on 
the same key passage in the second Critique. 
According to Kant, if theoretical and practical reason were merely juxtaposed, a conflict 
of reason would occur. His explanation (4th paragraph of 5:120) is that theoretical 
reason (“the first”) “would close its boundaries strictly and admit nothing from the latter 
into its domain, while the latter would extend its boundaries over everything and….try 
to include the former within them.” The reverse in which practical reason is required to 
be subordinate is impossible because “all interest is ultimately practical and that of 
speculative reason is only conditional and is complete in practical use alone.” 
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In its regulative function, reason sets ends and standards for activity rather than 
knowledge. Pure reason can be practical in that theoretical reason is concerned with 
directing us how to realise its ideas, rather than exclusively contemplative. In that sense, 
“all interest is ultimately practical.” It is a reference to the regulative, end positing 
character of reason as a whole.686   Justification of the assertion that theoretical reason’s 
interest is “only conditional” is required to support the claim that it is complete in 
practical use alone. In his “Assent from a Need of Pure Reason,”687 Kant points out that 
theoretical reason contrasts with the unconditional interest of practical reason (from the 
moral law). Where theoretical reason has its hypotheses, practical reason has its 
postulates, both answering to a “need of reason.”688 For both, there is a need for God 
and immortality, but for theoretical reason the hypothesis is an inference from an effect 
to a determining cause that, he says, is always doubtful, uncertain and, at best, “most 
reasonable” for humans. For practical reason the postulate of God is based on the duty 
(from the moral law) for the highest good, the conditions for which are freedom, God 
and immortality. Whereas the hypotheses of theoretical reason are only “merely 
permitted”,689 the postulates are based on a “need from an absolutely necessary point of 
view.”  Hypotheses and postulates therefore differ in their epistemological status. Only 
pure practical reason can issue categorical imperatives: unconditionally binding 
principles. Theoretical reason can only issue hypothetical imperatives. If we want x, do 
y (inquire into the highest a priori principles to fulfil our knowledge): but this can be 
rationally abandoned. It is not irrational to terminate inquiry or not to start it. In this 
sense the interest of theoretical reason is “only conditional”, because it directs us to do 
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something only under the condition that no other, overriding interests tell against it.690 
By contrast practical reason’s interest is based on the unconditionally binding moral 
law. Theoretical reason would reject the postulates unless subordinated to the interests 
of practical reason, and therefore conditionally. Practical reason’s acceptance of the 
postulates is unconditional. In the event of conflict the conditioned must be subordinate 
to the unconditioned. Hence the interest of theoretical reason can only be “complete in 
practical use alone.” This interpretation is supported elsewhere691 where he writes of 
reason that in its theoretical use, 
“one sees very well that it is only conditioned, i.e. we must assume the existence 
of God if we want to judge about the first causes of everything contingent...Far 
more important is the need of reason in its practical use, because it is 
unconditioned, and we are necessitated to presuppose the existence of God not 
only if we want to judge, but because we have to judge.” (Kant’s italics). 
And he continues in this passage to criticise Mendelssohn, whose error was to fail to 
give primacy to the practical. 
Although, as above, reducing section III of chapter 2 of the Dialectic to a disjunctive 
syllogism is possible, is this the structure of the argument that Kant intended? It seems 
unlikely. Kant does not set out the possibilities at the outset nor has he laid out his 
argument in this section in the structure of a syllogism. The claim that this is a 
deliberately structured argument by syllogistic reasoning remains unconvincing. The 
assertions that do not feature in the syllogism above are more important. These include 
the following: that pure reason can be practical; that consciousness of the moral law 
proves this; that reason is a unity; and that propositions belonging to the practical 
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interest must be accepted, not least because theoretical reason cannot refute or deny 
them - the conclusion of Kant’s critique of the existence of a highest being in the first 
Critique’s Doctrine of the Elements.692  
While the syllogism may be valid, is it true? In stating that “all interest is ultimately 
practical and that of speculative reason is only conditional and is complete in practical 
use alone”, Kant appears to be using the conclusion to support the argument. For on 
what is the assertion that “all interest is ultimately practical” based?  Further, why is the 
interest of theoretical reason “only conditional and … complete in practical use alone”? 
These propositions are supported elsewhere in the Critique and I have set out the 
answer to these questions above. But they do not appear or form part of this syllogism. 
Demonstrating the truth of the syllogism requires reference to other parts of the Critique 
– for example, the “Assent from a Need of Pure Reason.” These considerations support 
my contention that the syllogistic structure is not closer to Kant’s intended route to 
proving the primacy, although I accept the conclusion itself. Refashioning Kant’s 
argument for the primacy of the practical is valid but close attention to the logical 
structure of the key paragraph in this way is not necessary as Willaschek claims. 
Proof for the primacy doctrine has now been achieved, although having based the 
arguments on the key section in the second Critique, the justification has entailed a 
special role for the postulates and hence to God’s existence. Beyond this narrow 
conception of the primacy doctrine, lies a broader view that connects reason’s unity, 
interest and teleology. Those interests may extend into community (as opposed to 
individual) life and include the political. To explore this further, I return to the 
Categorical Imperative itself. 
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7.8 A broad view of practical reason’s primacy 
Kant contends that our reason imposes a vocation to morality. It is through and because 
of this commitment that our ultimate end is moral. Aside from the narrow justification 
of practical reason’s primacy, Kant makes many assertions of this broader theme. For an 
enlightenment man, even thought itself is a moral activity. Thus,  
“thinking for oneself means seeking the supreme touchstone of truth in 
oneself...To make use of one’s own reason means no more than to ask oneself 
whenever one is supposed to assume something, whether one could find it 
feasible to make the ground or the rule on which one assumes it into a universal 
principle for the use of reason.”693 
The ‘supreme touchstone of truth’ is a moral goal. As he writes in the same essay, “far 
more important is the need of reason in its practical use, because it is unconditioned.”694 
Philosophy itself requires reason to focus on action: 
“The entire armament of reason, in the undertaking that one can call pure 
philosophy, is in fact directed only at...what is to be done” (Kant’s 
emphasis).695 
This assertion is repeated in several other places in all three Critiques. Thus, our highest 
ends are moral;696 theoretical reason’s interests are complete in practical use alone;697 
theology and morality are the points of reference for reason’s inquiries;698 and the 
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efforts that we make with our faculties are ultimately practical.699 If the highest good is 
to be the object of the strivings of human nature, theoretical reason is inadequate: 
indeed he thinks the first Critique proves its “utter insufficiency”. Nature provides the 
faculty for our end “only in a step-motherly fashion.”700 
Kant’s first Critique was undertaken to establish reason’s boundaries, to correct its 
errors and to make metaphysics possible, yet reason’s end emerges as moral. It follows 
that one way of interpreting the primacy doctrine (in a broad way beyond the narrower 
role of the postulates) is a key role in proving the unity of our rational powers. The 
primacy of practical reason leads to the unity of reason beyond the internal unities 
within reason’s individual forms.701 I return to reason’s unity in ch8. 
The Categorical Imperative is the supreme principle of practical reason; and if practical 
reason has primacy, it must be the supreme principle of reason. The corollary is that 
vindicating reason means vindicating the Categorical Imperative.702 O’Neill’s 
conclusion is that the first Critique is not only “deeply anti-rationalistic but profoundly 
political.” She argues that a series of “connected political and juridical metaphors 
constitute” the Critique’s deep structure. The primacy doctrine therefore leads to a 
broad task beyond Kant’s moral theology.  
An approach based on Kant’s method takes us to the idea of a shared enterprise, 
exemplified in the quotation from Bacon’s preface to his Instauration Magna at the start 
of the second edition of the first Critique. In making a critique of reason, a shared plan 
is needed to avoid chaos: “the constant tendency to disobey certain rules is restrained 
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and finally extirpated.”703 For this, reason requires discipline and instructions that are 
largely negative to prevent a variety of excesses. Kant uses political metaphors, such as 
‘tribunals’, ‘debate’ and ‘community’ to explicate the authority of reason because he 
sees the problems of cognitive and political order in the same context.704 Acts of 
judgement must follow ideas of reason or maxims of judgement, guided by a practical 
principle. “Complex capacities require the adoption of maxims to regulate the use of 
these capacities in thinking and acting.”705 These must be universal – hence the 
Categorical Imperative is the supreme principle for all reasoning. We cannot adopt 
plans that others cannot share. Practical reason is basic because in choosing how to act, 
- including how to think, to understand – we accommodate the plurality implicit in the 
Categorical Imperative. Theoretical reason requires practical reason for its employment. 
Our nature as rational agents dominates our nature as rational knowers. Thanks to the 
Categorical Imperative, we think of ourselves and the world in certain ways and 
theoretical reason is unable to deny those beliefs.706 
In stating morality’s supreme principle as a product of universalised reason, moral 
empiricism is being denied. The pursuit of happiness (that memorable feature of the 
American constitution) cannot ground concepts of good and evil. The Categorical 
Imperative does not represent a dour principlism. For in applying this consideration to 
the body politic, Kant argues that this would lead government to a paternalism that 
would represent “the worst despotism”707 because it would deprive citizens of freedom, 
their most precious possession. A benevolent despot may make people happier and we 
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have needs for happiness. “Certainly our well-being and woe count for a very great deal 
in the appraisal of our practical reason.”708 But “happiness is not the only thing that 
counts.”709 It is our power as practical reasoners that distinguishes us from other 
animals. Man has uses for reason beyond promotion of welfare, which animals seek 
through instinct. Reason has a higher purpose to ground the will irrespective of objects 
of desire: “a will whose maxims always conforms with this law is good absolutely, good 
in every respect and the supreme condition of all good.”710 (A similar assertion as the 
very first sentence of the Groundwork.)711 In the political realm it is practical reason’s 
function to overcome the empiricist aims from theoretical reason. From pure rational 
principles comes a civil state based on freedom, equality and independence of each and 
every member.712 Practical reason must have primacy because if knowing has primacy, 
those in power claiming superior knowledge can defend a right to make political 
decisions for others. In realising a state of equality, for example, practical reason is far 
more fundamental than knowledge.  The Categorical Imperative is restated on a society 
basis in expressing the universalising obligation that every legislator should “formulate 
his laws in such a way that they could have sprung from the unified will of the entire 
people and to regard every subject, insofar as he desires to be a citizen, as if he had 
joined in voting for such a will.”713 It provides a vision of how society should be 
shaped, even if empty of content in what that might involve. A principle of action that is 
fully determinate could only cover one case; rather, a principle must guide action. Such 
is the Categorical Imperative.  
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As one commentator has said, this broad interpretation refers to the nature and structure 
of reason itself, in which the implications of practical reason's primacy relate to the 
"unity, interest and teleology of reason as a whole."714 Man’s rational destiny, 
combining man’s nobility and finitude, leads to a moral faith that replaces the 
unrealisable pursuit of knowledge, an ultimate end of the practical.715 The good will is 
the only good that has unconditional value. If that is so, our aspirations must ultimately 
be moral.  
In summary, this doctrine leads to the assertion of man’s importance and destiny that 
appears staggeringly bold in a modern age in which astronomical science has 
emphasised our seeming insignificance in the universe.  
“Without human beings the whole of creation would be a mere desert existing in 
vain and without a final end. But it is not their cognitive faculty (theoretical 
reason) in relation to which the existence of everything else in the world first 
acquires its value.”716  
Only humans, among all of nature, yet noumenally outside it, have by virtue of their 
rationality, the power to confer meaning and value on the universe. Only as moral 
beings can we be the final end of creation. The interest of practical reason will be in the 
"determination of the will with respect to the final and complete end," when practical 
reason’s primacy is construed broadly rather than in a narrower interpretation.717   
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8.1 Introduction 
For Kant, there is only one reason, not two. It is one reason that has two functions or 
fields of application, theoretical and practical. It is not a matter of two separated and 
distinct reasons: that is, a theoretical reason and a practical reason. It is the one reason 
that presupposes the unconditioned for everything that is conditioned in nature. In every 
theoretical investigation of nature, reason’s practical ends are presupposed.718  For 
example, in the second Critique, “if pure reason itself can be and really is practical…it 
is still only one and the same reason which, whether from a theoretical or a practical 
perspective, judges according to a priori principles.”719 Pure practical reason, writes 
Kant, must “be able…to present the unity of practical with speculative reason in a 
common principle, since there can, in the end, be only one and the same reason, which 
must be distinguished merely in its application.”720 Or again, in the second Critique, he 
refers to the “unity of the whole pure rational faculty (theoretical as well as practical)” 
with the aim of deriving “everything from one principle –the undeniable need of human 
reason, which finds complete satisfaction only in a complete systematic unity of its 
cognitions”.721 “There can only be one human reason”.722   
In this chapter, I will demonstrate why Kant believes in the unity of theoretical and 
practical reason. I will analyse this concept from the viewpoint in all three Critiques and 
relate it to the primacy of practical reason. In particular, I will suggest that unity should 
be sought as a practical imperative, pursuing the wider understanding of practical 
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reason’s primacy, outlined in ch7. I conclude that nature’s purposiveness unites 
theoretical and practical reason, stemming from divine design.  
Commentators have differed in their assessments of Kant’s account of the unity of 
theoretical and practical reason. In his early work, Guyer723 thinks that Kant fails to give 
a coherent account at all. The later Guyer,724 Allison725 and Freudiger,726 to take three 
examples, believe that Kant does not give a coherent account until the third Critique; 
Neiman,727 Kohnhardt728 and Kleingeld729 believe that this account can be found in the 
first two Critiques. Abela730 seems to reject reason’s unity altogether (the “integrationist 
standpoint”), while Timmerman thinks it is never systematically discussed or explained 
in any detail in any of Kant’s writings.731  
Unity has many meanings: at its simplest it is a mathematical term meaning ‘one’. 
Between people it may mean a common commitment, spirit or concord – embodied in 
entities such as the United Nations or the European Union or even the union of two 
persons in marriage; politically, the fact of unification – a united Germany, the United 
Kingdom or the United Arab Emirates; negatively, the absence of diversity; 
dramatically, the unities of classical dramatic structure set out by Aristotle. But in the 
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Kantian sense, it is best regarded as a whole or totality combining all its parts into one: 
a state of oneness or of completeness. (We could say that reason has an inherent 
tendency to unity in the sense of completeness.)732 
The following areas need consideration: 
 1 Systematicity: the most important reasons to support reason’s unity. 
 2 The need to avoid conflicts between theoretical and practical reason. 
 3 The unity of reason as a regulative idea. 
 4 The origin of theoretical and practical reason in a supersensible 
intelligence. 
 5 The implications of the primacy of practical reason, discussed in ch7. 
 6 The purposiveness of nature as unity as explored in the third Critique. 
 7 The shared structural and functional features (the similarity argument).   
 
8.2 The unity of reason in Kant’s early writings. 
In a paper from the 1980s, Guyer examines pure reason as practical reason in Kant’s 
early conception of the transcendental dialectic.733 Guyer’s assessment of the early 
conception of the transcendental dialectic is based mainly on the Reflektionen, a 
collection of notes mostly preceding the critical period.734 An experience has a unique 
place in time relative to all other experiences, but the unity of experience is more than 
chronological. Rather more, the faculty of reason seeks a unity. This “unity of reason” 
(Kant’s quotation marks) is “of an altogether different kind than any unity that can be 
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achieved by the understanding.”735 Guyer suggests two possibilities to interpret the term 
‘unity of reason.’ One is a single domain of application: either theoretical reason is a 
unity or practical reason is: not both. Alternatively, pure reason is aiming to introduce a 
single special sort of unity, wherever it is used or applied. Neither of these possibilities 
seems terribly satisfactory.736 Firstly, as above, we have already noted that Kant has 
asserted that pure reason can be both theoretical and practical. Therefore it is hard to 
make sense of a special unique domain for one variety of pure reason’s application. 
Secondly, Kant states that “reason serves to give necessity to understanding and to 
circumscribe and give unity to the sphere of its employment.”737 This comment 
resembles that made in the Critique that the transcendental concepts of pure reason are 
ideas that “can serve the understanding as a canon for its extended and self-consistent 
use, through which....it (the understanding) will be guided better and further.”738 739 
  How can reason improve on the achievement of the understanding?  Guyer proposes 
two possibilities.  
First, reason can aim to extend the use of understanding beyond its ordinary limits, set 
by the forms of sensibility. Reason would then be circumscribing its indefinitely 
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extendable sphere, and making complete and unconditional knowledge that is left 
incomplete and conditional by the understanding alone. Second, reason can aim to 
harmonise or systematise knowledge that otherwise would not be necessary in order to 
satisfy the requirements of understanding alone. 
These two aims he calls completeness and systematicity. The one implies some sort of 
totality, the second some kind of organisation (perhaps hierarchical) of representations.  
Pure reason, at this point in his argument, has two spheres of employment, theoretical 
and practical, and, insofar as it aims to complete and circumscribe subordinate forms of 
cognition, a dual function or manner of use. This misses the idea of an underlying unity 
of reason.  
On this basis, Guyer attempts to reconstruct a foundation, on the basis of which it is 
“fair to speak of the unity of reason” in terms of completeness and systematicity. His 
stated aim is to show that ‘pure reason’ has a positive use only as practical reason, while 
a theoretical application of pure reason leads only to transcendental illusion. As Kant 
writes in the critical period: 
“…to give to reason freedom to think of something beyond experience, which is, 
to be sure, necessary for the completion of our use of understanding but which 
can never be thought by means of theoretical concepts except negatively and 
which can be thought positively by moral concepts alone and which contains the 
totality of conditions for all.”740 
That “totality of conditions for all” is a unifying expression. Guyer’s other aim is that 
completeness and systematicity should be thought of as two aspects of the unity of 
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reason. It is important to remind ourselves that after the critical turn and the positing of 
transcendental idealism, unity becomes a subjective ideal of knowledge, even if 
remaining an objective ideal of practical reason. That is: for the world to be as it should 
– a systematic whole of human purposes. In the first Critique, the ideal is stated as  
“this highest formal unity that alone rests on concepts of reason (and) is the 
purposive unity of things; and the speculative interest of reason makes it 
necessary to regard every ordinance in the world as if it had sprouted from the 
intention of a highest reason.”741   
Nevertheless, Guyer concedes that regulative, rather than constitutive ideals of 
systematicity must await the third Critique742 where they will be re-assigned to the 
faculty of reflective judgement. In an extensive quotation of R4849,743 I note that 
considering reason’s unity as that between theoretical and practical reason does not 
feature at all. In other instances on reason’s unity, identified as originating in the pre-
critical period by Erich Adickes, Kant notes that reason tried to introduce unity into our 
knowledge, but that an interpretation of such unity is best applied in the sphere of 
practice, not that it concerns the unity of reason’s functions, theoretical and practical. At 
R4757744 he suggests that “since space and time are only conditions of appearance, there 
must be a principle of the unity of pure reason through which knowledge is determined 
without regard to appearance.” He rejects the idea of an antinomy of pure reason; and 
suggests that the unity he is considering is both the starting point and the systematicity 
of knowledge. But this is not explored in detail. Unity may concern origins and 
systematicity of practical knowledge, but it is not explored here. There is much more in 
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these notes and it is tempting to systematically comment on errors and omissions. 
Certainly there are hints of the relevance of the unity of thought to practical reason. 
Thus:  
“These propositions postulating the completeness of the world which is the 
object of our knowledge are only subjective necessities of thought: they describe 
how we must unify our experience but are not themselves valid for the 
exposition of the appearances of objects. But they do have a (to be sure 
unexplained) practical significance.”745 
As Guyer expresses it, “the link that Kant envisages between reason so conceived and 
the sphere of the practical must seem more obscure than ever.”746 
Among the notes, Kant does directly refer to practical reason. He suggests, for example, 
that the purposes that practical reason unifies747 are “empirical” or not given by reason. 
The unity of such purposes resides in their compatibility or the avoidance of 
contradictions among them.748 Morality requires unity of reason among one’s own 
actions and between one’s own and others. By 1778, the underlying idea of the unity of 
reason is related to practical reason’s aim at the greatest possible happiness, consisting 
in the attainment of the maximally consistent system of purposes.749 The object of 
morality is thus derived, says Guyer, from practical reason’s interest in systematicity. 
But this still leaves unclear the unity of theoretical and practical reason. 
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8.3 Ends and systematicity in the unity of reason 
If we have a large number of isolated facts, they make little sense to us unless they can 
be ordered. By assembling our cognitions, we can make a system out of a mere 
aggregate.750 By that process, we can build up a science. The art of systems is what 
Kant called an architectonic. So Kant defines a system as a manifold of cognitions as a 
unity under one idea. The logical form of any system can divide general concepts and 
lead to the classification of the manifold.751 Such systematicity can extend beyond 
intuitions to concepts, laws and so on. In building up a system, Kant aims for a 
systematic completeness of all cognitions: grounded on a transcendental law of 
specification. Reason prepares the field for understanding under the presupposition of 
varieties of nature using principles of homogeneity, specification and continuity of 
forms.752 Building a philosophical system is the key to a unity of concepts and of the 
empirical world. Reason also introduces ends; and this extends the system to the realm 
of the practical. Ends are what we aim for: that is, an end is a choice or decision of 
practical reason. By having ends, there is a justification to interrogate experience. 
Reason doesn’t just work out the means to ends that are determined by some other 
process.  
If reason strives in this way for systematic unity (for example, of the understanding), we 
can also expect that it will strive for the same systematic unity in reason itself. “Insight 
into the unity of the whole pure rational faculty theoretical as well as practical”, 
deriving everything from one principle, is an “undeniable need of human reason, which 
finds complete satisfaction only in a complete systematic unity of its cognitions.”753  
Considering myself as a thinking nature or soul, Kant argues that experience will never 
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attain a systematic unity of all the appearances of inner sense. By contrast, reason can 
conceive of “the concept of a simple self-sufficient intelligence.”754 
So, reason seeks the idea of the concepts of the understanding and this can be envisaged 
as a tree with the ideal (the highest genus) at the top. Going down this tree a level will 
eventually be reached where no further specification is possible, completing a system of 
concepts. The search for principles that can act as the foundation for such specification 
will be a regulatory idea. Such an ideal set of principles cannot be found because the 
complete concept of an individual can’t exist without its being capable of division into 
distinct species. It is impossible.755 Kant argues in the second antinomy that the 
existence of simple things cannot be established a posteriori, because no object of 
experience can testify to the reality of simple parts. Substances are infinitely divisible 
and contain infinitely many parts. 
What has been called reason’s principle of systematicity – finding “the unconditioned 
for conditioned cognitions of the understanding, by which its unity will be 
completed”756 – is “the proper principle of reason in general”.757 (Kant notes that these 
principles will be transcendent in respect of all appearances. He proceeds to discuss 
whether this principle leads to ever higher conditions to approach completeness in them 
and thus to bring the highest possible unity of reason into our cognition.”758) 
Kant suggests that reason’s necessary idea of a most real being (ens realissimum or 
God) arises from this principle of systematicity: a demand from theoretical reason, but 
further suggests that 
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“if a highest being were not presupposed  who could give effect and emphasis to 
the practical laws; then we would also have an obligation to follow those 
concepts, that even though they may not be objectively sufficient, are still 
preponderant in accordance with the measure of our reason, and in comparison 
with which we recognize nothing better or more convincing.”759 
The idea of a highest being above also suggests that such an idea is necessary from the 
perspective of moral motivation.760 It is a regulative principle of reason to “regard all 
combination in the world as if it arose from an all-sufficient necessary cause so as to 
ground on that cause the rule of a unity that is systematic and necessary according to 
universal laws.”761 
Perhaps one should emphasise that this concerns the idea of such a being, not its actual 
existence. It is a “mere idea”, a schema to “preserve the greatest systemic unity in the 
empirical use of our reason.”762 We consider things “as if” their existence arises from a 
highest intelligence. Having advocated the need of reason for systematicity in terms of 
purposes in the Appendix and also for the Idea of a highest intelligence, Kant makes the 
further link to practical reason: 
 “But this systematic unity of ends in this world of intelligences, which, as mere 
nature it can only be called the sensible world, as a system of freedom can be called an 
intelligible (moral) world also leads inexorably to the purposive unity of all things...and 
unifies practical with speculative reason.”763 
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8.4 The soul, God and regulative ideas 
Despite changes in our bodies and in the world around us, we continue to exist. The 
persisting source of our cognitions must be regarded as ourselves. From this comes the 
idea of the noumenal or super-sensible ‘I’ as a thinking personality. This permanent 
simple immaterial intellectual substance - a thinking self - persisting through all the 
changes we undergo is viewed by rational psychology as grounding the unity of 
experience. It is, in effect, the ‘rational doctrine of the soul’.764  The soul is a regulative 
idea in which “the investigation of reason will be directed to carrying through the 
grounds of explanation in this subject as far as possible on the basis of a single 
principle.”765 Theoretical and practical reason are both mental powers and the idea of 
the soul includes the notion of the unity of all mental powers thus united in a single 
principle.766  
In his discussion of regulative ideas in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, 
Kant offers an illustration of the way in which reason is used:767  
“The idea of a fundamental power – though logic does not at all ascertain 
whether there is such a thing – is at least the problem set by a systematic 
representation of the manifoldness of powers. The logical principles of reason 
demand this unity as far as it is possible to bring it about….this unity of reason 
is merely hypothetical. One asserts not that such a power must in fact be found, 
but rather that one must seek it for the benefit of reason…one must in such a 
way bring systematic unity into cognition.” 
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Kant is saying that we cannot know whether a fundamental power exists to unify reason 
when we try systematically to unify the powers of theoretical and practical reason. In 
stating that the unity of reason is “merely hypothetical”, he is classifying it as an idea of 
reason (see ch4 on the ideas and the status of the ‘hypothetical’). As such, it may be , 
indeed should be, something that we seek as if it exists and can be found because our 
reason needs it in order to be systematic and achieve a unity of cognition. Summing up 
then, the unity of reason is itself a theoretical, not a moral problem. From the latter it 
follows that the unity of reason is a regulative idea and not a practical postulate. 
The idea of the soul includes the notion of the unity of all mental powers. Theoretical 
and practical reason are mental powers. It follows that use of the idea of the soul 
involves representing them as two manifestations of a single power, not two 
independent entities.768 
  
Both nature and morality are ordered and that order is, Kant suggests, due to (the idea 
of) a higher intelligence: 
“reason bids us consider every connection in the world  according to principles 
of a systematic unity, hence as if they had all arisen from one single all-
encompassing being, as supreme and all sufficient cause….This highest formal 
unity that alone rests on concepts of reason is the purposive unity of things”769  
Ypi points to the similar argument expressed in Kant’s 1786 ‘What does it mean to 
orientate oneself in thinking?’ There is a right of reason’s need to orient itself in 
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thinking and therefore to assume something which can’t be assumed objectively.770 This 
orientation is in that “immeasurable space of the supersensible.” It is grounded on a 
need “not only to take the concept of the unlimited as the ground of the concepts of all 
limited beings but...the presupposition of its existence...Without  assuming an intelligent 
author we cannot give any intelligible ground of it.” This is essential to provide a 
satisfactory ground “for the contingency of things in the world, let alone for the 
purposiveness and order which is encountered.”771 This is similar to the first Critique’s 
argument. Through the systematic unity of the manifold, the greatest possible empirical 
use of reason is guaranteed and all combinations seen “as if they were ordained by a 
highest reason.”772 Ypi quotes Kant as arguing that the greatest systematic unity (and 
therefore also purposive unity of nature) is “the school and even the ground of the 
possibility of the greatest use of human reason.” She then states that  
“nature’s systematicity is a demand that stems from the nature of our reason and 
is expressive of its unity. In the same way that we seek “morally purposive unity 
for the sake of our moral ends, we must assume natural purposiveness for the 
sake of advancing the imperative to seek cognitive unity.”773 
But a reminder is required that in asking where we perceive purposive unity, “it does 
not matter whether you say, “God has willed it so” or “Nature has wisely ordered it.”774 
Reason is demanding this systematic and purposive unity as a regulative principle. 
This theme of purposiveness is expanded in the third Critique, where, explicitly,  
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“the purposiveness of nature is a special a priori concept that has its origin 
strictly in the reflecting power of judgement.”775 
  
8.5 The transcendental ideas as unifying concepts 
Reason, says Kant, has two specific uses: a logical use and a real or transcendental use. 
The logical use grounds particular knowledge claims only. The logical use of reason can 
be illustrated by the syllogism: and Kant offers the paradigm syllogism of ‘all humans 
are mortal/Caius is mortal etc.’ From this comes the generalisation that “what stands 
under the condition of a rule also stands under the rule itself.”776 Unification does not 
stop with a mediating principle (‘Caius is human’) being subsumed under a universal 
rule (‘All men are mortal’). The rule must be rationally grounded, which means it must 
be derived from a higher principle; and so on, guided by the maxim to find the 
unconditioned for the conditioned cognitions of the understanding, “with which its unity 
will be completed.”777  
Transcendental ideas are pure concepts of reason. Just as the categories were derived 
from the form of judgements, transformed into a concept of the synthesis of intuitions, 
so “the form of the syllogisms, if applied to the synthetic unity of intuitions under the 
authority of the categories, will contain the origin of special concepts a priori that we 
may call pure concepts of reason or transcendental ideas.”778 In its real or transcendental 
use, reason seeks out conditions that would allow us to connect all particular claims. 
This results in a single, coherent whole of knowledge:779 an ultimate condition, 
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containing within it the complete sum of all conditions capable of unifying all aspects of 
our knowledge. Thus: 
“This unity of reason presupposes an idea, namely that of the form of a whole of 
cognition, which precedes the determinate cognition of the parts and contains 
(all) the conditions for determining a priori the place of each part and its relation 
to the others. Accordingly, this idea postulates complete unity of the 
understanding’s cognition through which this cognition comes to be not merely 
a contingent aggregate but a system interconnected in accordance with necessary 
laws.”780                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
If every cognition is conditioned by further cognitions, then there is always the 
possibility that it can be extended or amended. “Reason has systematic unity in the 
sense that the empirically possible unity seeks to approach it without ever completely 
reaching it.”781 
Reason’s principle is regulative; that of the understanding is constitutive and it would be 
a dialectical error to interpret reason’s principle as constitutive. Reason can think of 
possibilities beyond the bounds of sense; the understanding cannot, for it can only 
provide concepts for real objects. Systematic unity cannot therefore be instantiated in 
experience. It is a regulative assumption that can bring us to a systematic unity in 
nature. I have already stated how the three logical principles of homogeneity, 
specification and continuity can bring maximal unity and systematicity to our empirical 
knowledge of nature.    
 
8.6 Conflict within reason? 
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If the regulative assumption is made that theoretical and practical reason are one reason, 
the question can still be raised as to whether they must be compatible  or whether there 
is the possibility of conflict. A conflict would destroy the idea of a systematic unity. 
Without the doctrine of the primacy of the practical, Kant considers that such a conflict 
could arise:  
“without such subordination a conflict of reason with itself would arise, since if 
they were merely juxtaposed, the first would of itself close its boundary strictly 
and admit nothing from the latter into its domain, while the latter would extend 
its boundaries over everything and when its need required, would try to include 
the former within them.”782  
That appears to say that practical reason would ignore the boundaries of sense and treat 
postulates as facts, while theoretical reason would reject claims of reason in its moral 
use, including the postulates which Kant thinks important for morality.  
In the first Critique, Kant asks how we could find complete unity of purposes among 
different wills. He proposes a “supreme will” that is omnipotent, omniscient, 
omnipresent and eternal.783 This leads to a systematic unity in “this world of 
intelligences”....the purposive unity of all things that constitute this great whole.” In the 
second Critique,  he also suggests purposive harmony between the practical and 
theoretical reason under a supreme intelligence “a wise author of the world...as the 
means of promoting what is objectively (practically) necessary...conducive to the moral 
purpose and moreover harmonising with the theoretical need of reason.”784 Thus the two 
uses of the one reason are in harmony with each other under God. There is no conflict. 
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8.7 Relating unity to the practical: is all reason practical? 
O’Neill785 has suggested that reason is a unity because all our reason, including the 
positive function of theoretical reason, is fundamentally practical. She points out that 
deployment of the categories in complete acts of judgement is only possible if ideas of 
reason or maxims of judgement786 are adopted to organise this judging. A practical 
principle must guide all complete acts of judgement. This explains why there is not a 
‘construction’ but only an ‘inventory’ of ‘materials’ at the end of the Doctrine of 
Elements. She writes: 
“An account of human knowledge will be systematically indeterminate unless 
these maxims are identified and vindicated. Here we begin to see why Kant 
thinks that practical reason is fundamental to all reasoning, why there can be no 
complete rules for judging and why human reasoning is....non-algorithmic.”787 
Human needs, including the needs of reasoning, are practical. If we can act only on the 
basis that our maxim could be willed as universal law, then the Categorical Imperative 
surely emerges as the supreme principle of all reason; and a unifying principle. The link 
to the broader interpretation of the doctrine of the primacy of the practical set out in ch7 
is plain to see. Practical reason is fundamental because in choosing how to think, 
understand, interpret or act we “embody the only principles that we could have reason 
to think of as principles of reason”788 and accommodate our plurality – the Categorical 
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Imperative’s universalisation. We should have the discipline to think from the 
standpoint of everyone else.789 
A similar argument is offered by Mudd, again based on the assertion that reason’s 
supreme regulative principle is a categorical imperative.790 Moral agents can fail to be 
guided by the practical principles we impose on ourselves. But a command to seek 
cognitive systematic unity is something we ought to follow. It is a universalisable law 
and objective. 
“Reason’s principle, practically construed, would neither determine anything 
given in the world nor anything given in the way we understand the world. 
Rather, it would normatively specify how we ought  to understand the world, 
namely, as a systematic whole.”791 
Summarising, reason’s principle is instructing us that we should understand the world as 
a whole but this will not be automatic. Seeking unity is a practical imperative and 
therefore must be a regulative principle. We are commanded to seek systematic unity as 
an object of striving even though it could never be instantiated in experience or found. 
So Kant projects systematic unity (for an unattainable ideal). The regulative command 
doesn’t tell us (constitutively) what nature is like, but it does tell us how we ought to 
organise our cognition of nature: that is as if nature is systematically organised: a 
subjective interpretation. But Kant’s argument takes us to the assertion of an objective 
interpretation that nature will make the unity possible792 (A651/B679). From here I 
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follow Mudd in resolving the incoherences that many believe result from subjective and 
objective interpretations. 
In guiding the understanding, reason helps unify the empirical judgements that the 
understanding itself generates – not objects given in experience.   
“The unity of reason is not the unity of a possible experience, but....the unity of 
understanding.”793  
Reason helps by projecting the ideas of systematic unity as the goal for our cognition’s 
striving; and encouraging us to seek this unity in order to understand nature. In the 
chapter on reason above, I have discussed the role of reason as logic in which it gives 
grounding to particular claims to knowledge. “Reason in its logical use seeks the 
universal condition of its judgement.” 794 In its transcendental use, (set out in the first 
book of the transcendental dialectic) it seeks an ultimate ground that could connect all 
particular claims:  
“...pure concepts of reason or transcendental ideas ...will determine the use of 
the understanding in the whole of an entire experience.”795  
Such a notion, containing the complete sum of all conditions is reason’s fundamental 
idea:  
“This unity of reason always presupposes an idea, namely that of the form of a 
whole of cognition, which precedes the determinate cognition of the parts...this 
idea postulates complete unity of the understanding’s cognition through which 
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this cognition comes to be....a system interconnected in accordance with 
necessary laws.”796 
The idea of a highest intelligence is, Kant says, “only a heuristic” but under its guidance 
this concept means that we “ought (my italics) to seek after the constitution and 
connection of things in general.”797 We have already noted above that we are required 
to seek the systematic unity of our cognition. If we do not succeed, then we must try 
harder to seek a complete and systematic unity:  
“Such concepts of reason are not created by nature, rather we question nature 
according to these ideas, and we take our cognition to be defective as long as it 
is not adequate to them.”798  
The Categorical Imperative is the standard of a good will and upon it depends pure 
practical reason. All categorical imperatives of this form help define what pure rational 
activity is. Here they are constitutive. If the command to seek cognitive unity is a 
categorical imperative, the principle of reason is objective in status. Only reason can go 
beyond the bounds of sense and project systematic unity of our cognition. That 
systematic unity should not be confused with the unity of the understanding: 
“If, therefore, pure reason also deals with objects, yet it has no immediate 
reference to them and their intuition, but deals only with the understanding and 
its judgments, which apply directly to the senses and their intuition, in order to 
determine their object, the unity of reason is therefore not the unity of a possible 
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experience, but is essentially different from that, which is the unity of 
understanding.”799 
This command to seek systematic unity expresses reason’s regulative principle in the 
most general way. Kant offers logical principles of homogeneity, specification and 
affinity which can bring maximal unity when transcendentally expressed in principles of 
genera, species and affinity.800 
Now to the two conceptual difficulties that Mudd describes and I have noted above. 
They are difficulties with the objective transcendental interpretation of reason’s 
principle and the subjective methodological interpretation, both of which Kant seems to 
hold. I will say more about these and give an account of Mudd’s analysis and solution, 
based on an analysis of subjectivity and objectivity, – which I find entirely plausible. I 
have noted that Kant holds that we ought to organise our cognition as if nature is 
systematically unified.801 Reason’s demand to seek systematic unity of our cognition 
appears to include a regulative assumption that nature itself is a systematic unity. Mudd 
therefore asks how this assumption affects the status of the principle: is it subjective or 
objective, with the implication that it would be contradictory to be both? Subjectively, 
commanding us to seek systematic unity is purely methodological, just telling us how to 
go about it. “[It] makes no valid claim of any kind about objects”, merely “prescribing 
the unity of the understanding’s own rules.”802 Objectively, reason’s demand involves a 
necessary regulative assumption that nature itself is systematically unified in a way that 
must be determined through the understanding. “On this view, reason’s principles 
would not only be concerned with our way of understanding nature but also concerned, 
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albeit indirectly, with nature itself.” Kant thinks we must accept both objective and 
subjective versions: commentators therefore accuse him of incoherence. We assume that 
rationally pursuing an end such as cognitive unity implies that nature will make its 
achievement possible.803  
Secondly, Kant sometimes presents reason’s principle as transcendentally necessary for 
any use of the understanding at all; elsewhere it’s a conditionally necessary heuristic 
aid. In the first case, it is a transcendental condition on the possibility of experience; in 
the second case, methodological guidance. This contrasting pair become associated with 
the first problem: the subjective-methodological and the objective-transcendental. 
Setting aside the various commentators’ arguments for reasons of space, Mudd responds 
with a six-fold division of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’, claiming this can resolve the 
incoherence. Reason’s principle could be objective in one sense and subjective in 
another (non-contradictory) sense. The divisions are: 
O1 Objective as directly transcendentally conditioning objects of possible 
experience, termed objectual. 
O2 Objective as validity not dependent on subjective contingent variation, termed 
inter-subjectively valid 
O3 Objective as reason’s principle conditions being fully rational cognitive activity 
insofar as that activity in other respects constitutes objects, termed indeterminate. 
S1 Subjective as what comes from the subject, termed subjectively grounded. 
S2 Subjective as not inter-subjectively valid, termed idiosyncratic. 
S3 Subjective as not directly transcendentally conditioning objects, termed non-
objectual. 
Her argument also requires an examination of ‘transcendentally necessary.’ 
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If objective is taken as O1 and subjective as S1, then transcendental principles can have 
dual status and incoherence is refuted. The problem is how interpreters have failed to 
identify the unique way in which reason’s regulative principle is both objective and 
subjective. Again, only assuming all transcendental principles are objectual (O1), is a 
transcendental principle that is regulative and not constitutive and incoherent. This 
explains the problem so many have in interpretation. Kant restricts transcendental 
concepts and principles of the understanding to being O1 so that other transcendental 
concepts and principles may not be. In the Appendix, reason’s principle is S3 (being 
regulative) and transcendental. In a broad sense of transcendental,804 there is no 
incoherence, further supported from the third Critique: (“we are delighted …when we 
encounter such a systematic unity among merely empirical laws.”)805 Here Kant 
supports the possibility of non-objectual (S3) transcendental principles seen in the 
Appendix.  
This analysis makes sense of the principle of reason’s objective (inter-subjectively valid, 
O2) status, while being, argues Mudd, also subjective (S1 and S3) as all transcendental 
principles are, (as well as they are in their role in guiding the activity of subjects). Just 
as Kant argues that we must assume nature to be morally purposive if we are to adopt 
the Categorical Imperative of seeking a moral world, so we must assume nature to be 
unified if we are to adopt the imperative of seeking cognitive unity. “Reading reason’s 
regulative principle as a categorical imperative… makes sense of both its objective-
subjective character and its peculiar methodological-transcendental necessity.”  That we 
are required or prescribed by reason to seek the systematic unity of cognition, suggests 
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that reason’s principle is indeed practical. It “shows how... we ought to seek after the 
constitution and connection of objects of experience.806 As a (regulative) rule, the 
principle postulates what should be effected by us in [seeking to understand nature.]”807 
In sum then, the unity of reason can be supported by a practical reading of the principle 
of reason as a categorical imperative. We interrogate nature by reason’s ideas even 
though failing to achieve the complete systematic unity that we seek. Categorical 
imperatives help to constitute what pure practical reason is. “This rationality-
constitutive feature ...illustrates the broad sense in which such [categorical imperatives]  
count as transcendental.”808 In seeking a moral world, we assume nature to be morally 
purposive and adopt the categorical imperative; we assume nature to be unified and 
adopt an imperative to seek cognitive unity. 809 This practical interpretation of reason’s 
principle avoids suggesting the inevitability of what we do but accounts for saying what 
we ought to do – and may not do. 
The argument in the above pages deserves more space: but the exposition shows how 
Kant’s categorical imperatives illuminate reason’s theoretical function; the primacy of 
the practical; and the unity of reason’s two faculties - at the heart of this thesis. 
This reading places a heavy weight on the Categorical Imperative. In particular, 
although not a logical objection, it is striking that the role of the Categorical Imperative 
receives little direct support in the first Critique for its proposed status as reason’s 
supreme principle  So perhaps the O’Neill/Mudd interpretation is deserving of some 
further examination.  
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Klemme argues810 that if the Categorical Imperative is the highest principle of all 
reason, it follows that critical self-disciplining has to be considered an autonomous 
procedure. This, in turn, implies identifying critique and moral autonomy. Nowhere 
does Kant promote such a view. Our duty to seek the truth and pursue knowledge does 
not provide an adequate grounding for the Categorical Imperative as the highest 
principle of all our reason – the issue posed in the Groundwork.811 In a section entitled 
“On the system of the higher cognitive faculties which grounds philosophy”,812 the third 
Critique offers “no ideas, like reason, of any object at all, since it is a faculty for 
subsuming under concepts given from elsewhere.” Klemme is right to assert that if 
autonomy in the sense of moral self-legislation were at the same time an attribute of 
theoretical reason any difference between practical and theoretical reason would be 
eliminated, but this assertion is not made by Kant, even if he could have done so in the 
Groundwork. The concept of autonomy is being confused by Klemme with self-
referential critique.  
In the Groundwork, where Kant introduces the idea of the unity of reason,813 he states 
that he cannot “yet bring it to such completeness...without bringing into it 
considerations of a wholly different kind and confusing the reader.” Yet it is in the 
Groundwork that he introduces the Categorical Imperative as the supreme principle of 
morality, making the final step from metaphysics of morals to the critique of practical 
reason without any mention of theoretical reason. I note that omission proves nothing, 
and it does seem remarkable that even such a lengthy dissertation on the Categorical 
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Imperative as that by Paton814 offers no comment on the Categorical Imperative as the 
supreme principle of all reason.  
Returning to O’Neill’s exposition, I note that critique and autonomy are described as 
identical. A critique of reason “reconsiders the standpoint from which the argument is 
conducted.” After Kant’s critical turn we have two standpoints of course. The critique’s 
function is to discipline reason by a process that is self-disciplinary, “to constrain its 
propensity to expansion beyond the narrow bounds of possible experience and to 
preserve it from straying and error.”815 The self-discipline of critique consists of 
autonomous self-discipline in thought and action if reason’s authority is grounded in 
autonomy. “Autonomy”, says O’Neill, “does not presuppose but rather constitutes the 
principles of reason and their authority.”816 Pure reason has a task (obliegen – translated 
not as ‘duty’ or involving duty, but as ‘to have a task’) to self discipline. But there is 
nothing in the Discipline of Pure Reason that the normativity of such action is grounded 
in the Categorical Imperative or human volition.  The Discipline of Pure Reason has no 
mention of autonomy, duty, the moral law or the categorical imperative. Autonomy 
cannot be an attribute of theoretical reason or cognition and volition would be the same. 
Kant’s rejection of this view is supported by his analysis of “the connection of the 
legislations of understanding and reason through the power of judgement” in the third 
Critique.817 It would appear that critique and autonomy are not fundamentally identical. 
In conclusion, on the one hand the idea of unity as a categorical imperative according to 
O’Neill/Mudd is more persuasive  than an argument based on absence of evidence; and 
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it may be valuable that “if we want to resolve the problem of the unity of pure practical 
and theoretical reason...we have to study the (third) Critique.”818 
 
8.8 Unity of reason now? 
If a ‘science’ is subjected to a critical elucidation, this will mean the investigation and 
justification of why it has a specific systematic form if compared with another system 
with a similar cognitive faculty as its basis.819 Both practical and theoretical reason are 
pure reason, he says, so that both have the same cognitive basis. By comparing them, 
the systematic form of the one can be distinguished from that of the other. The account 
that follows is as we might expect. The Analytic of theoretical reason has shown that it 
begins with intuition and therefore sensibility, progressing to concepts of the objects of 
this intuition, ending with principles. Practical reason, by contrast, makes objects real 
with a will that is a causality: it does not deal with objects in order to cognise them. A 
critique of the Analytic of reason “insofar as it is to be a practical reason (and this is the 
real problem) begins from the possibility of practical principles a priori.” From here 
practical reason can proceed to concepts of objects i.e. of good and evil. Kant’s interim 
conclusion is that the whole sphere of the conditions of the use of pure practical reason 
is divided in a way entirely analogous to the division of theoretical reason, albeit in 
reverse order. After comparing the use of Logic and Aesthetic, with the division of the 
former into an Analytic of principles and of concepts, he comments that since the 
division of the Analytic of pure practical reason proceeds a priori it must proceed from 
the universal (the moral principle) as in the major premise of a syllogism, with a minor 
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premise being a subsumption of possible actions as good or evil, through to a 
conclusion. This will be the “subjective determination of the will (an interest in the 
practically possible good and in the maxim based on it.).”820 Although Kant considers 
these comparisons “gratifying”, he (merely?) considers that they  
“rightly occasion the expectation of perhaps being able some day (my italics) to 
attain insight into the unity of the whole pure rational faculty (theoretical as well 
as practical) and to derive everything from one principle – the undeniable need 
of human reason, which finds complete satisfaction only in a complete 
systematic unity of its cognitions.”821  
The latter sentence seems a curious statement because it appears to refute the view that 
theoretical and practical reason are united, which can only be expected “some day”. It 
seems the more surprising when he has previously expressed the view that a critique of 
pure practical reason should be able to “present the unity of practical with speculative 
reason in a common principle.”822 One commentator offers the simplest explanation in 
suggesting that Kant  
“never explicitly demonstrates the unity of a single rational faculty, in the sense 
that there is only one such capacity (rather than two) because this assumption is 
taken for granted....The unity we hope to be able to demonstrate823 or attain 
insight into824 some happy day in the distant future is the unity of a complete 
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philosophical system created by the unified use of theoretical and practical 
reason.”825  
Once again Kant’s varying uses of the term ‘reason’, as discussed in ch3, can easily 
puzzle us. 
I have shown that the features of completeness and systematicity are related to the unity 
of reason in the mature philosophy. Interconnection based on one principle defines the 
systematic. Theoretical reason strives for the systematic unity of knowledge, practical 
reason for the systematic unity of our maxims for action. Systematic order requires an 
antecedent idea of such order (“always presupposes an idea”, as quoted above). The 
unifying idea is provided by reason: an “idea of reason.” 
Both theoretical and practical reason use the concept of ‘ideas’. The ideas of God, the 
soul and the world are employed by theoretical reason as regulative principles826 and by 
practical reason as postulates.827 Practical reason systematises in proposing a kingdom 
of ends in which our maxims harmonise with those of others with common laws.828 (At 
the same time, one must note that ‘ideas’ function differently so that in theoretical 
reason, they are used as regulative principles, whereas in practical reason they fulfil the 
higher function as postulates, as in ch4 above.) 
Subjectively too, both theoretical and practical reason assume that nature is a purposive 
order.829 And both theoretical and practical reason can be set out in a similar 
structure.830 There are undoubted similarities in that in both theoretical and practical 
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spheres, reason concerns itself with principles; and in both it is the task of reason to 
draw the right conclusions. And then too, both knowledge831 and action832 are based on 
rules due to the relation of knowledge and action to judgement. Reason is subject only 
to the laws it gives itself, but “without any law, nothing – not even nonsense – can play 
its game for long.”833 
If theoretical and practical reason share features, their similarity becomes an argument 
for their being unified as one reason with different applications. However I do not 
accept that is enough to demonstrate unity. How much similarity should suffice? How 
similar? There are significant differences also, “dialectical dissimilarities”834. The role 
of sensibility, for example, is very different. In transcending the bounds of sense, 
theoretical reason can produce unfounded knowledge claims. An oak is similar to an ash 
but they are different trees. I note this criticism is also one that Guyer makes of 
Neiman’s account.835 Moreover the greater the differences between the two expressions 
of reason, the harder it seems to support or demonstrate their unity. Freedom may be 
necessary for both theoretical and practical reason but practical reason gives it a far 
more prominent place in creating its own objects. Theoretical good is a conditional 
good, while moral action is unconditioned: a good will is the only unconditioned good. 
836 Reason is constitutive in the moral realm, but only regulative in the theoretical 
realm. Realising the objects of practical reason does not require the cooperation of 
nature or providence.  
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 Returning to the “curious statement” with which I began this section. Kant claims that 
reason is the faculty of principles and sets out what this means in the Transcendental 
Dialectic837 and similarly in the Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgement.838 
Although the context is theoretical reason, the comment in the first Critique is placed 
before his assertion that “given our present aims we will set aside the practical ideas, 
and hence consider reason only in its speculative use.”839  Beck is thus prepared to 
interpret reason as a faculty of principles to apply to all reason and not only the 
theoretical. In his view it “is fortunately not difficult to state what may have been the 
“one principle” in the “curious statement” quoted at the outset  
of this section. “Reason,” says Beck,  
“is the faculty of principles and brings all that is thought by the understanding 
under the highest unity of thought. Now if there are valid practical principles 
whose necessity is not derivable from universal and necessary principles 
conceived only by reason, then the internal unity of practice would itself be non-
existent or, at best, contingent. Only reason can supply universal necessary 
principles, whether to knowledge or to conduct.”840  
All reason is a faculty of principles. I note that Beck does not directly address Kant’s 
curious statement (the expectation of an insight some day) directly. What Beck has 
offered could be no more than another example of similarity, an observation which I 
have noted is suggestive but not adequate to prove reason’s unity. If reason is a faculty 
of principles, as Beck emphasises, and if we believe that there is only one faculty of 
reason, then it is reasonable to assert a unity of principles to bridge the divide between 
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reason’s practical and theoretical manifestations. It is practical reason that enables us to 
believe in the classical objects of metaphysics: freedom, God, immortality. They lie 
beyond validation by theoretical reason and depend on practical reason which “takes the 
lead.” Closing this gap creates a kind of rational unity: one faculty would not be able to 
answer the problem left by another separate faculty.841 The concept of freedom, says 
Kant, “insofar as its reality is proved by an apodictic law of practical reason, constitutes 
the keystone of the whole structure of a system of pure reason, even of speculative 
reason.”842 Freedom is an idea of theoretical reason established a priori by practical 
reason. And the unifying principle is a wise, benevolent God, creator of a teleological 
world that coheres with morality.843 
So far then, I have defined what unity might mean, in particular between theoretical and 
practical reason. A number of significant factors in considering its unity have been 
identified, together with its status as a regulative idea. Kant’s pre-critical understanding 
of reason’s unity has been outlined. The crucial importance of systematicity has been 
demonstrated. Reason’s unity as a subjective ideal of knowledge and an objective ideal 
of practical reason has been asserted. The idea of finding the unconditioned for the 
conditioned has been a recurrent underlying theme. The idea of God as a “fundamental 
power” that unifies has been introduced and the idea that all reason is ultimately 
practical has been argued, fulfilling the belief in the primacy of practical reason. 
Somehow, none of this is entirely satisfactory. Practical and theoretical reason just are 
different in so many ways. Some of these were outlined in the previous chapter, some in 
this. The principle of systematicity seems so important, yet it reduces to little more than 
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a form of similarity: and it is clear that similarity alone will not do to prove reason’s 
unity. The idea of unity stemming from an agreed principle, the Categorical Imperative, 
is a stimulating idea. But whatever the arguments surrounding this role for the 
Categorical Imperative, it is not the arguments themselves that fail to convince but the 
absence of any promotion of this idea by Kant himself in most of his writing: the 
absence of the Categorical Imperative altogether in the first Critique isn’t something 
that I find can be ignored. So, while on the one hand a case has been made out above for 
reason’s unity and while Kant emphasises often enough that reason is a unity, one is left 
with Beck’s protest:  
“One can only regret...that at no point does Kant, as it were, take the reader by 
the hand and say, “Now I shall show you precisely why I think theoretical and 
practical reason differ only in being two applications of the same faculty.”844  
This is even while Beck also asserts in the same paragraph, “the unity of theoretical and 
practical reason is asserted... and almost the entire [second Critique] can be considered 
an elaboration of this.” We seem to be left with the assertion that reason serves similar 
functions in both its practical and theoretical manifestations: “universalising, 
systematising, integrating and rendering necessary what appears prima facie to be 
contingent,”845 without going beyond the similarity argument. Yet Kant does not 
abandon the quest: “there must somewhere be a source of positive cognitions that 
belong in the domain of pure reason, and that perhaps give occasion for errors only 
through misunderstanding, but that in fact constitute the goal of the strenuous effort of 
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reason. For to what cause should the unquenchable desire to find a firm footing beyond 
all bounds of experience otherwise be ascribed?”846 
 It remains to turn to the third Critique.  
 
8.9 Unity and the third Critique 
In the third Critique, an emphasis on teleology may be expected; additionally, Kant 
introduces the idea of reflective judgement. Whereas in the first Critique, the origin and 
use of the notion of systematicity is assigned to the faculty of theoretical reason,847 this 
changes in the Critique of the Power of Judgement. It is now located in the faculty of 
reflective judgement. Reflective judgement is a type of judgement that seeks, for a 
particular, a universal that is not yet given; and a determining judgement as the faculty 
for thinking of the particular as contained under the universal. Given the importance that 
Kant has attached to systematicity in his argument for reason’s unity, this deserves 
consideration. Firstly, whatever their roles, reflective judgement includes aesthetic 
judgement whereas theoretical reason does not, so that this represents more than a 
change in terminology. Judgement “in general” in the third Critique is defined as “the 
faculty for thinking of the particular as contained under the universal”848 and “the 
faculty for the subsumption of the particular under the general.”849 In the function of 
subsumption, the “universal (the rule, principle, the law)” may be given so that 
judgement must find a particular to subsume under the universal – a determining 
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judgement; or alternatively, a universal must be found for a particular that is given – a 
reflective judgement.850  
If we visit an art gallery we may register an instant pleasure in response to particular 
exhibits; they may then be judged as subsumed under the universal concept of the 
beautiful. That would be an example of an aesthetic reflective judgement. Teleological 
judgements may also be reflective in this way.  
The contrast between the reflective and determinative judgement suggests that they are 
mutually exclusive. Implicitly, in the subsumption of a particular under a universal, the 
particular or the universal may be given, but not both.851 Cooperation is excluded: one 
judgement must connect the particular and the universal. Against this, suppose that 
more than two terms are involved. Suppose, says Guyer,852 causation (an abstract 
universal) requires an intermediate causal concept (say, a particular chemical causation), 
then both determinative and reflective judgements may be needed: determinative to 
apply the abstract concept to sensible particulars, but reflective judgements to find those 
concepts and finish the job assigned to determinative judgement.  
Now, in the first Critique, Kant considered systematicity desirable independent of any 
demand of the understanding. Rather, it was connected to pure reason’s demand for 
unconditional completeness in knowledge. In the third Critique however, his focus is 
the way that systematicity works in categories and in the transcendental laws of 
experience which they ground to the given sensible particulars of empirical experience. 
This provides a reason why Kant might prefer to associate systematicity with judgement 
rather than reason, “with the task of subsumption rather than with an independent 
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objective of completeness.” In guiding a search for intermediate (my italics) universals, 
empirical concepts or laws, systematicity seeks to apply categories to particulars. 
Hence, systematicity is best assigned to reflective judgement.  
Although Kant describes two other regulative ideals, neither of these is re-assigned to 
the third Critique’s reflective judgement.  One is the "regulative principle of pure 
reason"853  that Kant introduces in order to solve the "Antinomy of Pure Reason." This 
is essentially a quantitative ideal of the indefinite extendibility of any empirical 
synthesis; while the other is of pure or idealized fundamental explanatory concepts-an 
ideal of an explanatory minimum rather than quantitative maximum.   
In the Introduction to the third Critique, Kant claims that  
“there is an incalculable gulf between the domain of the concept of nature, as the 
sensible, and the domain of the concept of freedom, as the supersensible, so that 
from the former to the latter (thus by means of the theoretical use of reason) no 
transition is possible.”  
But he continues,  
“the concept of freedom should have an influence on the former, namely the 
concept of freedom should make the end that is imposed by its laws real in the 
sensible world; and nature must consequently also be able to be conceived in 
such a way that the lawfulness of its form is at least in agreement with the 
possibility of the ends that are to be realised in it in accordance with the laws of 
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freedom. Thus there must still be a ground of the unity of the supersensible that 
grounds nature with that which the concept of freedom contains practically.”854 
In associating the realisation of the ends of freedom from the noumenal world with the 
natural world, a common purpose of theoretical and practical reason is being proposed. 
Kant’s account of how beauty is the symbol of morality plays a role in bridging the 
“incalculable gulf” he asserts. How? In setting out the satisfaction that grounds 
judgements of pure beauty, these refer to the harmony of the cognitive faculties which 
concern our empirical knowledge of nature. So if, having established a relation between 
beauty and the understanding (i.e. nature), he now establishes that between beauty and 
reason (morality). So beauty lies as an intermediary between nature and morality. 
Apprehending the beautiful gives an immediate satisfaction that involves 
disinterestedness, freedom, and universality – qualities shared with moral awareness. 
Our imagination is expanded by the aesthetic idea, directing us to what is supersensible. 
Our experience of the beautiful directs us to moral awareness. These claims are made at 
two different points in the Critique: 
“Through the possibility of its a priori laws for nature the understanding gives a 
proof that nature is cognised by us only as appearance, and hence at the same 
time an indication of its supersensible substratum; but it leaves this entirely 
undetermined. The power of judgement through its a priori principle for judging 
nature in accordance with possible particular laws for it, provides for its 
supersensible substratum (in us as well as outside us) determinability through 
the intellectual faculty. But reason provides determination for the same 
substratum through its practical law a priori; and thus the power of judgement 
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makes possible the transition from the domain of the concept of nature to that of 
the concept of freedom.”855 
 
The experience of nature or of a natural object as beautiful is based on a reflective 
judgement about the purposiveness of the natural world around us for the object appears 
as if designed to evoke such a spontaneous response within us. We cannot assert that the 
object actually was designed for this purpose, but an idea of reason tells us so. 
Experience of the beautiful is an experience of purposiveness without purpose, a sense 
that things fit together in a way we cannot explain.856 
No additional explanatory power is gained by considering nature as a system of 
purposes. The purpose of a heart may be to pump blood around our bodies; we may 
legitimately say that it is not functioning as it should if it is damaged; we may say that 
in pumping blood around it has the purpose of maintaining life for the whole organism; 
we may even consider nature as ordered in describing a feature to keep a species 
survive. But there is no empirical or a priori reason to see nature as a purposive whole. 
Objectively, nature’s origin lies in the mechanism of nature. “But,” says Kant, 
“if we go through the whole of nature, we do not find in us, as nature, any being 
that can claim the privilege of being the final end of creation; and one can even 
prove a priori that whatever could be an ultimate end for nature could never, no 
matter with what conceivable determination and properties it might be equipped, 
be, as a natural thing, a final end.”857 
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Yet, as already noted in considering the priority of the practical, we judge humanity as 
an end in itself, the ultimate purpose for which all else is the means. This moral 
conception of humanity leads us to think of the whole world as purposively structured 
for the possibility of realising the Highest Good, a union of virtue (practical reason) and 
proportionate happiness (theoretical reason). Building on this idea, Kant envisages 
human history itself as guided by some purpose aiming for an ethical commonwealth:  
“a comforting view of the future, one in which we represent from afar how the 
human species finally works its way up to that state where all the seeds nature 
has planted in it can be developed fully and in which the species’ vocation here 
on earth can be fulfilled.”858 
As a species we have the capacity for planning rationally (i.e. morally) to build shelter, 
find food and so on. For this we require a culture of skill: essential but not sufficient for 
we choose our ends.859  He writes,  
“only in the human being, although in him only as a subject of morality, is 
unconditional legislation with regard to ends to be found, which therefore makes 
him alone capable of being a final end, to which the whole of nature is 
teleologically subordinated.”860 
Thus, for theoretical purposes we must regard the empirical world as ‘nature’, that is as 
a self organising, organised, self-subsisting dynamic purposive unity. We can 
understand the world in  general and organic nature only by assuming the theoretical 
Idea of Nature and thinking of the world of experience as a systematic whole, ‘as a 
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kingdom of ends’ incorporating the teleological principle.  We must presuppose “the 
systematic unity of nature as objectively valid and necessary.”861 It is here that we must 
find the unity of reason for nature itself as a unity can only be understood as united with 
practical reason because the latter is essential to pursue its ends. 
In the first Critique, Kant does not explain why teleology leads to the “greatest 
systematic unity”.862 In the third, he argues that if we make the regulative assumption 
that there is a teleology in nature, then we must regard nature as a system of ends, a 
final end of creation, to completely ground the teleological order.863 Since the noumenal 
human being is the final end of creation, nature’s ultimate end is to further the 
development of the end-setting capacities of humans:864 “that which nature is capable of 
doing in order to prepare himself for what he must himself do in order to be a final 
end.” Kant calls this ultimate end of nature “culture.” This is defined as the 
development of the aptitude to set ends for oneself, receptive to higher (moral) 
purposes, “not its own earthly happiness”. We must liberate ourselves from the 
“despotism of desires.”865 Mankind will go beyond what nature can accomplish and 
transform itself into a moral whole, a community of rational beings, legislating and 
obeying the moral law. This exposition, first set out in his Idea for a Universal History 
(1784), provided a similar teleological ordering principle that he used later in the third 
Critique. Now, our moral agency cannot be certain to impact on our inner nature. The 
approximation of a moral world (from practical reason) to that of nature requires nature 
to be designed to harmonise with morality coupled with a duty on us to promote such a 
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world which would justify our believing nature is so designed. Theoretical reason also 
uses the idea that the natural world is a product of intelligent design, so that practical 
reason’s idea of the world harmonises with theoretical reason’s idea of the world as it is. 
Theoretical and practical reason are therefore united as the product of intelligent design 
of a highest being. To quote: 
“this systematic unity of ends in this world of intelligences, which, though as 
mere nature it can only be called the sensible world, as a system of freedom can 
be called an intelligible, i.e., moral world, also leads inexorably to the purposive 
unity of all things that constitute this great whole, in accordance with universal 
laws of nature, just as the first does in accordance with universal and necessary 
moral laws, and unites practical with speculative reason.”866  
It is nature’s purposiveness stemming from divine design that unites theoretical and 
practical reason. This is echoed when he writes that “it is theoretically possible for 
(subjective reason) to think the exact harmony of the realm of nature with the realm of 
morals as the condition of the possibility of the highest good.”867 It is to the concept of 
the highest good that I will now turn.  
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9.1 Introduction 
Aristotle asked “What should be the fundamental goal of the good life?”868 I will now 
describe the concept of the highest good as Kant’s answer, demonstrate its religious (and 
specifically protestant) basis, oppose a secular interpretation, emphasise its importance 
for individuals as members of society and argue its place as the ultimate goal of human 
life. It will form the final end (telos) of reason. In bringing both chapter and thesis to a 
close, I will comment on his question, “What can I hope?”  
Clearly the concept of the highest good was important for Kant as it appears in all three 
Critiques and in other essays869,870,871. Kant’s exposition shows some changes from the 
first Critique of 1781 to its final outing in Perpetual Peace in 1795. Any account therefore 
risks some inconsistencies. 
 
9.2  Structuring the highest good 
In the second section of the canon of pure reason, Kant introduces "the ideal of the highest 
good as a determining ground of the ultimate end (Zweck i.e. telos, purpose) of pure 
reason".872 If reason is a unity, there must ultimately be only one unconditioned end. Kant 
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goes beyond the ends of practical reason in actions or of theoretical reason in cognition 
by proposing an 'end' of all things. This necessitates a totality, an absolute, a wholeness 
from reason’s systematic unity. The totality of the world should be considered as a 
purposive unity, organised and self-organising. "In such a product of nature each part is 
conceived as if it exists only through all the others, thus as if existing for the sake of the 
others and on account of the whole".873  The highest end, which is the ultimate aim of 
nature "is properly directed only to what is moral"874. Plainly, the highest end is the 
highest good.  
The highest good is the "unconditioned totality of the object of pure practical reason."875, 
876  It is, in Beck's definition, "the concept of the unconditioned for the practically 
conditioned, i.e., the concept of a supreme end which unites all other ends. Without it, 
there could be no system of ends."877 To attain the highest good appears impossible in 
practice even if attainable in principle, the "goal of unceasing endeavours", the aim to 
become a master of wisdom. The moral law (alone) is the ground for making the highest 
good and its promotion and realisation the object of the pure (practical) will. One who 
could attain the realisation of the highest good would have a holy will: a will of infinite 
worth because it would be a will completely conforming to the moral law.  
Kant defines a holy will as one whose maxims necessarily harmonise with the laws of 
autonomy, an absolutely good will. “Obligation cannot be attributed to a holy being.”878 
Commentators vary in their interpretation of the holy will. For some, a holy will is one that 
knows no temptation and not (merely) a will that can perfectly resist it. Thus Thorpe writes, 
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“For Kant the idea of a holy will is not the idea of a being that can overcome all temptation, but 
rather a being that does not suffer temptation...a holy will is to be understood as one in which 
there is no temptation.”879 880 
“Necessitation is conceivable only where a contravention of moral laws is possible, and 
hence a thing can be morally necessary without being a duty, which would happen if the 
subject were at all times to act without necessitation in accordance to the moral law; for 
then a duty or obligation so to act would not be present; hence this does not hold of a 
morally perfect being, in that such a being acts solely from holiness. Where there is no 
necessitation there also no moral imperative, no obligation, duty, virtue, ought or 
constraint is conceivable. Hence the moral laws are also called laws of duty, because 
they presuppose an agent subject to the impulses of nature. Like an angel, a being of 
this kind [a morally perfect being] can in no way be thought of existing, but to the 
philosopher is merely an idea.”881  
Wrongdoing has no attractions for one with a holy will: God. Mortals can only aspire to 
supreme virtue, approach it asymptotically and perhaps gain it in immortality. 
The objection to this argument for holiness as the impossibility of temptation is that Kant refers 
to “the Holy One of the Gospel”882 and clearly means Jesus Christ. Yet on the biblical account, 
Jesus was tempted883 “in all points like we are, yet without sin.”884 This suggests ambiguity in 
Kant or perhaps a change in view over time.885  
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But, Kant observes, the moral law does not promise happiness. Perfection, a perfect 
unity of nature and morals can be achieved in what is best conceived as a kingdom of 
God,886 where the full realisation of moral aspiration leads to beatitude.887 In this way,  
"the moral law leads through the concept of the highest good as the object and 
final end of pure practical reason, to religion, that is to the recognition of all duties 
as divine commands...from a will that is morally perfect (holy and beneficent)."888  
A virtuous disposition does not necessarily produce happiness, at least in this world of 
appearances; yet happiness is a natural desire. A concept of the highest good must 
therefore incorporate not only perfection of virtue but also happiness in proportion to 
virtue. On the account in the Lectures, Kant projects fulfilment in a future world: “Moral 
perfection in this life will be followed by moral growth in the next”889 – a statement that 
sits ill with the impossibility of attaining moral perfection in the world of nature. 
 
The moral good expresses the moral law and man’s practical rationality. The supreme 
good fulfils the moral law, but it is an incomplete good. Kant notes ambiguity in the 
concept of 'highest' and distinguishes its interpretations as supreme and not subordinate 
to any other; and as complete and not part of a greater whole. Thus virtue is supreme, but 
happiness also required for completeness. All people wish to be happy: "…an 
unavoidable determining ground of its faculty of desire."890 It is a human need. The 
complete or highest good must incorporate happiness insofar as our inclinations for 
                                                          
886 The use of the term ‘Kingdom of God’ represents another example of Kant’s use of Christian 
metaphors and in this case the representation of God’s kingdom as a transformed world: “the kingdom of 
God is upon you” is the first proclamation in the earliest gospel text (Mark 1:14). Kant also refers to the 
highest good as being “to bring (my italics) the kingdom of God to us.” (CPractR 5:130). 
887  CPractR 5:128 
888  CPractR 5:129 
889 Immanuel Kant, ‘Lectures on the Philosophical doctrine of Religion’, in Allen W Wood, George di 
Giovanni (ed & transl), Religion and Rational Theology  (Cambridge: CUP, 1996)  28:1085 
890 CPract R 5:25 
255 
 
happiness do not transgress the moral law. It thus combines perfect virtue and 
proportionate happiness.  
Happiness is empirically based, not grounded on transcendental pure reason. Worthiness 
to happiness, Kant urges, is linked to our hope of happiness because the principles of pure 
reason link this hope to it: 
"I say...it is necessary to assume in accordance with reason in its theoretical use 
that everyone has cause to hope for happiness in the same measure as he had made 
himself worthy of it in his conduct."891  
The necessary connection between worthiness to be happy and virtue cannot be 
established by a reason that is grounded only in nature. Rather it must be hoped for if 
"grounded on a highest reason, which commands in accordance with moral laws, as at the 
same time the cause of nature."892 Practical freedom is cognised through experience, but 
transcendental freedom has a practical interest in two things: God's existence and a future 
life. Found in practical use, pure reason leads us to ideas that attain the highest ends of 
pure reason.893 Pure moral laws, which command absolutely, are proved by the moral 
judgement of every distinctly thinking human being. This ideal concept is that of the 
highest good.894,895  
 
9.3 Happiness and God in the highest good 
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In the intelligible or moral world of the first Critique as defined at A808/B836, (which 
although a “practical idea...really can and should have its influence on the sensible 
world”), Kant indicates that  
“a system of happiness proportionately combined with morality can also be 
thought as necessary, since freedom, partly moved and partly restricted by moral 
laws, would itself be the cause of the general happiness, and rational beings, 
under the guidance of such principles, would themselves be the authors of their 
own enduring welfare and at the same time that of others.”896  
It is as a consistent system, not because of the particular contents of ends, that we 
should promote the ends of rational others. A similar point is made in the Groundwork: 
“the ends of a subject who is an end in itself must as far as possible be also my ends.”897  
The moral world898 is a real world and has an objective reality. Although Kant refers to 
abstracting all ends, it is then theoretical reason that gives us the hope of happiness. 
Happiness belongs to the world of nature. What individuals desire in order to attain it 
varies. The two components that comprise the synthetic concept of the highest good 
differ in status. Virtue is an unconditioned good: the supreme good (bonum supremum) 
that is the fulfilment of the moral law. Kant’s argument in the canon is that if we do that 
which makes us worthy of happiness, then “a system of happiness proportionately 
combined with morality can also be thought of as necessary.”899 Why is this? The 
suggestion is that rational beings would be the authors of the welfare of others and, 
Kant adds, their “own enduring welfare.” The issue this raises in turn is that “self-
rewarding morality is only an idea” and to offer the agent happiness depends (that is, for 
the idea to be realised) upon “everyone” (Kant’s emphasis) doing what s/he should. 
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However the moral law applies to each individual act and we are all too imperfect. 
Akrasia, inclinations, temptation all lead to imperfect individual behaviour. In the 
sensible world we will not attain perfect virtue, however legitimate a goal. Happiness 
cannot therefore be rewarded grounded in nature:  
“the necessary connection of the hope of being happy...cannot be cognised by 
reason...but only if it is at the same time grounded on a highest reason, which 
commands in accordance with moral laws, as at the same time the cause of 
nature.”900 
Such an intelligence is morally perfect and is the ideal of all blessedness: God who 
makes the highest good (Kant’s emphasis) possible. Kant leads us to the moral world 
while acknowledging that we only know the world of appearances. We must regard 
ourselves as members of this world too, the moral, intelligible world, awaiting a “world 
that is a future for us.”901 This leads to a sort of interim conclusion or claim: “God and a 
future life are two presuppositions that are not to be separated from the obligation that 
pure reason imposes on us in accordance with principles of that very same reason.” It 
requires “an intelligible world...under a wise ruler and regent”902 to realise the highest 
good.  
 
The canon therefore offers a justification and exposition of the highest good that 
demands a religious dimension for its realisation: God and immortality. “The sensible 
world does not promise that sort of systematic unity of ends.”903 It can’t. The emphasis 
moreover appears to be on individual happiness, while acknowledging that 
proportionate happiness for all is possible (as it must be to be a moral demand) to the 
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degree that all obey the moral law i.e.  achieve virtue. The moral law is a command but 
also offers promises and threats.904 (Kant does not expand on “threats” nor explore 
punishment). And Kant then links the highest good to Leibniz’s realm of grace (regnum 
gratiae) – yet another synonym for the concept. Further, Kant asserts that without the 
moral use of reason, we would be unworthy of reason and its moral use “depends 
throughout on the highest good.” No highest good: no moral use of reason. The 
importance of the concept of the highest good is therefore strongly emphasised.  
Kant comments that knowledge of nature could “only produce rudimentary and vague 
concepts of the deity”,905 perhaps surprising the reader that theoretical reason could 
produce any concepts, however vague, at all. Our concept of the divine being is correct 
because it agrees with reason’s moral principles. Kant now launches into a 
consideration of his moral theology emphasising that God is derived from morality and 
not the reverse.906 At “this high point”, he emphasises that morality is, so to speak, 
antecedent to God. We follow practical reason, not because God commands it, but 
regard our actions are internally obligated and therefore will regard them as God’s 
commands. He considers belief, opinion and knowing, returning to God and immortality 
which he analyses as “doctrinal” beliefs. God is “a guide to the investigation of nature”, 
a useful presupposition (as a regulatory principle would be) and there is likewise “a 
sufficient ground for a doctrinal belief in the future life of the human soul.”907 He 
concedes the instability of doctrinal belief in contrast to moral belief. His theological 
commitment is strikingly strong at this point and supports the role of moral faith in 
explaining the possibility of moral action. Thus he writes: 
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“I will inexorably believe in the existence of God and a future life, and I am sure that 
nothing can make these beliefs unstable, since my moral principles themselves, which 
I cannot renounce without becoming contemptible in my own eyes, would thereby be 
subverted.”908 
 
9.4  Happiness, virtue and a radical critique of the highest good 
A radical critique of Kant’s conception of the highest good is that moral motivation 
must be without hope of reward and therefore does not require any belief that happiness 
will be distributed according to virtue. On this basis, the highest good is unnecessary: 
any happiness that we enjoy will be accidental and contingent, not related to our virtue. 
There would no longer be any role for God, who alone can distribute happiness in 
proportion to virtue; and without God no justification for immortality to improve our 
virtue towards perfection. Why bother if the outcome is the same? There would be no 
role of justification for the postulates. The highest good would become a mere 
agglomeration of virtue and happiness, an accidental unity. Without a necessary 
connection between its parts, a coherent and unitary object of will would not be 
available to practical reason. Our motivation for conduct, supported by pure practical 
reason, as discussed in ch6, comes from the moral law. We would be destined to 
struggle to achieve perfect conduct with no guarantee of the hope of happiness or, 
indeed, happiness itself: a tragic prospect for us.  
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I suggest that this radical critique misplaces the role of the highest good in Kant’s 
system. The highest good is not intended to function as the goal of moral motivation, 
but as the ultimate interest and end of reason. Both of these are, of course, good. 
The concept of the highest good is first introduced in the first Critique. Although it 
features elsewhere in Kant’s writings, the dominant sources are found in the second 
Critique and in the Religion. Its rationale begins from the status of the moral law, 
which, as law, we have no morally justified choice but to obey. As noted, we are 
commanded to strive for holiness:  
“It is our universal duty to elevate ourselves to this ideal of moral perfection, i.e. 
to the prototype of moral disposition in its entire purity and for this the very idea 
which is presented to us by reason for emulation, can give us force.”909  
“Holiness is prescribed to [rational beings] as a rule even in this life.”910 
“…in actions being done not only in conformity with duty but also from duty – 
Here the command is “be holy””911 
 
While holiness (perfect virtue) is the supreme good, it is not the only good. Human 
beings have needs other than the moral. These needs can be summarised in one word: 
happiness. This is defined by Kant as “a rational being's consciousness of the 
agreeableness of life uninterruptedly accompanying his whole existence;”912 “the 
necessarily determining ground of every rational finite being and therefore the 
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unavoidable determining ground of its faculty of desire;”913 “the satisfaction of all one’s  
inclinations together;”914,915 “the state of a rational being in the world in the whole of 
whose existence everything goes according to his wish and will;”916 “an end that 
everyone has by virtue of the impulses of his nature;”917 and “the satisfaction of all our 
inclinations (intensive, extensive, protensive).”918 These definitions are compatible with 
each other and their repetition in Kant’s writing evidences the importance of happiness 
as a concept and the significance of it as a good. 
Conceiving the highest good as a unity of moral worth and happiness, the moral law, 
says Kant, can be rephrased as “do that through which you will become worthy to be 
happy.”919 The hope of happiness, in accordance with reason in its theoretical use, is 
unified with the moral principles of practical reason to realise this.920 “The system of 
morality is inseparably combined with the system of happiness though only in the idea 
of pure reason.” 
As to the ends of action, Kant comments that  
“not every end is moral (e.g. the end of one’s own happiness is not); the moral 
end must be an unselfish one. And the need for an ultimate end that is set out by 
pure reason and that includes the totality of all ends within a single principle...is 
a need felt by an unselfish will that extends beyond the observation of formal 
laws in bringing its object (the highest good) into existence.”921 
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Kant is keen to emphasise that happiness is an inclination and since “considered in 
themselves natural inclinations are good,”922 happiness is something that we should 
seek provided that it is not the motive for our action. Happiness may be the end of our 
action, not its motive. It should therefore be a conditioned end: one conditioned by the 
moral law.  
One commentator writes: 
“Kant is often thought to hold that happiness is not valuable, and even to have 
ignored it wholly in his ethics. This is a serious mistake. It is true that for Kant 
moral worth is the supreme good, but by itself it is not the perfect or complete 
good...Happiness ... is a conditional good. It is good only if it results from the 
satisfaction of morally permissible desires. But it is intrinsically valuable 
nonetheless. It is valued by a rational agent for itself and not instrumentally.”923 
Thus the moral law does not prohibit action that ends in happiness or the hope of 
happiness; and happiness is a component part of the highest good which should be the 
ultimate aim or end of all our ends because that is a complete good. 
The absolute integration of a united reason’s faculties excludes the possibility of 
conflicting interests. “If we consulted only our interest,”924 we would pursue the ends of 
practical reason with its interest in unity. A conflict would negate reason itself.925 Early 
in the first Critique, Kant had written, “reason is such a perfect unity.”926 For 
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transcendental idealism,927 our rational powers must be related to themselves, not to 
something independent and other, as for the transcendental realist. Thus Kant says that  
“human reason is by nature architectonic, i.e. it considers all cognitions as 
belonging to a possible system and hence it permits only such principles as at 
least do not render an intended cognition incapable of standing together  with 
others in some system or other.”928  
From a teleological perspective, Kant assesses in the Antinomy929 which claims of the 
theses and antitheses in terms of the ends of reason we should want. He answers: “those 
that accord with reason’s practical ends and its interest in unity” (whereas the antitheses 
would frustrate the demand for unity of reason.) Moreover, our rational powers are to be 
considered teleologically and carry their ends within themselves. Only one ultimate end 
flows from unity for a united reason of theoretical and practical faculties: the highest 
good. In its regulatory function, reason must have a teleological function in that 
unification. Kant tells us that there are three propositions that can only involve practical 
reason. What makes practical judgements teleological is their reference to a final end. 
Ends involve purposes. Theoretical reason has little interest in the proper objects of 
metaphysics (freedom, God, immortality) but practical reason has. It is the questions 
that nature poses that bring the empirical sphere under moral interrogation. Reason’s 
unity must lie in a principle of practical reason. Thus, the highest good gives an end to 
reason that not only subsumes all other ends but also satisfies reason’s architectonic 
interest and gives systematic form. The main function of the highest good emerges as its 
role in the unity of reason and transcendental systematicity, rather than in direct moral 
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motivation. The ultimate end of reason lies in the moral vocation of humanity with 
science, mathematics and rational knowledge receiving their ultimate point from their 
contribution to the highest good.930 
I have noted that moral (virtue) and natural (happiness) goods differ in kind – a so-
called ‘heterogeneity of the good’ which leads to the idea of a synthetic relationship 
between the two features of the highest good. The heterogeneity of the highest good is a 
further demonstration of the unifying function of the end of reason. “Reason in its 
practical use is no better off than its theoretical use in seeking the unconditioned totality 
of the object of pure practical reason, under the name of the highest good.”931 Both 
practical and theoretical reason seek a common end. They are one reason.  
In stating above that the highest good (with its inclusion of happiness) is a legitimate 
end of reason Kant could be charged with ignoring the lack of need of the highest good 
to motivate reason, which appears or seems heteronomous: seeking what Silber terms a 
‘heterogeneity of the good’.932  We need only the moral incentive and good of virtue, 
not the natural incentive and good of happiness. The highest good would become 
superfluous and, if so, the justification of the postulates could not be maintained. There 
would be significant implications therefore for Kant’s moral theory. We therefore have 
to ask whether the highest good has any other role beyond that of justifying the 
postulates to enable moral conduct and provide maxims of practical reason that realise 
the highest good. 
I have already noted that human reason demands an unconditioned totality of the object 
of pure practical reason as its final end. The conditioned will always seek a condition 
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until it reaches the unconditioned, beyond which nothing further is possible, its final 
end. Reason seeks the unconditioned as it unifies its rules under the idea of a totality as 
part of its systematicity and hence unity. The highest good is the expression of that 
unity from pure practical reason. We can reject the critique that the highest good offers 
nothing beyond the moral law, while the postulates remain as necessary for the 
proportionality of the highest good. Given the primacy of practical reason, all 
manifestations of the unity of reason require the highest good. It follows therefore that 
the highest good is not only directly related to moral motivation but is related to 
transcendental systematicity. It follows that it is not necessarily a problem that there is a 
discordance between happiness and the highest good as the highest good is not 
specifically concerned with moral motivation. While it may be true that there does not 
exist an explicit command to realise the highest good, independent of the Categorical 
Imperative, (but see my comments at 9.6), we should also consider prudence. We have 
reasons for realising the highest good that are not derived from the moral law but also 
from components of the highest good. In that respect there is a heterogeneity of reasons 
to bring about its components. The pursuit of the highest good is not solely and 
exclusively a matter of duty.933 Happiness, as discussed above is also a (conditioned) 
good. It is also Silber’s claim that Kant offers the addition of content to the abstract 
form of the Categorical Imperative, giving direction to moral volition.934 The two 
legislations of reason are united under one idea in a practical-dogmatic metaphysics. 
The heterogeneity of the good relates to the idea of the highest good as the unifying end 
of reason. In summary, the view of the radical critic can be rejected. 
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9.5 Kant’s theology in the highest good 
Kant’s involvement with the existence and nature of God began in the 1750s, responding 
to the metaphysics of Leibniz and Wolff rather than morality. Other figures, such as 
Hamann, Herder and Hume may also have stimulated Kant to explore links between 
morality, religion and the highest good. Metaphysically, Kant dismissed the rationalists’ 
view of God as a fundamental explanatory principle, the ultimate ground of our existence, 
and replaced it with God as a regulative principle termed “moral faith,” in accounts of the 
spatio-temporal order.  
Kant denies in the canon that morality itself acts as an incentive.935 The motivational 
impotence of reason leads Kant to discuss the importance of happiness.  
Our route to happiness is impossible to describe and may change with time. Happiness 
"could function as the efficient cause of virtue without it having to be the case that moral 
behaviour is performed only for ultimately prudential motives."936 The “martyr may 
choose to go to the stake and perhaps find happiness in doing so, but unless he is also a 
masochist he will not find pleasure in the flames”937. Fine moral ideas may bring forth 
admiration, but be “empty figments of the brain”.938 We need the hope for happiness to 
motivate and, maybe also, fear of punishment. “The system of morality is therefore 
inseparably combined with the system of happiness.”939  By associating happiness with 
morality, Kant can expand on the concept of the highest good which is constituted alone 
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by happiness “in exact proportion with the morality of rational beings…in an intelligible 
world”.940  
In ch6 I referred to Kant’s rejection of reward for good conduct suggesting a lingering 
idea from the Lutheranism of his early years: justification by faith, not works. Beck 
comments on the passage at A812/B840 that we need God and the hope of a future world 
to be moral and then denies that we need the prospect of future happiness to make us 
moral:  
“We look in vain in the first Critique for an analysis of the desire to be worthy of 
happiness, which is a truly moral and not eudaemonistic desire. Without 
(this)....the view...seems to be an incompatible mixture.”941  
Wood942 thinks that Kant leaves the question open as to whether man can follow a life of 
moral striving after perfection without divine aid and agrees that Kant can accommodate 
an Augustinian (or even Calvinist) account of man’s depravity in the absence of divine 
aid. This rests on the belief that we cannot know whether or when God acts in our lives: 
“for ratiocination it is an unfathomable mystery.”943 We cannot know how grace affects 
our wills. Claims about divine aid go beyond the bounds of our experience. “Inasmuch as 
reason can see, no one can stand in for another by virtue of the superabundance of his 
own good conduct” but God, having “called him into being…to be a member of the 
kingdom of heaven must also have a means of compensating from the fullness of his own 
holiness for the human being’s inadequacy.”944 Grace imputes righteousness to him: a 
characteristic protestant (Lutheran) position. 
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The suggestion that happiness is the reward of virtue opens Kant up to the charge of 
Pelagianism: that salvation qua happiness is earned by merit,945  counter to the view that 
Luther (an Augustinian professor of theology) accepted.946 In turn, this reflected the 
earlier controversy between Pelagius and Augustine, the latter basing his view on Pauline 
teaching: “For it is by grace you are saved by faith: it is not your own doing. It is God’s 
gift, not a reward for work done.”947 This was a key scriptural passage in Luther’s 
(protestant) doctrine of salvation by faith and not by works. Kant’s doctrine of radical 
evil set out in his Religion already allies himself with Augustine’s view on original sin. 
We are ‘fallen’ creatures.  Orientation rather than understanding may be central to 
Augustine’s ethics and perhaps too Kant was influenced by this tradition.948 Although 
Kant’s concept of grace and divine aid may appear to be a turn to Pelagianism, the receipt 
of good from God is stated as unmerited: “...the rewards God bestows on us proceed not 
from his justice but from his benevolence.”949 We do not earn them. As the happiness that 
God wills for all of his children is freely given, it comes from grace. The highest good 
therefore relates to protestant Christianity. Kant’s reinterpretation of Christian doctrines 
is complicated and his emphases vary in different sections of his Religion: sanctifying 
grace in the first, justifying or forensic grace in the second).950 However it is striking that 
Kant rejects the worldly conceptions of the highest good espoused by Stoicism and 
Epicureanism. Rather he reaffirms the traditional Christian view of Augustine as the most 
adequate account of this ideal. “The doctrine of Christianity…gives a concept of the 
                                                          
945  Jaqueline Marina, ‘Kant on grace: a reply to his critics’, Religious Studies 33 no.4 (1997) 379-400 
946  Desiderius Erasmus, Martin Luther, EF Winter (transl), Discourse on Free Will (1525). (London: 
Continuum, 2005). 
947  New Testament. Paul’s Letter to the Ephesians 2: 8-9 
948 Seiriol Morgan, ‘The inner life of the ‘Dear Self’, in Nafsika Athanassoulis, Samantha Vice (eds), The 
Moral Life. Essays in honour of John Cottingham, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p.115. 
949 Immanuel Kant, ‘Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion’ 28:1085 
950 Leslie Stevenson, ‘Kant on grace’, in Gordon E Michalson (ed), Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries 
of Mere Reason. A critical guide. (Cambridge: CUP, 2014), p.122. 
269 
 
highest good (the kingdom of God) that alone satisfies the strictest demands of practical 
reason.”951  
We live in a world where virtue does not seem to be rewarded: the evil prosper, the good 
suffer. Instinctively this offends us. Why is life given to those who find it so bitter?952 We 
think there should be a connection between happiness and virtue. Kant reflects this view 
in asserting the exact proportionality between virtue and happiness. In the third Critique 
he writes: 
“Once people begin to reflect on right and wrong…they inevitably had to arrive 
at this judgement: that in the end it must make a difference whether a person has 
acted honestly or deceitfully, fairly or violently, even if to the end of his life he 
has received no good fortune for his virtues…at least none that we could see. It is 
as if they heard an inner voice that said: This is not how it should be.”953 
Answering why this must be, reflects a protest of distributive justice. Happiness should 
reflect merit. Beiser contrasts this with the lack of consideration of the distribution of 
happiness in the highest good as a further weakness in the Epicurean and Stoic 
conceptions.954 Kant thinks the unity of the ancients was specious for omitting in the one 
case (Stoic) happiness in pursuit of virtue, which can’t deliver it, and in the other case 
(Epicurean) happiness which may result from lack of virtue.955 He criticizes the Stoics 
who had rightly chosen the right supreme practical principle as virtue, but omitted 
happiness and more significantly, "strained the moral capacity of the human being"956 by 
suggesting its attainability in this life. 
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Beiser claims wide misunderstanding of a further point of Kant’s theology. The City of 
God957 (Augustine’s major treatise) is not located in some supernatural realm beyond the 
earth: it is in this world as it is completely transformed by Christ’s second coming. The 
earth will not remain natural but be completely transformed, beyond our imagining.958 
This view, asserts Beiser,959 was one Kant never challenged and many of the alleged 
changes in his position result from a modern view of God’s kingdom and the world of 
nature as two exclusive realms. Appreciating this insight makes much debate about the 
ontological status of the highest good redundant: that is, whether it was originally 
transcendent and other-worldly in the earlier Kant, then becoming phenomenal and this-
worldly. Yet even in Augustine’s account the two cities are both separate and 
transcendent. I think it is possible to continue without agreement on Beiser’s religious 
interpretation and will postpone further discussion of Kant’s theology. 
 
9.6  The moral law, the highest good & holiness 
The pure will’s (practical reason’s) object may be the highest good, but cannot be its 
determining ground. “The moral law alone must be viewed as the ground for making the 
highest good and its realization or promotion the object.”960 Our autonomy means that the 
moral law, as included in the concept of the highest good, cannot then be its object. The 
moral law determines our will. Virtue may equal worthiness to be happy, but it is not 
happiness itself. A perfect volition of a rational being wanting and worthy of happiness 
could not refuse it. This emphasises the individual approach to the highest good rather 
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than the communal one. Perhaps, suggests one commentator,961 the communal conception 
is the proper object of morality, “which must be shown to be believable through the 
postulates of pure practical reason in order to prevent the commitment to morality 
becoming undermined.” Yet since an individual emphasis follows shortly after, the point 
is moot here. "Power, riches, honour, even health and that complete satisfaction with one's 
condition called happiness, produce boldness and thereby often arrogance as well unless 
a good will is present."962 Incentives of virtue and self-love in a maxim makes the latter 
heteronomous.963 Heteronomous maxims may clash with each other and Kant therefore 
comments: “thus the question, how is the highest good possible? still remains an unsolved 
problem.”964  
Kant believes that the moral law requires the highest good because it is a necessary 
condition of the moral law. If the morally worthy share the same fate as the morally 
unworthy, the "principle which enjoins moral worthiness cannot be understood to be 
connected to the moral agent's condition of existence."965 The notion of a moral world 
cannot be construed as a replacement world for the present one: rather it is an ideal 
towards which we strive, an object owing its existence to the needs of reason.  That ideal 
will be realised in the City of God of Leibniz and Augustine; an unseen world that is 
already with us, Kant's noumenal kingdom of ends. Beck966, Auxter967 and Murphy968 
assert that the highest good commands no more than the moral law. It finds no place in 
the Groundwork. But it is equally true that Kant believes that it is inseparably bound up 
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with the moral law. Moreover, the third formula of the Categorical Imperative states, “so 
act as if you were always through your maxims a law-making member in a universal 
kingdom/realm of ends.”969 The realm of ends is identical with the idea of a moral world 
in the first Critique and the latter is the highest good. So the command to seek the highest 
good is found in the Categorical Imperative and therefore as an expression of the moral 
law. In that respect, the highest good cannot contain a concept of happiness. So although 
derived from the moral law, the highest good does contain more than the concept of 
morality.970    
Kant resorts to the Hebrew wisdom tradition in writing how "one wide grave will engulf 
us all"971 which seems to make morality a delusion; if not, then, as Friedman suggests, 
"there is a relationship between one's righteousness or moral worthiness and one's fate in 
the world." Or as Kant expresses it, "it must make a difference."972 This sentiment sits 
squarely with his conclusion in the second Critique: for  
"the whole and complete good as the object of the faculty of desire of rational 
finite beings....happiness is also required, and that not merely in the partial eyes 
of a person who makes himself an end but even in the judgement of an impartial 
reason which regards a person in the world generally as an end in itself."973 
In the second Critique, the pursuit of holiness is the end of the moral law; and 
the aim of all rational beings, though not achieved in this world by any, is located in a 
future life: “endless progress is only possible on the supposition of the same… rational 
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being continuing endlessly (which is called the immortality of the soul).”974 Kant 
suggests a distinction between a law of holiness and a law of duty:  
“The moral law is...for the will of a perfect being a law of holiness, but for the 
will of a finite rational being a law of duty, of moral necessitation and of the 
determination of his actions through respect for this law and reverence for his 
duty.”975  
Noting en passant the emphasis on the individual rational being, if morally perfect we 
would possess holiness: 
“an accord of will with the pure moral law ...an accord never to be disturbed   (in 
which case the law would finally cease to be a command for us, since we could 
never be tempted to be unfaithful to it). The moral law is, in other words, for the 
will of a perfect being a law of holiness, but for the will of every finite rational 
being a law of duty.”976 
In principle, holiness is not beyond reach in another world. The emphasis on the 
individual here cannot be dismissed on the grounds that “perhaps this lapse into 
individualism is just a manner of speaking,”977 or “this way of talking is just a matter of 
habit here.” 
The difficulty in making sense of all this lies in our conceptions of what we mean by 
“future” life or “immortality” when we acknowledge that time itself is an intuition we 
have to make sense of the phenomenal world. Requiring, by implication, time to 
improve our virtue and make us holy is beyond our imagining in a postulated future 
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world that is outside time or, we might want to say, in God’s time. Or ‘future’ may 
relate to some quality beyond our comprehension, perhaps that we live in now as well 
as the sensible world, just as we are citizens of the noumenal and phenomenal worlds.  
 
 
9.7  Proportionality 
In contrast to Aristotle, happiness for Kant is subjective, individual, empirically 
determined, concerned with desire satisfaction , has no relation to ‘higher’ pleasure, 
incorporates no moral component (except insofar as contentment depends on the 
consciousness of acting well), and is not the highest human good.978 
When Kant first introduces the highest good, the idea of proportionality between 
morality and happiness is also introduced. Happiness offers us a system "insofar as it is 
distributed precisely in accordance with morality." He goes on to state that this is only 
possible in "the intelligible world, under a wise author."979 And later he says that 
"happiness in exact proportion with the morality of rational beings...alone constitutes 
the highest good of ...an intelligible world."980 Proportionality is emphasised in the 
second Critique again linking it to the deity: "the greatest happiness is represented as 
connected in the most exact proportion with the greatest degree of moral perfection"981; 
and "happiness in exact conformity with moral worth...on the presupposition of a moral 
author of the world". Similarly in the Religion: "happiness proportioned to obedience to 
duty - that is to say, the idea of a highest good in the world for whose possibility we 
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must postulate a higher, moral most holy and omnipotent Being which alone can unite 
the two elements of this highest good."982 Only in the third Critique is the "combination 
of universal happiness with the most lawful morality"983 discussed without specifying 
proportionality and no conclusion can be drawn that proportionality is being excluded; 
the religious link remains appropriate in this context. 
 If proportionality can be shown to be unnecessary, the concept of the highest 
good is weakened, indeed becomes no more than adherence to the moral law. Kant 
emphasises "most exact proportion" or "distributed precisely" or "in exact conformity": 
what is implied is more than a general seal of approval for good deeds. Exactitude is an 
obvious objection to secular interpretations of the highest good: while we do judge 
intentions (for example, discriminating between manslaughter and murder) nobody 
would claim exactitude. Exactitude demonstrates justice as fairness. It would not be fair 
if others gained a greater happiness for a lesser moral worthiness. Attempts at virtue 
would go largely unrewarded or be excessively recognised. Kant offers no theory of 
moral desert: "to look upon all punishments and rewards as mere machinery in the 
hands of a higher power, serving only to put rational being into activity toward their 
final purpose (happiness) is so patently a mechanism which does away with the freedom 
of their will that it need not detain us here."984 Yet happiness is a legitimate incentive if 
combined with virtue. 
 
 If Kant's argument that immortality is necessary for progress to complete virtue 
is accepted but his view for the existence of God as being necessary for the 
proportionate distribution of happiness is modified, the combination of happiness and 
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virtue can still be part of the highest good. If God is necessary for complete happiness - 
bliss - and that all will receive this in some form of continued existence, this cannot 
disincentivise the more virtuous or discourage good conduct: because conduct is not 
virtuous that is incentivised by reward. It is only good according to its motivation by 
duty. And the divine will, being the divine will, can do as it pleases. We might instance 
the Matthaean parable of the labourers in the vineyard985. In the parable, the employer, 
out of sheer generosity and compassion for the unemployed, pays as large a wage to 
those who have worked for one hour as to those who have worked all day. "It is," 
comments a leading Biblical scholar986, "a striking picture of the divine generosity 
which gives without regard to the measure of strict justice." Generosity is like that: we 
receive more than we deserve and nobody loses out. It is another expression of grace.987 
Acts of generosity are supererogatory: which is to say that they are permissible, good to 
do, with positive value and altruistic intent. It can be viewed as a Kantian duty of 
beneficence: "to be beneficent (is) to promote...the happiness of others in need, without 
hoping for something in return."988  (I will not discuss supererogation in Kant's moral 
philosophy here). The virtue of generosity may be viewed as a mean between meanness 
and profligacy. Profligacy is a vice: but we recognise it as a vice because it represents 
waste. In a world where every resource of nature is limited and finite, profligacy 
represents a shortage for someone else at some time, present or future, equally or more 
deserving. But divine profligacy would come from an unlimited source. If therefore 
generosity is deemed profligate, it would come without such an objection. The highest 
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good follows from the moral law, but in combining virtue with happiness there is no 
reason why the degree of happiness should not be full, provided all receive their due. 
 
9.8 A secular interpretation 
If the highest good is the interest of practical reason and if it leads us to the concept of a 
supreme intelligence or a moral ruler of all things, it is a reminder that the highest good 
is essential to support doctrines of immortality and God's existence. Several passages 
quoted above suggest this theological link is crucial. Firstly, ensuring proportionate 
happiness requires God, for only God know whether we are virtuous, because only God 
knows our wills.989 Secondly, for moral perfection a further world,990 which offers 
immortality, is necessary to develop a holy will. This also requires God. So if the 
highest good is our final end, there must be a God to realise it. A defence of the highest 
good is also an argument for immortality and God's existence from practical reason.991  
 
Morality is the highest expression of practical reason.992 The remote aim of the three 
propositions993 he instances in the canon “have in turn their more remote aim, namely, 
what is to be done if the will is free.”994 In the third Critique, he writes, “God, freedom 
and immortality of the soul are those problems at the solution of which all of the 
apparatus of metaphysics aims as its final and sole end.”995 And earlier in the same 
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Critique: “in the end all the effort of our faculties is directed to what is practical and 
must be united in it as their goal”996 - the highest good.  
The usual interpretation outlined above has been challenged by Reath.997 He proposes a 
concept of the highest good through human agency, combining virtue and happiness 
without proportionality. He considers a secular or political view as the best expression 
of Kant's view, as well as the best view simpliciter. 
 
 All views of the highest good "converge in the idea of a morally perfect world, 
in which events take place according to moral laws, and moral conduct is successful in 
achieving its ends."998 In the Analytic of the second Critique, there is a focus on the 
good as an object of practical reason through freedom: that is, any end to which an 
action could be directed or willed.999 An object of pure practical reason would result 
from the moral use of freedom. An effect possible through freedom must be one that we 
can imagine as the result of human action even if we are physically incapable of doing 
it. So Kant's definition of the good "should indicate that it should apply to possible 
human ends,"1000 that is, ends that could be realised by rational creatures under ideal 
conditions. Since rational beings make the moral law and (mainly) determine happiness, 
individually or collectively, the highest good is a concept of human agency.  A secular 
highest good is therefore a state of affairs that could be achievable in this world without 
agency or mechanisms beyond those of nature. 
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In the first Critique, the highest good is referred to as the moral world1001: a "world as it 
would be if it were in conformity with all moral laws", to which Kant adds, "as it can be 
in accordance with freedom of rational beings and should be in accordance with the 
necessary laws of morality." The end of the highest good is thus constructed from the 
moral law, not a synthesis between moral ends and natural ends, suggests Reath: in 
contradiction to Kant for whom the highest good “cannot be cognised analytically... it 
must be a synthesis of concepts.”1002   
Could one imagine social structures arranged to offer happiness proportionate to virtue? 
Surely not: universal participation can only be envisaged in a theological conception. In 
a secular interpretation, proportionality of virtue and happiness through human agency 
in history, would represent a social ideal in which "individuals in the present sought to 
promote ...the final end of moral conduct."1003 Some notion of the highest good follows 
simply from the fact that moral conduct is directed at ends: but an exact proportionality? 
There must be a necessary connection between the components whereas in the secular 
interpretation that connection could only be accidental and contingent.  
The moral law combines two kinds of ends into a single scheme by subordinating the 
natural (happiness) to the moral (virtue). But this hardly refutes the charge that the role 
of the highest good represents an escape from heterogeneity.  Moreover, Reath’s claim 
that we could know what the secular form of the doctrine could be like by referring only 
to human actions is contradicted by Kant’s belief that we couldn’t conceive of the 
highest good as a real possibility without adopting a belief in a moral author of the 
world. As Guyer points out,1004 “Kant always supposes that we will need to postulate 
the existence of God as the ground of the conjunction of virtue and happiness...Either a 
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heavenly or an earthly conception of the highest good remains religious as long as it 
involves the postulation of the existence of God.”  
Human motivation results from either moral or natural (happiness) factors. Happiness  
does not require renunciation by reason  
“but only that as soon as duty is in question one should usually take no 
account (Kant’s italics) of [claims to happiness]. It can even be a duty to 
attend to one's happiness, partly because happiness contains means for 
the fulfilment of one's duty and partly because lack of it (e.g. poverty) 
contains temptations to transgress one's duty." 1005  
That is, happiness may be an indirect way of fulfilling duty or a co-factor with morality, 
never a direct principle of a duty. It follows that it cannot be automatically objected that 
happiness as an incentive leads to heteronomy of choice.  If conduct is motivated solely 
by duty, then s/he will develop a truly virtuous disposition. It is not so much a matter of 
reward and punishment but receiving one's due from an objective moral standard. Kant 
gives no explicit arguments for the proportionality being asserted, merely implying 
moral desert. If there is no justification for proportionality, then the secular version 
becomes a more attractive interpretation as such a moral world would be a system of 
self-rewarding morality:  
"In the moral world...such a system of happiness proportionately combined with 
morality can also be thought as necessary since freedom, partly moved and 
partly restricted by moral laws, would itself be the cause of the general 
happiness, and rational beings, under the guidance of such principles, would 
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themselves be the authors of their own enduring welfare and at the same time 
that of others."1006   
That is: the happiness of all would result from the adherence of all to the moral law. A 
proper functioning social system, supporting and maintaining its members' conduct 
would ensure the happiness of all. Individuals would not aim at a connection between 
virtue and happiness; rather, "they would establish social conditions that support moral 
conduct and the realisation of various moral ends; once these condition existed, the 
happiness of all would be the natural result."1007 This seems an excessively optimistic 
empirical prediction: a social goal to be achieved in history. As Bader points out, 
neither the virtue nor the happiness of other people is an object of any finite creature’s 
practical reason. It is not for us to bring about the highest good in other people and 
hence not to bring about the highest good in the world, except, of course, insofar as the 
pursuit of our own highest good contributes to that of the world.  
“Bringing about the highest good of the world... pertains to God insofar as it is 
up to God to provide the world with such a causal structure that proportionate 
happiness results from virtue, given that God is benevolent and as such 
concerned with creating the best possible world.”1008  
Yet only, Reath thinks, in a theological system could all (Reath's italics) enjoy the 
highest good, which "might seem unfair." But without proportionality, a theological 
interpretation would ignore a just divinity and proportionality is the weakness in the 
secular version. Although Reath considers Kant's theological version to be adapted from 
Leibniz's notion of the City of God1009, he suggests that Kant's Ethical 
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Commonwealth1010 in his Religion is a secular conception because it is a human 
community with a particular institutional structure. So might some consider the many 
attempts at realising a kingdom of God on earth; and view them squarely as religiously 
inspired: say, for example, the "kingdom of Zion" of Münster, whose fanatic lunacies 
were suppressed in 1535?1011 Is a social ideal possible, with conduct to achieve certain 
moral ends, by restructuring the existing social environment?1012 
   The religious interpretation claims to answer the question of how we can 
imagine the concept of the highest good in this world at all: if we can't imagine it here, 
then we must locate it there i.e. in another world.1013   
Perfection of goodness requires an endless progress. For this, immortality of the soul is 
required, a continued existence of the personality of the same rational being. This 
postulate of pure practical reason is “a theoretical proposition....attached inseparably to 
an a priori unconditionally valid practical law.”1014 Only God can offer immortality. An 
argument for immortality implies a belief in the existence of God1015 and not the other 
way round: that is, an argument for immortality to support the concept of the highest 
good leads to God, not that God leads to immortality.  
The secular interpretation claims a clearer view because it can be describable entirely in 
naturalistic terms - "as a state of affairs to be achieved in this world, through human 
activity."1016 But it is not clear what advantage this would bring, and it could not 
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accommodate Kant’s concept of grace. If ultimate happiness is to be located in another 
world, what concerns us is the conviction or not that this is the case: there is no 
additional benefit in knowing the architecture or lifestyle of heaven.  
 The object of practical reason is that we should become fully virtuous, but 
plainly this is not possible on a secular basis. "(Man) is evil by nature...we may 
presuppose evil to be subjectively necessary to every man, even the best."1017 The 
connection between happiness and virtue is synthetic1018 but happiness could result from 
virtue if there is another world.1019 Expressed simply, God is needed for proportionality, 
immortality (which only God can give) for complete virtue. God however cannot make 
us virtuous, only realise the restricted complete good by ensuring proportionality. The 
realisation of the supreme good (as opposed to the highest or complete good) depends 
on us and how we use our freedom. 
 As an a priori rational concept, the relationship between the two components of 
the highest good must be a necessary connection. An accidental or contingent 
relationship as occurring in Reath’s account is therefore inadequate. Happiness has to 
result from virtue, not merely correspond to it. Realising the components of the highest 
good is not the same as realising the highest good.1020  
 Reath suggests that "accepting a theological conception seems to remove the need 
to address the problem of non-ideal circumstances": what's wrong in this world will be 
put right in another, so why bother? On this reading, belief in God is not merely useless, 
it makes life in this world worse than it need be, ignoring the desirability of assisting 
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moral ends through social institutions. But no evidence is offered that people do actually 
behave in that way: motivation by the moral law would remain the same. 
 
 
 
 
9.9 Realms and hopes 
As the representation of the unconditional and ultimate end of everything, Kant uses a 
variety of terms.1021 These can be listed: kingdom or realm1022 of ends, intelligible or 
moral world, ethical community, ethical commonwealth, ethico-civil society. The first of 
these appears in the Groundwork as a formulation of the Categorical Imperative.1023 Kant 
describes this kingdom or realm as a “systematic union of rational beings through 
common laws.” Since laws determine ends, by abstracting personal differences of rational 
beings and their private ends, we can arrive at a whole of all ends in systematic connection 
i.e. a realm of ends. In such a realm, all will treat others as ends in themselves and all 
rational beings will be members (as a sovereign in being a lawgiver and as a subject under 
those laws). That exposition resembles the highest good: interpreted as a community of 
moral agents conforming to the purest morality and with (resulting) universal happiness, 
defined as “universal happiness combined with and in conformity with the purest morality 
throughout the world”.1024 Words like ‘realm’, ‘community’, ‘commonwealth’, ‘world’ 
and ‘society’ all imply a collective whereas the highest good could relate to an individual 
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or a group. In a group, an implied mutually supportive system is present where each 
supports all. As one commentator says, “rational beings constitute a realm to the extent 
that their ends form a system….furthering…the ends…in a single teleological 
system.”1025 Insofar as an individual’s duty is to promote the happiness1026 of others where 
compatible with morality (and his/her own virtue), that individual has an obligation to a 
collective of other human beings. Even if the highest good is best interpreted as for an 
individual, there remains a collective benefit in the realm of ends or the moral world. 
Participating in the realm of ends means treating everyone as an end in themselves and 
never merely as a means – as in the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative. 
We would achieve the realm of ends if we all conformed to the various formulations of 
the Categorical Imperative: it would be our goal or object or ideal in choosing our 
practical maxims. 
Practical reason can command beliefs only if they are necessary for action, based on 
moral principles.1027 To have primacy, practical reason must be able to demand certain 
beliefs that have no warrant in theoretical reason: it must be able to go beyond it. The 
demands of the highest good are clearly beyond those of theoretical reason and its 
claims of evidence. Theoretical reason cannot reject any belief that is beyond evidence, 
for or against. Justification of the highest good therefore implies practical reason’s 
primacy.  
Our desire for happiness represents our hope; and there is an incentive in hope that differs 
from the assurance of the guaranteed rewards. This is what the highest good offers: the 
hope of realisation in our belief, the confidence - as the only known rational creatures in 
the universe - that our lives can be endowed by reason with purpose and meaning. 
                                                          
1025 Allen W Wood, ‘Kant’s Ethical Thought’ p.166. 
1026 Kant offers several compatible definitions of happiness: see ch9.4 
1027 Frederick C Beiser, ‘Moral Faith and the Highest Good’, in Paul Guyer (ed,) Cambridge Companion 
to Kant and Modern Philosophy. (Cambridge: CUP, 2006), pp.588-529. 
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“Human reason defines for man a final end, a single highest purpose for his existence, an 
ideal inseparably related to his finite rationality itself.”1028 In that highest purpose, Kant’s 
philosophy echoes hope and the “unthinkability of despair”.1029 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1028 Allen Wood. Kant’s Moral Religion p.250 
1029 Simon Jarvis. Adorno: a Critical Introduction New York: Routledge (1998), p214  
